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iAbstract
The subject of this thesis is the establishment and 
consolidation of the power of Amir ’Abd al-Rahman in 
Afghanistan between 1880 and 189*5.
’Abd al-Rahman reappeared in Afghanistan from exile 
in Russian Turkistan at a critical time when the British 
were considering how to establish a government satisfactory 
to their interest, in Kabul. ’Abd al-Rahman showed skill 
in obtaining both the support of anti-British groups (who 
were committed to the former ruling family) and the 
British themselves. At first, he obtained only the reduced 
state of Kabul, the British being determined to retain 
control of the province of Kandahar. Later, following the 
defeat of their army in Kandahar, the British reversed 
their former policy and evacuated Kandahar which passed to 
fAbd al-Rahman* Subsequently, ’Abd al-Rahman succeeded in 
expelling Mohammad Ayub (a brother of the former Amir) 
from Herat and thus establishing his rule over the whole 
of Afghanistan, (chapters 2 and 3)*
’Abd al-Rahman then extended and consolidated his rule 
over the provinces at the expense of the authority of the 
tribal elders and dynastic governors. This led to conflict 
between him and the elders, who aroused the tribes against 
him. The several disturbances which ensued are described. 
They were all ultimately suppressed (chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
Further, the Amir brought under control the territories of 
the Hazarajat and Kafiristan (chapters 7 and 8). At the 
same time, the Government of India contained the extension
11
of the Amir’s authority into the territories "beyond the 
frontiers which the Government of India was largely 
instrumental in establishing for Afghanistan during the 
reign of 'Abd al-Rahman.
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VA note on transliteration
Because of typing difficulties, and considering the 
* fact that this was a thesis in history and not in
language, I abandoned my original system of transliteration 
which employed a different form for each letter. In the 
system now used. £  has been recorded by the sign of (’ ) . 
The transliteration of Persian and Pashto words follow 
conventional system but letters peculiar to Pashto are 
transliterated as follows
3
*
d
t ch
n
- sh
r
Pashto names in the singular have been spelt as they 
are pronounced in Pashto but anglicised in the plural.
Thus we have Afriday, G-hilzay and Safay, not Afridi, 
G-hilzai and Safi, as they are generally written. Persian, 
Pashto and ’Arabic words have normally been underlined, 
but such words as amir, khan, sardar and mulla have been 
considered to be anglicised as they are regarded as such 
in the Oxford English Dictionary.
vi
Maps
Page
The Eastern Province . . . ...» ........ . 148
The Grhilzay Land ■ . • . . . .. * . . . 179
Afghan Turkistan . , • . . * *, 0 « 204
The Hazara^ a.t « « « •«« • » « •«« <> <> o 23p
Kafiristan ... • , „ , . „ ......... 210
Chapter 1
Introduction 1865-1880
Afghanistan (the land of the Afghans), “before 1880,
was known to outsiders as Afghanistan hut its own inhabi-
tants distinguished it by two appelations - Khurasan
(Zabulistan) and Kabul (Kabulistan), the former including
the territories to the north-west of the massive range of
the Hindu Kush up to Persia, and the latter including the
territories to the south of the Hindu Kush up to the Indus 
1river. Its boundaries were not defined. They were 
demographic rather than territorial. Hence their fluctu­
ations in accordance with the extent of the power of the 
rulers of the central government in Kabul over the outlying 
districts. In 1871, the outlying districts in the south 
and east (nominally subject to the central government) 
were the Chitral, the land of the Yusufzays, of the 
Afridays, of the Waziris, and of the Kakars. Baluchistan 
bordered it in the extreme south. To the west, it was 
bounded by Persia. The territory of Sistan was included 
in Afghanistan, but this claim was disputed by Persia.
To the north-west, Afghanistan was bounded by the Turcoman 
country. The Oxus (from the Haji Salih to the Pamirs) 
formed its northern boundary with Bokhara. The country 
was divided into the provinces of Kabul, Kandahar,
Jalalabad and Balkh (Afghan-furkistan).
1 Bellew, II. quoted by MacGregor, C. M . , Central Asia, 
pt 2. A contribution towards the better knowledge of 
the tonography, ethnology, resources and history of 
Afghanistan. Calcutta, 1871, 7- According to MacGregor, 
the Afghans called their country Wilayat. Ibid. Since 
wilayat means a province, the wilayat of MacG-regor is 
probably the wilayat of Kabul.
2 MacGregor, 5*
2This extensive area was inhabited by various ethnic 
groups whose total number was estimated to lie between 
four and a half and six millions. The Pashtuns (also 
called the Afghans), comprising the tribes of Durranis, 
G-hilzays, Yusufzays, Khugianays, Kakars, Shinwarays, 
Mohmands, Waziris, Mangals, Orakzays and others, were 
equal in number to the rest of the population who were 
the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Qizilbashes, Char Aimaq,
Kafirs and others. The inhabitants were divided among 
themselves linguistically and ethnically. The Pashtuns 
spoke the Pashto language, while the rest, except for 
the Uzbeks who spoke the Turki language and the Kafirs, 
who spoke different languages, spoke Persian. The common 
bond among the majority of the population was the religion 
of Islam but this was weakened by the existence of the two 
sects of Sunnism and Shi’ism. Kafirs, Hindus, Jews and 
Sikhs were the non-Muslim minorities.
A small portion of the population lived in towns, 
among them about 140,700 in Kabul (1876), 31,000 in 
Kandahar (1880), 17,000 in Herat (1885) and 3,000 families 
in Mazar (1906). The urban population was heavily dependent 
for its provisions on the neighbouring countryside, whereas 
the rural population was self-sufficient. Military control 
of the towns did not necessarily imply control over the 
country. The Pashtuns, as the ruling nation, considered
3 IG-IA (1908), 23 - 4,500,000
MacG-regor (1871), 32 - 4,901,000
MRA (1906), 111 - 6,100,000
Amir *Abd al-Rahman’s firman,
Mar 1883, PSLI, 35, 930 - 13,000,000
The last figures are no doubt too high.
3the profession of artisan degrading.^ But like the Tajiks
they were also engaged in trade. The artisans who were
5engaged in various professions were mainly the ICahulis 
and Tajiks.
Village life was very common as all the tribes in 
general and the Tajiks and the Kafirs in particular lived 
in the villages. Of all the tribes, the Tajiks alone were 
non-tribal agriculturists. Some parts of other tribes in 
general, and the Char Aimaq in particular, were pastoral 
and nomadic, moving in the short distances between their 
summer and winter quarters. The Ghilzay tribe, as a whole, 
was in a transitory state from pastoral to agricultural 
life. Its migratory sections (the Powindas) made regular 
movements from the central highlands of Afghanistan in 
the summer to India in the winter. Before 1880, there was 
no legal restriction on the movements of people, but such 
movements among the settled population were infrequent.
The roads were not usually wide enough for wheeled traffic 
and bridges over rivers did not exist, although there were 
ferries on some rivers. Regionalism and tribal feelings 
were, therefore, very strong. Trade routes, however, were 
many and Kabul, the capital city, was connected by them, 
not only with the provincial towns, but also with neigh­
bouring countries, through the cities of Quetta, Peshawar, 
Meshed, Merv, Tashkand, and Bokhara. Mainly for security
4 Elphinstone, M . , An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul 
and its Dependencies in Tartary. Persia, and India. 
London, 1842, 1, 532.
5 According to Elphinstone, the number of different kinds 
of artisans and tradesmen in Kabul reached 32 in the 
early part of the nineteenth century, 1, 336.
6 GAK, 140.
7 MacGregor, 57«
4reasons, commercial goods were carried on camels and 
ponies in large caravans*
Being mountainous, Afghanistan has a very varied
climate and abounds in products of both the temperate
and tropical zones. In the late nineteenth century, about
one-fifth of the arable land was under cultivation. It
was tilled with primitive implements. Except in the more
elevated areas, there were two harvests each year. The
main products xvere wheat, barley, rice, corn, millet,
cotton, and many kinds of vegetables and fruits. On the
whole, ownership of the land was more equally divided in
0
Afghanistan than in most countries. A large number of
small landowners, assisted by hired labourers, cultivated
their own fields, although crop-sharing tenancies were
also very common. This fairly even distribution of land
may account, in part, for the sense of equality which
existed among the population of Afghanistan, It has been
said frequently that individual liberty existed nowhere
9in the East so extensively as it did in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan before 1880 was nominally a monarchy. In 
reality, it was a military and aristocratic republic, the 
ruler of which was established for life. Its sovereign, 
who was absolute under the Shari1 at, could introduce 
changes in the system of administration as he saw necessary. 
Also he had the power to dispose of the property and
8 MacGregor, 34.
9 Ibid, 59.
510lives of his subjects, though even the poorest of his 
subjects was able to take his complaints to him in person. 
In theory, the principle of succession was hereditary, 
but in practice the legitimate heir was obliged to submit 
the question of succession to an election and the chances 
of war. Thus the death of a ruler was always followed 
by civil wars.
The main support for, and the opposition to, the
12rulers came from the sardars who were mainly the
commanders of the subdivisions of tribes and often chosen
from among the tribal elders, mainly the Durranis. The
sardars were under the nominal control of the rulers in
Kabul who paid them the taxes of the region over which
they held command in return for their military service
13in time of war.  ^ Each of these sardars ruled his region
after his own fashion. Therefore the political stability
of the country depended mainly on good relations between
these sardars and the rulers. Religious groups, among
them the mullas, were the next restraining influence over
the absolute power of the rulers. Because of their
religious knowledge and the fact that they acted like
14local magistrates and lived closely with the people, 
the mullas had enormous influence with them. The rulers 
were careful not to antagonise the mullas. They paid them
10 Ibid, 57.
11 MacGregor, 58.
12 Literally, a leader, but actually a military title 
given by kings to tribal elders.
13 MacGregor, 60.
14 For detail see Risalah-i-mu 1tga, written on the 
instructions of Amir fAbd al-Rahman, Kabul, 1311 A.H.
6regular allowances (wazifas) and used their influence in 
stirring popular opposition against foreign invaders.
As a political entity, Afghanistan "began to emerge 
when the empires of the Safavids in the west and of the 
Moghuls in the east declined rapidly. From the sixteenth 
century to the eighteenth, the eastern provinces of 
Afghanistan formed a part of the one and the western 
provinces a part of the other, while the northern provinces 
were mainly under Bokhara. Although the eastern Pashtuns 
were the first to rise under their poet leader IChushhal 
Khattalc (1613-1689), it was the Pashtuns of ICandahar under 
Mir Wais (d. 1715) who succeeded in overthrowing Safavid 
rule in the early part of the eighteenth century.
. It was at the beginning of the second part of the 
eighteenth century that Afghanistan became fully independent 
under Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773)• Ahmad Shah founded 
an empire which, towards the east and south, stretched as 
far as Delhi, Little Tibet, and the Arabian Sea. The 
river Oxus formed the northern boundary of his empire, 
while Persian Khurasan to the west became a tributary state. 
The empire was too vast to survive and began to disintegrate 
when his numerous grandsons quarrelled over the throne in 
the early years of the nineteenth century. In the later 
stage of their struggle, the few surviving grandsons of 
Ahmad Shah were overthrown by the elders of the Barakzay 
branch of the Durrani tribe. The Barakzays had fought 
among themselves, but by 1839, one of them, Dost Mohammad, 
was able to bring a considerable part of Afghanistan 
(Kabul, Ghazni, Jalalabad) under his rule and to declare
7himself Amir. His progress was interrupted when the 
British, in conjunction with Shah Shuja’ al-Mulk (a former 
Sadozay king), and Ranjit Singh (the Sikh ruler of the 
Panjab), overran Afghanistan in that year. This invasion 
proved a failure and during the second, long reign of Amir 
Dost Mohammad (1843-1863) the whole of Afghanistan 
(Turkistan, Badakhshan, Kabul, Jalalabad and Herat) came 
under his control.
The absence of a working principle of succession and 
the practice of polygamy among the rulers had always been 
one of the root causes of civil wars in Afghanistan. In 
this context, the civil war which followed the death of 
Amir Dost Mohammad in 1863 is hardly surprising. The Amir 
had left over 20 sons and grandsons of importance by his 
five principal wives. They were governors and sub-governors 
when he died. Although one of his sons, Sher ’ Ali (b. 1823) 
by his favourite Barakzay wife, had been declared his 
successor, his amirate was challenged.
The civil war, one of the bloodiest in Afghan history, 
lasted for four years (1864-1868). The principal opponents 
of Sher ’Ali were his elder half-brothers Mohammad Afzal 
(b. 1811) and Mohammad A ’zam (b. 1818); they challenged him 
for the amirate. Sher 'Ali’s full-brothers, Mohammad 
Amin (b. 1829) and Mohammad Sharif (b. 1830) opposed the 
extension of his authority over the provinces which they 
considered to be their ’’possession11. Others revolted 
because of the Amir’s attempts to deprive them of their 
revenue ~ free lands and private armies. Prom May 1866 
to October 1868, Mohammad Afzal and Mohammad A'zam ruled
8in Kabul as Amirs successively, and Sher ’Ali was expelled 
to Herat. But finally Sher ’Ali triumphed over all. Sher 
'Ali’s opponents either died or fled the country. Of the 
surviving contenders 'Abd al-Rahman (pronounced 'Abdur 
Rahman) (b. 1844), the only son of Mohammad Afzal, 
distinguished himself during the civil war by defeating 
Amir Sher 'Ali in May 1866, January 1867, and September 
1867. After the triumph of Sher 'Ali, ’Abd al-Rahman fled 
to Samarkand in 1869, where he resided on a Russian pension 
for 11 years. Mohammad Ya'qub (c. 1849), Sher 'Ali's son, 
also distinguished himself in the civil war by regaining 
Kandahar in 1868.
During his second reign (1868-1879), Amir Sher 'Ali 
injected significant stability into the war-torn country 
and introduced some reforms. His reforms were mainly the 
result of the civil war. In a way, the war had been a 
war between the centre and the provinces for domination.
The problems which Amir Sher 'Ali and his rival brother, 
Mohammad A ’zam (while Amir), faced were almost identical, 
when they tried to extend the authority of the central 
government over the provinces. This attempt was opposed 
by all the Barakzay sardars. With the triumph of Sher 'Ali 
representing the centre, the power of the sardars was 
greatly reduced when the Amir created a standing army of 
about 80,00Cr^ in which all irregulars (including the
15 Rishtia, S. Q., Afghanistan during the Nineteenth Century. 
(Afghanistan dar q~arn-i-nuzdahum), Kabul, 1556 (A . H /) 
Second editi'on7"l8^) According to H. C. Rawlinson, Amir 
Sher 'Ali had a regular army of 68 regiments of infantry, 
16 cavalry, and 300 guns. "The Situation in Afghanistan" 
The nineteenth Century, 1880, 199*
9private army of the sardars) were converted into regulars
16and paid in cash instead of by orders on villages. But 
the basic structure of tribal aristocracy remained the 
same until it was altered drastically some years later by 
'Abd al-Rahman. Another notable result of the civil war 
was the pre-eminence of the Ohilzays during the second 
reign of Sher 'Ali. He recruited his army mainly from 
among the Ghilzays. With the Ghilzays in the army, the 
Pashto language also came into prominence, as the manual
17of instruction for the army was prepared in that language. 
The Amir's newly created, but short-lived, Consultative 
.Council (1874) was also dominated by Ghilzay elders, among 
them 'Ismat Allah, Arsala Khan and Mustaufi Habib Allah 
Wardak, who were to play a prominent part in the coming 
struggle against the British invasion of Afghanistan# It 
is significant to note that no Barakzay of importance was 
made a member of the Council.
In order to tackle the difficult question of finance,
the Amir decided to collect the land revenue wholly in cash,
not half in cash and half in kind as was hitherto the 
18practice. Among the achievements of the second reign 
of the Amir, a mention should also be made of the construc­
tion of a new city to the north-west of Kabul, the establish 
ment of a periodical, Shams al-Nahar, and the complete 
pacification of the northern provinces (Kataghan, Badakhshan 
Turkistan and Maimana) by his Viceroy Ka'ib Mir 'Alam Khan.
16 Sykes, Sir P., A History of Afghanistan, London, 1940, 
2, 78.
17 Ibid, 79.
18 Sykes, 2, 78.
10
If Amir Dost Mohammad was the 1ffounder of Afghanistan" ,
iq
Sher ’Ali was its "reformer” .
In the knotty question of the succession, Sher ’Ali 
acted unwisely. He failed to understand that it was 
mainly the personal ability of a prince, his popularity 
with the army and the Barakzay aristocracy, rather than 
his nomination by his sovereign father, which makes him 
obeyed. In 1874, the official nomination of his minor 
son, 'Abd Allah Jan (b. 1862) as his successor made his 
two ambitious elder sons, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub and 
Sardar Mohammad Ayub, rebel against him. Ya'qub was 
imprisoned and Ayub fled to Persia. Since the most 
capable Barakzay sardars had either been killed in the 
civil war or driven into exile, the removal of his two 
sons created a situation in which the position of the 
Barakzays, as a ruling dynasty, could be in danger. The 
timely return of 'Abd al-Rahman after the death of Sher 
'Ali and the subsequent deportation to India of Ya'qub 
and others firmly re-established the Barakzay rule. Further, 
the nomination also strained Amir Sher 'Ali's relations 
with the Government of India, because of his insistence 
on the recognition of his nominated successor by the 
reluctant British.
During the second reign of Sher 'Ali, there was much 
diplomatic activity. Since it is not our purpose to deal 
with it in detail, only an outline of the main events which
19 Rishtia, 188.
11
led to the British intervention in Afghanistan in 1878 
-will be given here. British involvement in Afghanistan 
unleashed forces which reshaped the course of its 
history.
The period of civil war in Afghanistan corresponded
with the rapid military advance of Russia in central Asia.
By 1868, after having annexed Tashkand and Samarqand,
Russia established her suzerainty over Bokhara and through
her became co-terminus with Afghanistan. Because of his
alarm over the Russian advance, the Amir wished to draw
closer to Britain. Britain gave an implied warning to
Russia that she would not remain indifferent if the
independence of Afghanistan was endangered. The result
was lengthy negotiations between Russia and Britain over
the northern frontiers of Afghanistan from 1869 to 1873*
Russia assured Britain that Afghanistan was beyond the
20sphere of her political action.
In the late seventies, however, the conflicting 
attitudes of Russia and Britain towards the Ottoman empire 
changed their attitude towards each other in central Asia 
drastically. As a result, a policy emerged in India which 
aimed at pushing forward the frontiers of India and securing 
advanced strategic positions along her north-western 
borders and active interference in Afghanistan.
20 Singhal, D. P., Afghanistan and India. 1876-1907. 
Australia, 1963? 11.
12
From the accession of Sher ’Ali, his relations with 
India fall into three periods. From 1864 to 1868, India 
pursued a policy of so-called ’’neutrality” towards 
Afghanistan; from 1868 to 1876 a policy of reconciliation 
without commitment; and from 1876 to 1878 a policy of 
intervention.
After his accession, Amir Sher ’Ali hoped that the
Government of India would follow the same friendly relations
with him as it had with his father. But the Government
of India maintained a facade of ’’neutrality” during the
civil war in the hope that his rival brother A ’zam would
establish ” ...a strong government in Afghanistan friendly
21
to the British power.” Apprehensive of Russia’s
advances, the Amir still wished to draw closer to Britain.
However, his relations with Britain did not improve
fundamentally, as is evidenced from the conferences of
Ambala in India in 1869 and Simla in 1873- The Government
22of India did not share the Amir’s alarm of Russia and was
23
not willing to recognise ’Abd al-Lah Jan as his successor, 
although she offered him arms and assurances of non­
interference in Afghan affairs.
Such was the atmosphere when, early in 1876, Lord
Lytton was chosen as Governor-General and Viceroy in India,
24
partly with a view to securing the confidence of the Amir. 
Instead, Lytton brought war on Afghanistan. Instructed by
21 MacGregor, 105.
22 Singhal, 11.
23 Rishtia, 185®
24 Singhal, 15.
13
London, Lytton was willing to accept the Amir’s demands,
including' a more decided recognition of his nominated
successor than had so far been given, and the conclusion
25of an offensive and defensive alliance with the Amir.
But as these concessions were contingent on the Amir’s 
acceptance of British officers about his frontiers, and 
refusal of all communication with Russia and other foreign 
powers,^ they were not acceptable to the Amir.
It is not surprising that the Peshawar conference
between the Viceroy and the representatives of the Amir
in March 1877 failed. A mission from the Ottoman Sultan
to the Amir with a view to estranging him from Russia also
failed. Lytton suspected that the Amir was under Russian
influence. The Amir!s view of the Russians was that they
27
were devils and concerned only with their own interest.
Nevertheless, they did not seem to have the intention of
advancing on his kingdom. Not only were they courteous
28to the Amir, they also treated him as their equal.
Such was the atmosphere when General Kaufmann, Russia* s 
Governor-General in Turkistan, despatched a mission under 
General Stolietoff on his own initiative to Kabul in 
June 1878. Versions vary as to Russia’s proposed treaty 
with the Amir. As mentioned in the Parliamentary Papers, 
the proposed treaty was in many ways similar to that of 
Britain. The fundamental difference was the placing of
25 Ibid, 18.
26 Ibid.
27 Singhal, 28.
28 Singhal, 29*
14
, 29
no restriction on the Amir’s relations with other powers.
The whole scheme was a manoeuvre to involve Britain in
Afghanistan and thereby force them to withdraw the Indian
troops they had sent to Malta in support of the Ottomans
30with whom the Russians were then at war. Thus when the 
treaty of Berlin was signed between the Great Powers in 
July 1878, the Russian mission at Kabul was instructed to 
leave Kabul (August 1878).
The Kaufmann scheme was successful. It gave Lytton 
the required pretext to carry the Cabinet in London with 
him on his rash actions towards Afghanistan. After he 
failed to force his mission on the Amir in September 1878, 
war was declared on Afghanistan on November 21, 1878.
By the end of January 1879? the greater part of 
southern Afghanistan had passed into British hands. This 
advance had been facilitated by the non-opposition by the 
Afghan army as the Amir, against the wishes of his officials, 
had prevented it from fighting.*^ The Amir left Kabul for 
Turkistan, hoping to seek aid from Russia, but he died at 
Mazar on 21 February, 1879*
Before his flight, Sher ’Ali had released his imprisoned 
son, Ya'qub, and appointed him governor of Kabul; (the 
heir-apparent had recently died). After the death of his 
father, Ya’qub declared himself Amir and opened communication 
with the Government of India. He was less inclined than
29 Ibid, 34.
30 Ibid, 33.
31 Rishtia, 240.
15
his father to resist the invading army and antagonise
Britain. He had rivals in the persons of his half-brother,
Mohammad Ibrahim, and the full-sister of the late heir-
apparent, who had been unsuccessfully encouraged by Afghan
3 2Government officials at Mazar to raise their claims.
At Kabul, his uncle, Sardar Wali Mohammad (b. 1830) was 
already known to be the choice of Lytton if Ya’qub proved 
unfriendly to the British. Moreover, his long imprison­
ment (1874-1878) had dispirited him considerably. Thus,
despite the opposition of his councils to a treaty with
34 /Britain, Amir Mohammad Ya1 qub went to G-andamak (about
29 miles to the south-west of Jalalabad) after he had
received a favourable response to his earlier communication
from the Government of India.
On 26 May 1879? Ya'qub signed a treaty - the most 
humiliating ever signed by an Afghan ruler - with 
L. Ijfevagnari, Envoy of the Government of India. Britain 
obtained a position in Afghanistan which she never had 
before or afterwards. Ya’qub accepted all the demands 
which Lytton had made on his father, and others in addition. 
The most important among them were the control of the 
Amir’s foreign affairs, the stationing of British agents 
in Afghanistan in return for British support against 
foreign aggression, a small subsidy and a deceptive promise 
of non-interference in Afghan home affairs.
32 Rishtia, 242.
33 Singhal, 43*
34 ibid, 44.
16
The treaty made the Amir, in fact, a British 
feudatory. Singhal maintains that the aim of the treaty
35was "...to reduce Afghan territory into small principalities." 
But according to the treaty, Afghanistan was not to be 
divided* Lytton hoped to rule over Afghanistan through 
Y a ’qub whose power, he hoped, "...would gradually be 
transferred to the British e n v o y I n  such an event, 
Afghanistan was likely to be absorbed eventually into the 
British empire, as Baluchistan was absorbed by a similar 
treaty in 1876, and Chitral sixteen years later, in 1895*
Cavagnari became the first British Envoy and, along
with three British officials and 75 Indian infantry and
cavalrymen, took up residence in the Bala Hisar (citadel)
in Kabul on 29 July 1879- Soon the Envoy openly attempted
to assume power by fixing or holding back payments and
37subsidy to the Afghan army and elders. This interference 
led to the massacre of all but one of the party by an army 
contingent from Herat, backed by the inhabitants of Kabul 
on 3 September 1879* Ike incident was not instigated by 
the Amir, but he failed to protect the life of the Envoy 
and others as was required of him by the treaty of 
Gr-andamak. The massacre showed how right the late Amir was 
in opposing British agents in his dominion*
Shortly after the massacre, Afghanistan was again 
invaded. The cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad
35 Singhal, 46,
36 Ibid, 49•
37 Rishtia, 246.
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(up to G-andamak) were occupied, through Kurram., Quetta 
and Khyber respectively. General F. Roberts led the 
forces in Kabul, General D. Stewart in Kandahar, and 
General Gough and others in Jalalabad.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted mainly 
to Kabul, referring to other provinces only when it is 
necessary. An attempt will be made first to describe 
events inside the province and then describe the new 
policy the Government of India adopted towards Kabul.
Being the capital, Kabul was the most important of 
all the provinces. It was like a kingdom in itself, 
diversified in area and population* Broadly, the province 
of Kabul was bounded on the north by the Hindu Kush, on 
the west by the Hazara country, on the south by Baluchistan 
and Kandahar, and on the east by the Indus. The most 
numerous group among the inhabitants of the province were 
the Ghilzays, who occupied mainly the central and southern 
areas. Tajiks were settled mainly in the north; the Hazaras 
in the north-west; and Safays, Kafirs, Mohmands, Shinwarays, 
Khugianays, Khostwrals, and others in the east. Dehgans, 
’Arabs,and Hindus (as shopkeepers in the towns) were also 
to be found* As has been mentioned already, the inhabitants 
of the outlying districts in the east such as the Chitralis, 
Yusufzays, Waziris, and the Kakars were under the nominal 
control of Kabul.
The city of Kabul was also diversified in population.
Of its 140,700 inhabitants (in 1876), 103,050 were 
detribalised Kabulis, 12,000 Tajiks, 9,000 Pashtuns
18
(Durranis, G-hilzays and Safays), 4,000 Hindus, 3,000
38Kashmiris, 3,000 Parachas and 100 Armenians, Amidst 
the Sunni inhabitants, the 6,500 Shi* ite Qizilbashes had 
always played a significant role out of all proportion to 
their number. Being hostile to the Sunnis. they had 
assisted the British in both Anglo-Afghan x^ars.
The Amir was uncertain about himself when Kabul was
39invaded. He feared the opposition of his people, 
presumably for his inaction against the "infidel" invaders. 
Having failed to save the lives of the British, he also 
feared his imprisonment by Roberts. He preferred submission 
to resistance, and offered his resignation to Roberts.
Until a decision on his resignation was made, Ya’qub was 
kept under surveillance in the British camp.
Roberts imprisoned all senior Afghan officials, 
including the Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak, the Wazir 
Yahya Khan and Zakaria Khan, presumably for their inaction 
during the massacre. Only Baud Shah, the Commander-in- 
Chief, was not molested, because of his unsuccessful 
attempts to save the lives of the British. Roberts set 
up a military government led by Major T. Hills. The 
immediate measures Robert took were brutal. Assisted by 
the Qizilbashes,^ each of x^hom was awarded 50 rupees,^
38 G-AK, 230. Based on the census taken under the general 
supervision of Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir during the reign of 
Amir Sher fAli. Parachas are people of obscure origin.
39 Rishtia, 250,
40 Hensman, W., The Afghan War 1879-80. London, 1881, 88.
41 Rishtia, 251. Rishtia mentions them not by their 
name but as ”traitors1’.
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Roberts rounded up suspected insurgents and hanged / 89_/ 
of them.^ After having demolished the historic Bala
A ' Z
Hiear (the seat of the Afghan kings), where the massacre 
had taken place, he moved the British army to a newly 
made cantonment in Sherpur, which extended for about two 
miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bimaru 
hills.
On 28 October 1879? Ya’qub was informed that his 
resignation had been accepted, after the G-overnment of 
India was assured by its officials in Afghanistan that 
this would not have an adverse effect on the Afghans. In 
early December, Ya'qub was deported to India, followed a 
week later by all his principal officials, except the 
Mustaufi who was set free in the hope that use could be 
made of his administrative ability in the management of the 
country. The severe punishment, the deportation and the 
tight grip over the city led Roberts to think that the 
British were on their way towards reducing the country, 
but he was mistaken. December saw a rising more formidable 
than the one which had happened almost forty years before. 
But unlike the previous one, this rising did not bring 
immediate success. However, it marked the intensification 
of popular resistance which continued until the British 
army left the country in late 1880.
After many engagements around the city, a combination
42 Rishtia, 251. 
45 Ibid, 250.
44 PNEA, 100.
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of 40,000 to 60,000 of the Ghilzays, Tajiks* Safays, 
Waziris, Zadrans and others (except the Qizilbashes and 
Hazaras) occupied the city and besieged the British army 
in the Sherpur cantonment in the middle of December 1879*
But they failed to force, the army into submission, Rishtia
maintains that the British officers bribed two relatively
unknown leaders - Zar Pacha Khan and Mohammad Shah 
46Surkhabi - whose treacherous retreat at a critical 
moment led to the general retreat. It seems more likely, 
however, that the Afghans failed to destroy the wired and 
fortified cantonments with their primitive weapons (the 
guns of the Amir* s army had been seized by the British) 
and were themselves forced to retreat because of the cold, 
shortage of provisions, the lack of an efficient leader, 
and the counter-shelling of the besieged army.
46
The insurgents or ” ...the bulk of Afghan people” , 
known to us first as the Ghazni Party and later as the 
National Party, chose Ghazni as their temporary centre.
They were led by sardars, tribal elders, and mullas. Pew 
of them played any significant part and none of them was 
a dominant leader. The lack of a real leader was, in 
fact, the basic weakness of the movement.
Mull a Mushk-i-' Ala.ni Akhundzadah was the most 
influential of all the leaders of the National Party.
His parentage is not known, but he was identified with 
the Andar section of the Ghilzay tribe. His original
45 Rishtia, 255.
46 PNEA, 103.
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name was Din Mohammad* The name Mushk-i-fAlam ("the
perfume of the universe") was given to him by a celebrated 
religious teacher, Mulla ' Abd al-Hakim, on account of the 
versatility of his religious knowledge. Mulla Mushk-i- 
fAlam had enormous influence with the mullas and people of 
G-hazni, Kabul, Laghman and the Mohmand in particular, and 
with all the Muslims throughout the country in general, 
on account of his religious knowledge, the establishment 
madrasas and also for the fact that he was a wealthy 
man, receiving allowances from the Amirs in Kabul, presents 
from his followers, and owning large tracts of revenue-free 
lands.^ But he was too old (b. 1790) to be able to lead 
the struggle personally. He was, in fact, the moving, 
spiritual leader in the struggle and had preached jehad 
ever since Ya'qub was kept under surveillance. He was 
honest and straightforward but lacked political insight. 
Mohammad Jan Wardak was one of the most energetic leaders
of the National Party. His ancestors x^ere elders of the
Wardak tribe and he himself was a wealthy man and a
general in the army of the ex-Amir. He was most influential 
with the dispersed army, among whom there was a substantial 
number of Wardaks. He led the attack on the British 
residency,^ after which he was known as G-hazi. He also 
distinguished himself in the subsequent rising and was 
mainly responsible for the siege of the British army. 
Although a good soldier, he was temperamental and lacked 
the stature of a political leader. ’Ismat Allah Jabar Khel 
G-hilzay (b. 1830), who was influential with the G-hilzay
47 BOA, 1 4 3 .
48 P. Roberts to  India, 18 Peb 1880, PSLI, 28, 147.
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tribe, in particular, and with the Mohmands, Shinwarays,
49Khugianays in general, was another leader. His
popularity was more on account of his parentage than of
his personal ability. He was a member of the late Amir’s
Consultative Council and had served as Minister of the
50Interior under Sher 1 Ali. Sardar Mohammad Hasan, 
grandson of Amir Host Mohammad (not to be confused with the 
pro-British Sardar Mohammad Hasan, son of Amir Host 
Mohammad) proved to be the staunchest and most persistent 
supporter of Ya'qub. But he was more of a government 
official (he was the governor of Jalalabad when Afghan­
istan was invaded for the second time) than a popular 
leader. Of the other Barakzay sardars a mention should 
also be made of Sardar 'Abd Allah Khan, son of Sikander 
Khan, Sardar Mohammad Tahir Khan, son of Mohammad Sharif 
Khan and Sardar Mohammad 'Alam Khan (cousin of the late 
Amir). The last ti^ o sardars were amenable to compromise 
with the British and their pro-British attitude weakened 
the leadership of the Party considerably. Mir Bacha of 
Kohistan (a district to the north of Kabul) was a leader 
of the Tajiks. Being a persistent opponent of the British, 
he was one of the four whom Roberts had exempted from the 
amnesty.
The aim of the National Party was the restoration to
power of the deported Amir and the observance of the
51"old engagements" - a probable reference to the two
49 BCA, 48.
50 Rishtia, 200.
51 Letters from elders of Afghanistan to Roberts (one 
dated 25 Bee 1879), PNEA, 103.
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treaties of 1855 and 1857 concluded between Amir Dost 
Mohammad and the Government of India, in which the latter, 
among other things, had undertaken not to interfere in 
the internal affairs of Afghanistan while the Amir had 
committed himself to be the friend of the friends and the 
enemy of the enemies of the British.
Following the September massacre, Lytton resolved 
to divide the kingdom of Afghanistan. He had given up the 
idea of controlling Afghanistan through a puppet Amir.
On 11 December 18799 the Home Government had agreed with 
him, stressing the point that military supremacy should 
take precedence over political arrangements. It was left 
to Lytton as to how he should carry out his scheme of 
disintegration.
Lytton’s view was that Kandahar and Kabul should form
two separate political entities. Herat was to be offered
to Persia, on certain conditions. Ho decision had been
reached as yet on the provinces between the Hindu Kush
and the Oxus but Lytton was ” ...philosophical about the
52eventual loss of Badakhshan and Wakhan to Russia.”
At the same time, he was not averse to their inclusion in 
the province of Kabul if' its future Amir was able to hold 
them. The assigned frontier districts of Pishin, Kurram 
and Sibi and the passes of Khyber and Michni, secured by 
the treaty of Gandamak, were to be permanently annexed to
52 Alder, G. J., British India’s northern Frontier 
1865-95, London, 1963, 172.
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India* The new rulers would he assisted militarily 
and financially and would he in subordinate alliances with 
Britain. Every attempt for a united Afghanistan, even hy 
a friendly ruler, would he opposed. The scheme, if 
successful, was in fact an attempt to divide Afghanistan 
between Russia, Persia and British India, with the latter 
in a position to control eventually all territories up to 
the Hindu Kush.
The December rising had made an early settlement for 
Kabul necessary. But before a permanent settlement could 
be agreed on, a temporary administration was set up there 
on 15 January, 1880. Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan (half- 
brother of the late Amir) who, along with his sons and a 
few other insignificant sardars, had been protected by the 
British army during the rising, for their co-operation with 
the British, was appointed as Wali (governor) of Kabul. 
Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak was to assist him in revenue 
affairs. The Wali was at no time able to exercise power 
outside the city. In the city, too, his power had to be 
maintained by the British military force. Roberts, 
however, was over-optimistic, believing that with the help 
of these Barakzay sardars and Qizilbashes "...it should be 
possible in time to bring over and attach to our interest 
a considerable part of the population." ^
As to the permanent settlement for Kabul, the
53 PNEA, 103.
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situation did not seem promising either* The policy of 
disintegration, and the finding of a qualified ruler with 
the full backing of the people, did not seem to be feasible* 
The Afghans may not have had a special liking for Y a ’qub 
when he was their Amir, but his deportation made him a 
martyr in their eyes, as x^ as evidenced from the December 
rising* But Lytton was irrevocably averse to his 
restoration.
In the beginning, the attitude of the Government of 
India towards Ya’qub was favourable. The Indian Government 
annoyed the late Amir over Ya ’qub’s imprisonment in 1874. 
Lytton was so pleased with him that just before the
54massacre he noted that Ya’qub was "...behaving angelically."
Soon after the massacre, he changed his view. Was this
because Y a ’qub had a hand in the rising? The official
judgement of the Government of India was that "...the
massacre was not instigated by the Amir", but the Amir
and his immediate advisers were accused of being at least
"culpably indifferent to the fate of the Envoy and his
,.56companions
Lytton resolved to dethrone Ya'qub and in this he 
succeeded and carried the Council with him with but two 
dissensions. He was so much opposed to Ya ’qub that he was 
willing to resign rather than see him restored. The Home
54 Singhal, 49-
55 Ibid, 55-
56 Ibid, 56,
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Government also agreed with him that Ya 1qub should not 
57
be restored.'
The fact was that the policy of disintegration and
the re-establishment of Ya’qub, in Lytton’s words,
’’.♦.a prince born to the hereditary sovereignty of the
58whole Afghan kingdom” were incompatible. About Musa
Jan (b. 1866 ?), son of Ya’qub, Lytton also held a similar
view, arguing that he ’’...might be less willing than others
who have no hereditary claims to sovereignty, to acquiesce
59in the new order of affairs in Afghanis tan.” Obviously 
only puppet rulers with no hereditary claims could fit in 
in this "new order” . Such a ruler was easily found for 
Kandahar. For Kabul, it proved so difficult that eventually 
Lytton invited a person with hereditary claims to 
sovereignty.
57 PKEA, 146.
58 Ghose, D. P., England and Afghanistan, Calcutta, I960, 97*
59 PEEA, 145.
Chapter 2
The Accession of 1 A M  al-Rahman
At a time when Lytton was desperately looking for a 
friendly ruler for Kabul, Sardar ’Abd al-Rahman appeared 
in Badakhshan. Lytton correctly looked on him to be the 
only Barakzay sardar who could exclude the family of the 
late Amir Sher ’Ali, to whom Lytton was obstinately opposed. 
In spite of the popular demand for the restoration to 
power of the ex-Amir, Lytton agreed to the amirate of 
’Abd al-Rahman, and risked his possible ties with Russia. 
But ’Abd al-Rahman aspired to the whole of Afghanistan 
and proved a tough negotiator who exasperated British 
officials. He was nearly to raise the country against 
the British, whose declared policy now was to leave 
Afghanistan. But the cool statesmanship of Ripon 
(successor to Lytton) and the military movements in 
south-west Afghanistan of Sardar Ayub - the rival to 
’Abd al-Rahman - induced the latter to accept the 
reduced State of Kabul, on British terms.
’Abd al-Rahman had spent most of his life in exile, 
mainly in Samarkand. After the death of Amir Sher ’Ali 
he was removed to Tashkand, apparently at the suggestion 
of Sardar Sher ’Ali, the Wali of Kandahar, who then led 
a mission of the late Amir to General von Kaufmann.
’Abd al Rahman’s repeated requests to enter Afghanistan 
during the reign of the late Amir were refused because of 
his relationship with Russia,
The deportation to India of the ex-Amir, Y a ’qub, in 
December 1879? provided ’Abd al-Rahman with his
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opportunity. Now even he was urged to go to Afghanistan 
by the Russian authorities in Tashkand.
When TAbd al-Rahman left for Afghanistan is not 
certain. But it is known that he left Tashkand with 
about 100 horsemen, travelling through Khojand, Shahr-i- 
Sabz (near Samarqand) and Hissar. Before crossing the 
Oxus opposite Rustaq (a district in the north-east of 
Badakhshan), *Abd al-Rahman sent off a letter to 
Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan, then the ruler of Badakhshan.
G-eographically, Badakhshan proper lies between the 
province of Kataghan in the south, the Oxus in the north­
east, Turkistan in the west and Wa-khan in the east. In
1914, its population of Tajiks, Mongols and Hazaras was
1estimated to be 120,000 with the Tajiks as the largest
group. Among the Tajik population only those who lived
2
in the most inaccessible highlands were Shi1as.
In the confusion and anarchy that followed the death 
of Amir Sher fAli, Badakhshan became the centre of an 
intense struggle, first between the Afghans and the local , 
inhabitants (Badakhshanis), and later between the members 
of the former ruling family of Badakhshan who, before the
"5death of the late Amir, were either in prison or in exile. 
This former ruling family had been on bad terms with the 
late Amir, because its leader, Mir Jahandar Shah was 
*Abd al-Rahmanfs father-in-law. After the death of 
Sher TAli, the Afghan forces and governor, Sayyed
1 GAB, vii.
2 GAB, 10.
3 PNEA, 112
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Mohammad ’Alam, were forced to retreat to Kunduz by the
local insurgents, who were led by Prince fAbd al-Fayaz, and
Mir Baba Khan (a nephew of Mir Jahandar Shah, who had been
imprisoned in Mazar). Mir Baba was declared as "Amir al-
4Umara"• He appointed his associates as district rulers.
Mir Baba was in power for about a year when he was ousted 
by Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan (son of Mir Shah, brother of 
Mir Jahandar Shah) and Mohammad ’Umar (son of Yusuf ’Ali,
cousin of Jahandar Shah)* They had been either in exile in
5 6Ferghana or with ’Abd al-Rahman in Samarqand. Mohammad
'Umar rebelled against the Shahzadah and the latter had to
expel him beyond the Oxus with the assistance of his former
rival, Mir Baba, who was then appointed as the ruler of 
7Rustaq. The coalition between the Mir and the Shahzada was 
dictated by expediency. In fact, they were rivals.
It was at this juncture that a letter from ’Abd al™ 
Rahman reached the Shahzadah, asking his assistance with 
money and supplies, but assuring him that he was intending 
to go to Kabul.^ Nevertheless, the Shahzadah opposed 
his entry. In excuse, he wrote to ’Abd al-Rahman that 
"The envoy of the British Government / Mohammad Ashur 
Shignani, Agent of the British Resident at G-ilgit, who 
had recently been with the Shahzadah_7 is with me. I 
have created alliance with that G-overnment and I can
4 Bek, Mirza Fazil, Mirza Sang Mohammad, Tarikh-i-Badakhshan 
(Persian text), 1325 A.H* (1907), photostated Leningrad, 
1959, 197*
5 Bek, Mirza Fazil, 198.
6 Young, (Secretary, the Punjab^ G-overnment), to A. Lyall, 
(Secretary to G-overnment of India), 30 Mar 1880, PSLI,
25, 921.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
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not give you any assistance for fighting that 
9G - o v e r n m e n t B e i n g  related to the Shahzadah, ’Abd
al-Rahman had hoped for assistance from him. How,
’Abd al“Rahman had to force his way in, but his own account
of crossing the Oxus in early February is, no doubt,
an exaggeration when he says that the army of the enemy,
11numbering 12,000, facing him dispersed without any
reason. Both Ashur Shighnani and Mirza Fazil Bek are
unanimous in saying that Mir Baba and Mohammad ’Umar
12
brought ’Abd al Rahman to Rustaq.
From Rustaq, ’Abd al-Rahman succeeded in ousting the 
Shahzadah with the assistance of Mir Baba to whom ’Abd 
al-Rahman had promised the governorship of Faizabad, the 
capital of Badakhshan. Accompanied by a number of mirs 
(elders) including Ashur Shighnani, the Shahzadah escaped 
to Yassin and ultimately to G-ilgit where he died shortly 
afterward.
At Faizabad, after having thwarted a plot by Mir
Baba, ’Abd al-Rahman feared a coalition of the Mir and
Mohammad ’Umar. He then set out for Kataghan (Kunduz),
inhabited almost entirely by about 120,000 Uzbeks of the
13Kataghan tribe.
Ever since 1865, Kataghan had been ruled by Sultan 
Murad, son of Mir Ataliq, Sultan Murad was a powerful
9 Ibid, 922.
10 KD, ... PSLI, 25, 9.
11 Mahomed, S., 1, 171*
12 Young to Lyall, 30 Mar 1880, PSLI, 25, 922.
13 GAB, 62.
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ruler, but a great opportunist who, during the civil
war in the sixties, ohose, with remarkable success,
whoever was winning. Twice he had sided with ’Abd al-
Rahman, but did not hesitate to desert him when he saw
that he was losing in 1869- Thereafter, Sultan Murad
had held Kataghan as a fief from the Amir, and expelled
for him Mir Jahandar Shah from Badakhshan. During the
British occupation of Afghanistan, Sultan Murad held
friendly correspondence with Roberts in Kabul, and the
15British Resident at Gilgit , and defied General Ghulam
Haydar Wardak, who held Turkistan for the deposed Amir.^
But a force sent against him from Turkistan forced him to
leave Kataghan. He was on his way to Badakhshan when he
met ’Abd al-Rahman at Kala-i-Afghan (a small village in
the extreme south of Badakhshan), Although Sultan Murad
had earlier refused passage for 'Abd al-Rahman through
his territory on the pretext that this would "...offend 
17the English," 'Abd al-Rahman not only pardoned him, he 
even promised him Kataghan when he came to power. Together 
they arrived at Talukan (a town about 21 miles to the 
east of Khanabad), some time before 21 March 1880. It 
was here that the victorious army of Mazar in Kataghan 
(5 battalions, 1,200 cavalry, 5 b a t t e r i e s a l s o  joined 
'Abd al-Rahman.
The acceptance of him by the army as a leader was
14 BOA, 200.
15 Sultan Murad to Scully, British Resident (Gilgit),
21 Jan 1880, PSLI, 25, 925*
16 See p.181.
17 Mahomed, S., 1, 175*
18 Mahomed, S., 1, 183-
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a turning point for ’Abd al-Rahman. From a mere
Barakzay Sardar, with a small number of followers,
among predominantly non-Pashtun inhabitants, ^Abd al-
Rahman now became the acknowledged leader of a regular
army. His prestige and power increased further when news
reached him that the whole army of Turkistan had already
19Joined Sardar Mohammad Ishaq, who supported his cause.
All the provinces of northern Afghanistan except the 
district of Maimana came under his rule. Row fAbd al- 
Rahman was in a position to enforce his authority. In a 
public darbar he ordered that "All the rulers of this
20country must bring money according to their position,..."
The unreliable Mir Baba was imprisoned, ostensibly for
21his failure to release "6000" Afghan women , but in 
reality for his earlier plot against 'Abd al-Rahman 
which had been instigated by General G-hulam Haydar 
Wardak. On 24 March 1880 'Abd al-Rahman set out for 
Kunduz (a large town about 13 miles to the north of 
Khanabad).
In Kabul, armed opposition to the British lasted
longer than had been originally anticipated. London was
getting restless at the prolonged occupation and was not
22ready to sanction it further. At the same time, 
Roberts' executions of the insurgents in Kabul had
19 Vide pd.82.
20 Mahomed, S.,1,188.
21 Ibid, 189.
22 Singhal, D.P.,59*
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aroused public fury even in England. Two consequences
were finally to emerge. First, Lytton decided that all
military forces were to be removed from Northern
Afghanistan by the following autumn (October) and before
that the country was to be pacified. Vast military
operations ("the Spring Operations1') were therefore
sanctioned in accordance with which G-eneral Stewart was
ordered to pacify the country between Kabul and Kandahar,
and G-eneral Roberts was ordered to move with his forces
to Rohistan and Bamian, Second, implementing the "new
order" required vast diplomatic skill which Roberts
evidently lacked. Lytton therefore deputed Lepel Henry 
23
Griffin, to undertake all the administrative and 
diplomatic affairs, under the general supervision of 
General Stewart, who would replace Roberts as the British 
Supreme Commander in Northern Afghanistan. Griffin reached 
Kabul on 19 March with instructions from Lytton on a 
wide range of subjects, among them!™
' 1st. Non-restoration of the ex-Amir. 1
1 2nd. Permanent severance of western /""Kandahar^/ 
from north-west Afghanistan. *
23 (1838-1908). Joined ICS 1860. Appointed assistant
Commissioner in Panjab. His appointment at Kabul 
had been preceded by a number of civil posts. On 
his appointment to Kabul, Lytton said of him, "I have 
come to the conclusion that there is only one man 
/  Griffin/T" in India who is in all respects completely
qualified to do for the Government_of India what
I want done as quickly as possible.../ in Afghanistan//". 
After the termination of his job in Kabul, Griffin 
was appointed Agent to the Governor-General in Central 
India, a post he held until he retired in 1889.
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’3rd. Neither annexation nor permanent occupation
of the latter*1
14th. Willingness to recognise any ruler (except Ya'lkub)
whom the Afghan themselves will empower to arrange with
us on their behalf for the restoration of their country
. 24and its evacuation by our troops.
Two points of the above need comment. Lytton was 
not only opposed to the restoration of Ya’qub, he was 
also unwilling to accept either Musa Jan or Sardar Ayub 
as Amir. With the policy of disintegration three terms 
were widely used by the British officials. The term 
Western Afghanistan was applied to the province of Herat 
which was to have been offered to Persia. Since this 
scheme ultimately fell through, the question of fixing 
its boundaries did not arise. Southern Afghanistan was 
applied to the province of Kandahar. Since Lytton 
considered the Hindu Kush to be the natural boundary of 
India he wished to push the northern boundary of Kandahar 
up to the Hindu Kush along the Helmand J river, in order 
to obtain a commanding position over Herat - ’’the gate to 
India” . For this reason the severance of Kandahar from 
the rest of the country was declared to be ”irrevocable” 
and efforts were made to win over the Hazaras of the 
southern Hindu Kush. Northern Afghanistan was used to 
designate the provinces of Kabul, G-hazni and Jalalabad. 
The provinces lying between the Hindu Kush and the Oxus
24. Balfour, B., Lord Lvtton’s Indian Administration: 
1876 - 1880. London 1899, 408.
25. PNEA,95.
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(Kataghan, Badakhshan, Mazar and Maimana) were, generally,
26called Afghan Turkistan.
Griffin1s main task was to search for a ruler for 
Kabul, acceptable to ’’the Afghan themselves” and to Lytton. 
The difficulty of his task could be appreciated when we 
bear in mind that the wishes of Lytton and the great 
majority of the Afghans were irreconcilable. On the whole, 
Griffin did well but at certain stages his judgement 
nearly failed him.
Within a few days of his arrival at Kabul, Griffin 
explained the main features of British policy towards 
Afghanistan to Sardar Wali Mohammad and Sardar Mohammad 
Hashim, an influential cousin of the ex-Amir. This 
stirred the various factions in Kabul and the National 
Party in the country into activity.
In Kabul, the strongest party was probably that of
Sardar Mohammad Hashim, son of the late Mohammad Sharif
(d. 1883 at Baghdad), full-brother of Amir Sher ’Ali.
He was the richest of all the Barakzay sardars,
enjoying the additional prestige of being the son-in-law
of Amir Sher Ali’s favourite wife - an able and
energetic lady. As a person, Hashim was gentle and
polite but lacked determination, and preferred diplomacy
to militancy. After the deportation of Y a ’qub he hoped
27to become Amir ’, and believed that he would if he
26 Vide p.180.
27 BOA, 92.
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succeeded in building a bridge between the National 
Party and the British. However, the National Party 
never trusted him, and the British officers withdrew 
their original support when they started negotiations 
with fAbd al-Rahman. Only then did Hashim show 
opposition to British policy. He had the whole-hearted 
support of Sardar ’Abd Allah Jan, one of the most 
capable Barakzay sardars, and the half-hearted support 
of the Mustaufi Habib Allah. The Wali also aspired to 
the amirate, although it was generally known that he 
would not survive for a day without the backing of the 
British army.
In the Jalalabad area two powerful elders, Mohammad
PR
Akbar Khan Mohmand of Lalpura, and Sayyed Mahmud,
29
Badshah of Kunar, supported British policy in the face
°£ a >1 ehad led by Mull a Khalil, the Faqir of Mian 'Isa,
Sadiq Khan and others. Griffin spoke of Akbar Khan and
the Badshah as well as ’’the various other chiefs of
lesser or greater importance, who form the English 
30
party.” The identity of the ’’other chiefs” is not
known. Griffin might have been referring to the elders
of the Qizilbashes, Rajab ’Ali Hazara, an influential
elder of the Hazaras of the southern Hindu Kush, and to
others, mainly contractors who had benefitted from the
British occupation. In Griffin’s words, they ’’...would
rejoice if Afghanistan were for ever annexed to the
31British dominions,”
28 See p. 4.
29 See p o 111«
30 KD, 1 Apr 1880, PSLI, 25, 227.
31 Ibid.
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But the most influential voice in the choice of 
the Amir was that of the National Party, It was pro- 
Ya'qub, pro-Musa and pro-Ayub, although it is not known 
whether there was much communication between the Party 
and Ayub, who held Herat. The National Party would not 
accept any compromise on the integrity of Afghanistan. 
Although it was hostile to British policy in Afghanistan, 
the Party preferred British friendship to that of 
Russia.
Before the arrival of Griffin in Kabul, Roberts had 
made contact with the elders of the National Party, 
probably in response to letters sent by the elders of 
the Party to him. On 10 February 1880, Roberts had deputed 
Badshah Khan, an elder of the Ahmedzay Ghilzay from the 
district of Logar, and others to inform Mohammad Jan 
Wardak that the British had no interest in Afghanistan, 
except to protect it against the intrigues of Russia and that 
there was no need for any fighting. But Mohammad Jan 
did not trust Roberts1 words and imprisoned the messenger.
In mid-February, Roberts sent the Mustaufi to the elders 
of the National Party at Ghazni in the hope that he 
would be able to impress upon the elders the necessity
'Z
of naming someone to rule Kabul. The proposal fell 
short of what the elders of the National Party had earlier 
demanded, but the mission of the Mustaufi had some 
success. The elders of the National Party showed their 
willingness to come to a settlement with the British.
They sent back the Mustaufi, with a number of rather 
insignificant men who arrived at Kabul on 11 April 1880.
32 Roberts to Mohammad Jan, ... PSLI, 25> 25*
33 PNEA, 178.
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In a letter of 9 April, 202 elders of the party proposed 
that:-
”1 - Our king and ruler should he released and restored
to his former power; and we, the tribesmen, guarantee
that he will maintain a lasting and sincere friendship
towards the British G-overnment ...
”2 - The British Agent, whoever he may be, should be
of Mohammaden religion, while all British troops should be 
withdrawn from our country.11
113 - The kingdom of Afghanistan should be restored in
its entirety  In this way, it will be able to cope with
i n  V 3 4
its foreign [_ apparently RussianJ  enemies.11
On 13 April 1880, Griffin rejected these proposals in a
public darbar. Instead he told the emissaries of the
Rational Party that Afghanistan would be divided up and
35Ya’qub never allowed to reign again.
Once again an opportunity for coming to an under­
standing with the Rational Party was missed. The proposals 
could have become a basis for a settlement, but Lytton’s 
obstinate refusal to contemplate the restoration of 
Ya’qub was a stumbling block. Followers of the Rational 
Party resisted the advance of G-eneral Stewart who had 
left Kandahar on 1 April for Kabul. Two bloody engage­
ments were fought between the forces of the Rational Party and 
those of the G-eneral - one in Mushaki (about 23 miles 
to the south of Ghazni), the other in Char Assia 
(near Kabul). With the ultimate victory of the
34 Afghan elders to Griffin, undated, PSLI, 25, 509-
35 KD, ... PSLI, 25, 325*
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British forces, two Barakzay leaders of the National 
Party lent their support to the British, naively hoping 
this would help towards the restoration of Y a ’qub.
On 24 April, when Ghazni fell to General Stewart, Sardar 
Mohammad 'Alam accepted the temporary governorship of 
that city.
During this period, 'Abd al-Rahman tried to 
consolidate his position in Turkistan and extend his 
influence in the country, especially in the province of 
Kabul, In Kabul, the main centre of his attention was 
Kohistan, where he had many followers. In his letters 
to the elders and his relations, ’Abd al-Rahman, with 
remarkable skill, appealed to the hopes of the militant 
anti-British Afghans as well as to the British, Basically, 
his liters were not anti-British, but they were equally 
not meant to disregard the anti-British feelings in 
the country. In fact ’Abd al-Rahman kept in with both 
sides, the one expecting a peaceful settlement and the 
other leadership against the British.
’Abd al-Rahman called on the Kohistanis to be ready 
to fight for their faith and country and announced that 
he was moving on Kabul. He advised Mulla Mushk-i-*Alam 
and others to await his arrival and to attack the line of 
communications rather than Sherpur , the headquarters 
of the British forces at Kabul. To his relations in 
Kabul, where his letters were most likely to be intercepted,
36 Griffin to Foreign (T),....  PSLI, 25, 696.
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’Abd al-“Rahman wrote that "...affairs in Afghanistan 
had fallen into confusion owing to "bad management and
•27
breaking faith with Powerful State....'1 or "I hope 
when I have talked the matter over with the English
70
Government, they will.... .be pleased to withdraw. .
Among the people, the immediate response was one of
expectation and excitement. They looked on ’Abd al-Rahman
as the long-awaited leader. The Charikaris expressed
39their willingness to join ’Abd al-Rahman. Mir Bacha 
started arming soldiers for him and Ghulam Haydar Charkhi, 
a leader of the national Party, joined him in Kataghan. 
Only General Mohammad Jan Wardak came out against him, 
warning the British officials that ” ...Abdur Rahman and 
the sons of Azim / Mohammad Ishaq and his brothers^/" are 
sent by R u s s i a . ^
The Kabul sardars were disturbed. Mohammad Hashim 
entered into closer communication with the Mustaufi, and 
with the liberal use of his money tried to win over the 
Rational Party.
Griffin was alarmed. Since Kabul is, strategically, 
at the mercy of Kohistan, Griffin believed that a general 
rising' of the Kohistanis would prove formidable. He 
wrote, ’’The principal danger to be feared is that.....
37 Griffin to Foreign (T) ... PSLI, 25? 696.
38 ’Abd al-Rahman to Sardar Fakir Mohammad, 23 Mar 1880, 
PSLI, 25? 253.
39 Lytton to Cranbrook (T), 9 Apr 1880, PSLI, 25, 99.
40 Mohammad Jan Wardak to Bawab Ghulam Husayn (Assistant 
to Political Officer) ... PSLI, 25, 705 *
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the Sardar may prefer to trust a general rising, unite 
his forces with those of the Ghazni party, who might he 
induced to join him, and endeavour to become Amir of 
Afghanistan without the assistance of the English whom 
he knows to be anxious to leave the country.”^ - The 
picture looked still gloomier to Griffin when an erroneous 
report reached him that 1Abd al-Rahman had made an 
alliance with Ayub. As will be discussed later, Griffin’s 
alarm was premature.
Long before ’Abd al-Rahman had stirred up the people,
Lytton had thought of him as Amir for Kabul, mainly
because both were opposed to the family of the late Amir
Sher ’Ali. With the offer of Kabul to the hitherto
fugitive ’Abd al-Rahman, Lytton hoped he would make
’Abd al-Rahman so grateful that he would easily accept
his ’’new order” . It did not prove difficult for Lytton
to obtain approval of his choice from London, with the
one qualification that ’Abd al-Rahman was .acceptable
to the country, and he would be contented with northern 
42Afghanistan.” However, before that Cranbrook asked 
Lytton, ”But where is he, and how do you propose to know 
his wishes?”^  Lytton had already instructed his 
officials in Afghanistan to find out the whereabouts and 
wishes of the Sardar.
While the Sardar was in exile, his mother lived in
41 Griffin to Stewart, 8 Apr 1880, PSLI, 25, 247•
42 PNEA, 151.
43 Ibid.
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Kandahar and his sister in Kabul. They were contacted
by the British officials, probably in early February.
In a letter to *Abd al-Rahman, his sister wrote "Twice the
English had asked me about you. They enquired whether
44you were disposed to be friendly with them." Sayyed
Grhous al-Din, a nazir of the family of *Abd al-Rahman,
had a similar letter. "The English are exceedingly anxious
45for your friendship. They constantly ask me about you."
On March 3, 1880, * Abd al-Rahmanfs mother, who was interested 
in public affairs, was able to inform General Stewart in 
Kandahar that *Abd al-Rahman had rejected Ayub’s invitation 
for a joint march on Kabul because "... he had no intention
AC.
of acting against the English,..." Lytton considered
these letters very important and wrote to Griffin about
them, before the latter had set out for Kabul, that they
may have "... the most important practical bearing on the
early solution of the very difficult problem you are about
47to deal with in North Afghanistan."
Because an agent of the British Resident at Gilgit 
was with Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan, Lytton must have known 
that !Abd al-Rahman had entered Badakhshan in early 
February, yet he still seemed to avoid coptact with him.
When the encouraging letter of 'Abd al-Rahman*s mother 
was followed by the establishment of fAbd al-Rahman*s
44 *Abd al-Rahman*s sister to *Abd al-Rahman, undated, 
PSLI, 25, 220.
45 Ghous al-Din to *Abd al-Rahman, undated, PSLI, 25, 220.
46 *Abd al-Rahman*s mother to Stewart, PSLI, 25, 34.
47 Balfour, B, 421.
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authority in Kataghan, three messengers, from Kandahar, 
Peshawar and Kabul, were sent to him. Only the one from 
Kabul, Mohammad Sarwar G-hilsay, a confidential servant 
of fAbd al-Rahman*s family, succeeded in his mission.
The negotiations with fAbd al-Rahman have been 
covered in works by D. K. G-hose and D. P. Singhal, and by 
the latter in full detail, but they have dealt mainly 
with the diplomatic aspects. However, the attitude of 
*Abd al-Rahman in these negotiations is fully comprehensible 
only when the attitudes of the various political factions 
within the country are given equal weight. After a long 
residence abroad, *Abd al-Rahman found himself in a 
situation in which he had to deal with the British within 
the narrow framework of the **new order*1, and at the same 
time try to win over to his side the most influential 
elders in Kabul who were basically committed to the family 
of the late Amir Sher *Ali and without whose support it 
was difficult to establish himself. The following pages 
give a balanced, but a short, account of both aspects - 
internal as well as diplomatic.
On 2 April, Mohammad Sarwar set out for Kataghan.
Griffin*s written message to *Abd al-Rahman was very
general, inviting him to make any representations that he
might wish to the British G-overnment about his purpose in
48entering Afghanistan. In contrast, Griffin*s verbal 
message was more precise. Sarwar was directed to tell
48 Griffin to *Abd al-Rahman, PSLI, 25 > 225*
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'Abd al-Rahman that the English would like to establish
an Amir who would be friendly with them and that they were
determined to leave the country and that they had no
hostile feelings towards him because of his long residence
within the Russian Empire, and that the British Government
49was able to help him more than could Russia♦ ^
On 10 April 1880, Sarwar reached Kunduz where 'Abd 
al-Rahman had taken up residence. 'Abd al-Rahman did not 
believe in open diplomacy, but in Kataghan he was not 
strong enough to do otherwise. To deal with the British
50
while ignoring the army and elders would cause his "ruin". 
He therefore received Sarwar, in an open darbar attended 
by about ,f7,000", Uzbeks and Afghans. His written answer 
which he composed in their presence and which was approved 
by them was general, but his verbal message, like that of 
Griffin to him, was the more important, although that too 
was given in the presence of his council. The most 
essential points of his verbal message were that he would 
like to know the nature of the British friendship, would 
like to discuss the problem of negotiation in person in 
Charikar, that Afghanistan under him would be friendly to 
both Russia and Britain, and that the country, like Persia, 
would enjoy immunity from foreign interference. About 
his relationship with Russia, Griffin was to be told that 
"I have entered into no secret or written engagement with 
the Russians. I am bound to them..... simply by feelings 
of gratitude. I have eaten their salt and for 12 years
49 Singhal, 64.
50 Mahomed, S, 1, 191.
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51was dependent on their hospitality.11
Between Sarwar* s return to Kabul on 21 April 1880 
and the despatch of a second mission by Griffin to 'Abd 
al-Rahman on May 3, much had happened in Kabul and England 
which was to have significant bearing on the affairs of 
Afghanistan. The Spring Operation had come to an end 
and General Stewart had arrived in Kabul. Although it 
was the harvesting season and G-hasni was no longer the 
headquarters of the National Party, gatherings were being 
held in the Ghilsay country, and the opposition was 
still unabated. In Kohistan, the pendulum of popular 
enthusiasm continued to swing towards 'Abd al-Rahman, 
and the disbanded soldiers of the ex-Amir were joining 
him in large numbers. In England, as a result of the 
general election, the liberals under W. E. Gladstone 
formed a new government on 28 April. The Marquis of 
Hartington was the new Secretary of State for India and 
the Marquis of Ripon the new Viceroy, but until his 
arrival in India (8 June 1880) Lytton continued in office. 
The new administration was against an active policy in 
Afghanistan and had pledged itself to the recall of 
British troops from Afghanistan "decently and "honourably” . 
Although this change gave a new urgency to the early 
settlement of the Afghan problem, its importance should 
not be over-estimated.
Before trying to examine how 'Abd al-Rahman1s letter
51 1Abd al-Rahman to M. Sarwar, PSLI, 25, 603.
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was interpreted in Calcutta, it is necessary to examine, 
as far as we can in the absence of Russian sources, why 
Russia permitted ’Abd al“Rahman to enter Afghanistan, and 
what was ’Abd al-Rahman’s own purpose in doing so.
It is clear from Sultan Mahomed’s The Life of Abdur
Rahman that during his residence in Tashkand and Samarqand
(1869 - 1880) ’Abd al-Rahman was treated well and received^
moderate pension. Although he did not mix with the
52Russians, he occasionally met Kaufmann. But he was 
refused permission, despite his repeated requests, to 
enter Afghanistan during the reign of Sher *Ali and of 
Ya'qub, Only when Ya'qub was deported to India was 'Abd 
al-Rahman allowed and even urged to enter Afghanistan.
"You surely will be able," says the Secretary of Kaufmann 
to 'Abd al-Rahman, "to drive out General G-hulam Haider and
establish yourself in Turkistan  The English have
removed Yakub Khan to Hindustan; the opportunity is 
favourable. If you wish to go you are at liberty to do 
so.” Some three days later, 'Abd al-Rahman was emphatically 
urged. "...Why do you not go? If you fail it does not 
matter much, you can return to us and your present 
allowances. .
During this time Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and the 
main lines of communication had fallen to the British 
forces and it appeared as if the British meant to annex
52 BCA, 20.
53 'Abd al-Rahman to Sarwar, PSLI, 25? 603.
54 Ibid.
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Afghanistan south of the Hindu Kush, as indeed was 
Lytton*s original idea. In such an event, a Barakzay 
sardar such as ’Abd al-Rahman, who had spent many years 
in Russian Turkistan would not be allowed in Kabul.
Because the Sardar was encouraged to oust G-hulam Haydar 
Wardak, it suggests the view that it was more than likely 
that the Russians had a long term design on Afghanistan 
north of the Hindu Kush, a view that is borne out by 
their southward advance in the mid-eighties. A small 
Afghan state to the north of the Hindu Kush under 'Abd 
al-Rahman would be dependent on Russia eventually, 
especially in the face of a hostile British Empire.
Hence the lack of any written agreement with 'Abd al-Rahman 
and the small amount of assistance given him in arms and 
money^ to establish himself in Turkistan. But was 
'Abd al-Rahman to be content with only Turkistan?
Because of the lack of evidence, we are not sure with 
what purpose 'Abd al-Rahman left Tashkand for Afghanistan. 
But once he entered Afghanistan, all the evidence suggests 
that he was aiming for Kabul. In his letter to Shahzadah
56Hasan, 'Abd al-Rahman spoke of "...proceeding to Kabul.." 
Mirza Eazil Bek held the same view.^^ To Sultan Murad 
of Kataghan 'Abd al-Rahman wrote that he had come "...to
58release Afghanistan from the hands of the English..."
It may be argued that these were just ploys, aimed at
55 Griffin to Stewart, PSLI, 25, 1253-
56 'Abd al-Rahman to the Shahzadah,.....PSLI, 25, 921.
57 Eazil Bek, 211.
58 Mahomed, S, 1, 176.
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creating a favourable atmosphere for his entry and eventual 
establishment in their lands. But there are other consider­
ations which support the opposite view, with even greater 
force. Letters from his relations, indicating that the 
British were disposed to be friendly towards him, reached 
him when he was in Badakhshan. In the light of these 
letters, his rapid advance to Kunduz, in order to make 
an early contact with the British officials, may be 
understood. He was fully aware of the strength in 
Afghanistan and equally he was disillusioned with the 
Russians, of whom he said, 111 know what the Russians did 
to my grandfather, the late Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, and
59to the late Amir Sher:Ali. They will do the same to me." 
Also, he may have guessed that he had a good chance of 
becoming the ruler of Afghanistan if he responded favourably 
to the British. This may explain why in his first message 
to Griffin 'Abd al-Rahman said that he had entered 
Afghanistan in order "..to help my nation..."*^ Therefore 
it is tentatively suggested that Russia's design on 
northern Afghanistan was not altogether shared by 'Abd al- 
Rahman, and that the latter wished to become the ruler of 
the whole of Afghanistan.
fAbd al-Rahman1s message was received at a time 
(21 April) when Lytton was satisfied with his Afghan 
policy. He thought the massacre had been revenged by the 
capture of Kabul, the severance of Kandahar, and the
59 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Mohammad Afgial (British Agent 
Kabul) 29 June 1885, PSLI, 55, 720.
60 Mahomed, S, 1, 192.
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seizure of the frontier districts. By October, the army
was to withdraw whether Kabul had found a ruler or not.
This may explain why the points which ’Abd al-Rahman had
raised were not fully answered and the throne of Kabul
was offered to him. What Lytton had to say about them
to Cranbrook was vaguely conveyed to ’Abd al-Rahman
through the next messengers. About ’Abd al -Rahman:’ s
reference to Russia as a co-guarantor of a neutral Afghanistan,
Lytton, as might be expected, was completely opposed.
He said: ” ...he 'Abd al-Rahman_7 must put out of his head
61 the Anglo Russian protection...” over Afghanistan.
Although 'Abd al-Rahman was considered to be under Russian
influence, and his message dictated by Russian ’’advisers” ,
in Lytton’s view this did not make him ineligible for
the throne of Kabul - a strange attitude, because it was
precisely the fear of Russian influence over Amir Sher 'Ali
which was the main cause of the Anglo-Afghan war. But
Lytton was against 'Abd al-Rahman’s territorial concept
of "Afghanistan” . To Lytton, the separation of Kandahar
was irrevocable, "...he j_ 'Abd al-Rahman_J7 must put
out of his head the acquisition of Kandahar which we
would never restore...”^  Under such conditions, the
transfer of Kabul to 'Abd al-Rahman was to be unconditional
63and with a reasonable amount of assistance.
On 3 May 1880, Griffin sent a mission, led by 
Sardar Mohammad Afzal Wazirzadah, to 'Abd al-Rahman. Sardar
61 Balfour, 415°
62 Lytton to Cranbrook, ... PSLI, 25? 438°
63 Lyall to Griffin, ... PSLI, 25? 745°
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Mohammad Ibrahim and Sardar Sher Mohammad Barakzay were 
its other members. In choosing Mohammad Afzal and 
Mohammad Ibrahim, Griffin made his first mistake, because 
they were Amir Sher 'Ali’s brother-in-law and son 
respectively, and reported unfavourably on ’Abd al-Rahman. 
Afzal was a son of Hizam al-Dowla Sadozay who had resided 
on a British pension in India. Mohammad Afzal had distin­
guished himself in the British service and was now an 
Assistant Political Officer in Kabul, He had relations 
in the Kohistan and had some influence with them.
Mohammad Ibrahim was the eldest surviving but incompetent 
son of the late Amir. Also, because of his service to 
the British, Ibrahim had no influence with the Afghans 
and was himself under the influence of his uncle, the 
Wali of Kabul, who was opposed to ’Abd al-Rahman. The 
third member of the mission was an unimportant sardar, 
but a well-wisher of ’Abd al-Rahman.
The conditions of the "unconditional1' offer were so
severe that even Griffin was pessimistic about its
successful outcome. He believed that neither 'Abd al-
Rahman nor Ayub would accept the throne of Kabul if both
Kandahar and Herat, the two provinces most closely
associated with the historical glories of their line,
64
were taken from them. He therefore searched for some 
concessions to be made. Since the scheme of offering 
Herat to Persia had fallen through, Griffin and Stewart 
both favoured the inclusion of Herat in the dominion of
64 Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1256.
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the ruler of Kabul, to which the Government of India
agreed, but with the reservation that ’Abd al-Rahman
must take possession of it himself.^ As an alternative
to agreement with ’Abd al-Rahman, G-riffin proposed that
"In the event of failure, Abdur Rahman be set aside and
66a new Amir proclaimed." But if no capable Amir was
found, in that case the great Afghan tribes would be
told that "...each tribe should manage its internal
affairs in the same manner as the independent tribes of
the north-west frontiers, Afridis, Waziris, Usufzais,
67
and others have been wont to do." Strangely, G-riffin
proposed to reduce the already reduced state of Kabul,
and protect the elders of Lalpura and Kunar to whom they
68
had given guarantees. But none of these proposals was
acceptable to the Government of India, because they might
involve India, which she did not want, in the struggles
among equally matched factions, perpetuate anarchy, and
69divide the country still further without a government.
On 15 May the mission arrived at Khanabad (the centre 
of Kataghan, about 257 miles to the north of Kabul) 
where ’Abd al-Rahman had taken up residence. In Khanabad 
’Abd al-Rahman had with him almost all the influential 
elders of Kohistan. He was confident of their loyalty 
but he had not yet won over the Ghilzay elders, though he
65 Lyall to G-riffin, 27 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1075.
66 Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25? 1256.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid, 1258.
69 Lyall to Griffin, 20 May 1880,. PSLI, 25, 1265.
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was in constant communication with them. Before accepting
the throne, he preferred to consult the Ghilzay elders.
He said: tf, . .1 will first summon the chiefs of Logar,
the Ghilzays, and Wardaks, and will bring them to consent
70to my rule, like the Kohistanis." He feared that his
association with the British without consulting the
G-hilzays would make him like the puppet rulers of Kabul
and Kandahar. Although Mohammad Afzal went beyond his
instructions and offered ’Abd al-Rahman the arnirate and
a -treaty with India, ?Abd al-Rahman was still unwilling
to accept them. He said, "Singly, I can neither be
friend nor foe of anyone; my special desire therefore is
to accept no position and make no treaty without the
71approval and consent of the chiefs of my nation." At 
the same time, ’Abd al-Rahman was very careful not to 
lose the opportunity. lie therefore adopted delaying 
tactics and in a public darbar asked the mission the 
following questions
"When the British Government tells me that what 
are to be the boundaries of Afghanistan; will 
Kandahar, as of old, be left in my kingdom or 
not? Will a European Envoy and a Government 
(British), remain within the borders of Afghanistan, 
after friendship is made between us two or not?
What enemy of the British Government shall I be 
expected to repel and what manner of assistance 
will the Government wish me to give? And what
70 Afzal and others to Griffin, 18 May 1880, PSLI, 25? 1272.
71 Ibid, 1271.
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benefits will the Government undertake to
72confer on me and on my countrymen?’1
On 16 May, ’Abd al-Rahman sent his formal reply through 
two members of the mission, who arrived at Kabul on 
June 2. !Abd al-Rahman kept Mohammad Afzal at Khanabad; 
he concluded that ’’The Sardar desires friendship of the 
British Government, but is suspicious* Russia is 
assisting him with money and arms. Believes he is very 
popular with the nation.
Meanwhile, ’Abd al-Rahman increased his communication
with the elders of the country and addressed almost all
groups, including the Qizilbashes, the Hazaras, and even
some of the staunchest supporters of the ex-Amir, like
Mohammad Jan and others. It is significant to note that
of the 97 letters sent through one Nazir Mohammad Qasim,
74there was only one letter to a Kandahari. As usual,
the tones of his letters varied, but he spoke less of a
jjehad. He advised the Kohistanis not to make disturbance
7 5
but to be ready. To the more militant faction of the 
National Party, represented by the elders of the Maidan 
and Mohammad Jan Wardak, 'Abd al-Rahman wrote that 
” ...there should be no passive laxity on your part in 
collecting your levies, who should remain fully equipped 
and armed, but passive and stationary until the result 
/of the negotiations/ is known, of which I shall acquaint 
you.”^  Reportedly, ’Abd al-Rahman went so far as to
72 Ibid. 1272.
73 Ibid.
74 ’Abd al-Rahman to elders, PSLI, 25, 1296.
75 ’Abd al-Rahman to Khwaja Sultan (Kohistan), 19 May 1880, 
KB, 25, 1088.
76 'Abd al-Rahman to elders in Maidan Jamad-i-us-Sani, 1297, 
PSLI, 25, 1305*
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seek the advice of some influential elders of the
77eastern G-hilzays whether he should go to Kabul or not.
Despite the moderate tone of these letters, popular
militancy was increasing. Earlier, Mir Ghulam Haydar,
a spokesman for the Kohistan elders and son-in-law of
the late Mohammad A ’zam, had urged Mulla Mushk-i-’Alam,
Mohammad Jan and the elders of the southern Ghilzays and
of Logar that should the British not accept ’Abd al-Rahman
1 •..it was incumbent upon all Afghans to rise and make
7ft
a final effort to expel the English,” The spring season
was on its way out and most people had gathered their
crops. Also the appearance of the Safays of Tagao at
Kohistan gave a new dimension to the anti-British struggle,
Griffin took all this seriously. He said, "Should the
cry / of jehad. 7 be raised it would spread like
7 0
wild-fire .,f But he thought it might not prove difficult
to expel ’Abd al-Rahman by the expenditure of 5 or 4
lakhs of rupees in paying up the Turkistan troops and
SOraising the Uzbek population against him.
In Kabul, when the opening of negotiations with 
’Abd al-Rahman was known, changes took place in the 
political factions. The Wali abandoned hope of the 
throne. Similarly, Mohammad Hashim also saw his chance 
lost. He asked permission to go to Earah, ostensibly to
77 ’Abd al-Rahman to Ghilzay elders (eastern), KD, 
19 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1087.
78 Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1252,
79 Ibid, 1254.
80 Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1256.
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his own estate but in reality to join Sardar Ayub.
Sardar Mohammad 'Alam and Sardar Mohammad Tahir tried to
impress upon G-riffin that '' . . .Yakub was the only man who
81could really pacify the country.” But the man who really 
tried to thwart the negotiations with 'Abd al-Rahman was 
Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak. He had much influence with 
the Logaris and Wardaks and was a personal friend of 
Mulla Mushk-i-'Alam and Mohammad Jan and was respected 
throughout the country. In many ways the Mustaufi was 
the most able and powerful man in the country, with the 
intelligence to devise schemes and the patience and
82powers of organisation successfully to carry them out.
The accession of 'Abd al-Rahman meant ruin to the
Mustaufi. Besides being a senior official of the late
Amir Sher 'Ali, the Mustaufi had made 'Abd al-Rahman his
enemy. Twice the Mustaufi had written to General G-hulam
Haydar Wardak to dispose of any member of the family of
83
'Abd al-Rahman who might cross into Turkistan. After
the escape of the General, his secretary went over to
'Abd al-Rahman, so presumably the Mustaufi's actions were
known to 'Abd al-Rahman. The Mustaufi then increased
his secret activities against the negotiations with 'Abd
al-Rahman. In Kabul he tried to combine all the aardars
84of the Sher 'Ali faction against 'Abd al-Rahman.
In Turkistan he endeavoured to raise the country against
81 Sardar Mohammad 'Alam to Griffin, 12 May 1880, 25, 1203*
82 Griffin to Stewart, 21 May 1880, PSLI, 25? 1066.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
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'Abd Al-Rahman and to incite such disaffection in his
85
army as to prevent his visiting Kabul. But on 20 May 
the Mustaufi was deported to India. Griffin wrote,
"The removal of the Mustaufi appears sufficient for the 
break up of the formidable combination formed against 
the Government
On 21 May 1880, before 1Abd al-Rahman1s answer was 
received in Kabul, Lord Hartington, the new Secretary of 
State for India, had announced his views on Afghan policy. 
He argued against the military occupation of the whole 
country. Prompt evacuation and the re-establishment of 
a " ..settled government11 were considered to be the 
best alternatives. 'Abd al-Rahman might be established 
in Kabul ".. .with as little direct assistance from Her 
Majesty's agent or troops as possible, and to give him 
to understand that he must rely on his own sources."^
On the other hand, he might not be embarrassed with the 
presence of British officers. Her Majesty's Government 
was content with only a Rative envoy who would supply
89the Indian Government with all necessary information.
On 2 June 1880, 'Abd al-Rahman's reply was received 
in Kabul. His delaying tactics exasperated Griffin, who 
swung rapidly from one view to another. At first, sharing 
the view of Mohammad Afzal and Mohammad Ibrahim that 'Abd
85 Griffin to Stewart for India, 21 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1066
86 Ibid, 1069 •
87 Prasad, B. The Foundations of India's Foreign Policy 
1860 - 1882. 1, 2 2 5 .
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
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al-Rahman’s letter was simply a device ” ..•to gain time
for Russian advice. . Griffin concluded that ’Abd
91al-Rahman was a ’’Russian nominee” . Then Griffin changed 
his view that his hesitation to come to Kabul ” ...might 
be dictated by other motives /""the weakness of his position 
in the city^/ than by love of Russia.”^  With all his 
astuteness, Griffin failed to realise that ’Abd al-Rahman 
was trying to win over the elders of the Rational Party 
and avoid too close association with the ’’infidels” .
To add to the complications, over 200 letters from
’Abd al-Rahman to the people of every group had created
tremendous popular excitement. ’Abd al-Rahman*s new tactic
was to pose before the staunchest supporters of the ex-Arair
simply as his follower, determined either to bring about^
the restoration of Ya'qub or the appointment of his son.
Now even the followers of the ex-Amir believed that at
last they had found a leader who was capable of forcing
the British out and bringing the .jehad to a successful
conclusion. Mohammad Jan Wardak with levies from the
various sections of Ghilzays and Wardaks was heading
towards Ghazni, with a plan to advance on Kabul, while
the Kohistanis were preparing themselves for a similar
m ov e.^ Believing that this agitation was primarily due
95
to the letters of 'Abd al-Rahman Griffin and Stewart
90 Griffin to India (T), 3 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1077.
91 Ibid.
92 Griffin to Stewart for India, 5 June 1880, PSLI,25»1288.
93 Griffin to Stewart for India, 9 June 1880, PSLI,25,1303*
94 Griffin to Stewart for India,11 June 1880, PSLI,25,1146.
95 Griffin to Stewart for India,11 June 1880, PSLI,25,1146.
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proposed that 11.. .negotiations with him should be
broken off"*^ and Ya1qub restored. In case Ya'qub did 
not accept Afghanistan without Kandahar and the frontier
districts, Griffin proposed the appointment of Sardar 
97Ayufcr' although he was not certain about his acceptance
only of Kabul. But the new Viceroy was not prepared
to break off with fAbd al-Rahman, because in his view
"...the grounds upon which it is proposed at once to
break off correspondence with 'Abd al-Rahman are as yet 
98
inadequate.H
On 14 June 1880, Griffin, instructed by the Govern­
ment of India on 12 June, sent 'Abd al-Rahman the British 
terms in full detail. 'Abd al-Rahman was to be told that 
since the British Government admitted no right of inter­
ference in Afghanistan and since Russia and Persia were 
pledged to abstain from all political influence in Afghan 
affairs, it is plain that the Kabul ruler could have no 
diplomatic relations with any foreign power except Britain. 
And if such power shotild attempt to interfere in Afghan­
istan and if such interference should ledd to unprovoked 
aggression on the Kabul ruler, Britain would be prepared 
to aid him and if necessary to repel the aggressor, 
provided that he would follow our advice in his external 
relations. With regard to territorial limits, the whole 
province of Kandahar had been placed under a separate 
ruler, except Pishin and Sibi retained in British hands.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid, 1147.
98 Ripon to Hartington, 15 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1136.
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Therefore the British Government could enter into no 
negotiations with the Sardar on these points or in 
respect of arrangements with regard to the north-west 
frontier made with the ex-Amir. With these reservations, 
the British Government were willing that the Sardar 
should establish over Afghanistan generally, including 
Herat, as complete and extensive quthority as had hitherto 
been exercised by his predecessors. The British Govern­
ment would not interfere in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan nor would they demand acceptance of an 
English resident anywhere in the country, though for 
the conduct of ordinary friendly intercourse it may be 
convenient to station, by agreement, a Mohammadan British
QQ
Agent at Kabul.
It should be recalled here that Persia was bound 
by the treaty of Paris of 1857 not to interfere with 
Herat, but Russia was not bound by such an undertaking.
In 1873 and 1875 a kind of understanding had been reached 
between Russia and Britain over Afghanistan whereby 
Russia admitted Afghanistan to be beyond her sphere of 
influence, while Britain agreed not to violate the 
independence of Afghanistan. But with the treaty of 
Gandamak, and the subsequent occupation of Afghanistan 
by Britain, the Russian official view, as expressed in 
the "Journal de St. Petersbourg" and the MAgene Russe" 
on 28th and 29th August 1879 was that the treaty had 
made that understanding null and void.^^^
99 Lyall to Griffin, 12 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1147 
100 PLEA, 128.
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On 20 June 1880, ’Abd al-Rahman received Griffin’s
message in Khanabad. On instructions from Calcutta,
Griffin had set a four-day time limit for ’Abd al-Rahman
within which he was required to reply. This time,
’Abd al-Rahman accepted the terms in principle, but he
interpreted them as if Kandahar and the assigned districts
were included in the offer, saying ’’Regarding the boundaries
of Afghanistan which were settled by Treaty with m y....
101grandfather Amir Rost Mohammad, these you granted me.”
He accepted all other points of the offer too, but inter­
preted them differently, slightly to his advantage. It 
is significant to note that ’Abd al-Rahman expressed his 
willingness to set off shortly for Parwan (north of Kabul) 
and soon sent off his message, on 22 June, by express 
horsemen, who reached Kabul on 26 June. Further, ’Abd 
al-Rahman wrote to Griffin about Ayub: "If he should be
hostile to m e .... then I will inform you and take such
actions as we.... may deem to be right and proper.”
Accompanying the letter of ’Abd al-Rahman was Mohammad 
Afzal’s message in cipher: "Abdur Rahman'to appearance
is a friend of the English; at heart their enemy and
102contemplates mischief.”
When the first treaty (1855) was signed between 
Amir Rost Mohammad and the British, Kandahar was not in 
the Amir’s dominions, but it was at the second treaty 
(1857)* The vague reference of ’Abd al-Rahman to ’’Treaty”
101 'Abd al-Rahman to Griffin, 15 Rajab 1297 (22 June 1880), 
PSLI, pt 2, 26, 1297.
102 Afzal to Griffin, ... PSLI, 25, 1411.
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could be applied to either. Thus he left his claim open 
103on Kandahar. In announcing his acceptance of the
terms to the elders, 'Abd al-Rahman went a step further 
by saying as if the British had promised him that "The 
very same boundaries shall be given to you, as existed 
in the time of your grandfather
Usually, after each message which he sent to Griffin,
'Abd al-Rahman progressively increased the number of his
letters to the elders. After the acceptance of the terms,
his circulars were increased still further. His new
letter to Griffin and his circulars to the elders alarmed
Griffin. Their immediate result was that Mohammad Hashim
and Sardar ’Abd Allah joined the Ghilzays, and the latter
103were greatly excited. Griffin’s fears were further
increased by wrongly believing that Ayub was "...no doubt
106in concert with Abdur Rahman." Believing that the
Afghans had been "...enriched by the war" and that they
were today "...more formidable for offence and defence 
107than ever" and that they had looked upon ’Abd al-Rahman
as a Baraksay sardar, able "...to unite all parties in
108driving the infidels out of the country,/’ Griffin and
Stewart reaffirmed their early conviction that "...the
109people are preparing for a general rise..." They again
urged that the negotiations with 'Abd al-Rahman be broken
103 Ripon to Hartington, 6 July 1880, PSLI, pt 2, 26, 10.
104 'Abd al-Rahman to elders, KD, 22 June 1880, PSLI, pt 2, 
26, 24*
105 Griffin to India, 27 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1414*
106 Ibid.
107 Griffin to India, 5 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1286.
108 Griffin to India,19 June 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 24
109 Griffin to India, 9 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1305*
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off, and that either the ex-Amir or his son or Ayub he 
brought to power, but they preferred the ex-Amir on the
grounds that he would easily expel !Abd al-Rahman from
110
Afghanistan.
But Ripon, despite the unsatisfactory reply of
’Abd al-Rahman, did not share Griffin’s alarm, saying
that ” ...in the present cexplicated state of political
affairs and parties in Afghanistan, an understanding with
the Sardar /" ’Abd al-Rahman_J7' still offers the most
111desirable solution.” The Government of India instructed
Griffin to request ’Abd al-Rahman to start at once for
Kabul, accepting the separation of Kandahar from Afghan- 
112istan. Meanwhile, Stewart was authorised to break
off with ’Abd al-Rahman if he delayed his reply, and to
ask the representatives of the late Amir Sher ’Ali’s
115family to organise a government.
Accordingly, Griffin addressed a letter to ’Abd al-
Rahman on 2 July 1880. ’Abd al-Rahman had already left
114Khanabad on a slow march, and received the letter in
115Minjan after he had travelled a long way from Ak Chasma.
On 6 July, ’Abd al-Rahman sent his reply in the affirmative 
by express horsemen who had already been stationed along 
the road to Kabul. ’Abd al-Rahman indicated to Griffin
110 Ibid. 27 June 1880, PSLI, 25, 1414.
111 Ripon to Hartington, 6 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 11.
112 Foreign (Simla) to Stewart (T), 29 June 1880, 26,
pt 2, 25.
115 Ripon to Hartington, 6 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 11.
114 Ghose, 118.
115 Ghose, 118.
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that he wanted "...to consult the people of Afghanistan," 
in Kohistan, where he arrived on 14 July and encamped 
at Tutundara (a valley ahout four miles to the north of 
Charikar). G-riffin and Stewart did not insist on 'Abd 
al-Rahman1 s arrival at Kabul, not because " ...there was
no sign of growing hostility against the British Govern-
11 7ment" as Ghose believed but, on the contrary, in the 
face of growing hostility they did not think it advisable 
to embarrass fAbd al-Rahman, for whom they were now trying 
to win over the Afghan elders.
’Abd al-Rahman's correspondence with leaders of the 
Rational Party, his arrival at Kohistan, and the repeated 
announcements of Griffin that the British were leaving 
Afghanistan, brought about new alignments. At first the 
Rational Party split, then its most influential leaders 
declared their support for 'Abd al-Rahman. Finally, after 
the withdrawal of the British troops, the Rational Party 
ceased functioning.
Elected as their leader by some Ghilzay and Wardak 
elders at Gardez (the main town of Zurmut), Sardar Hashim 
drew closer to that wing of the Rational Party which was 
bitterly opposed to the British. Sardar Mohammad Hasan 
and Eaiz Mohammad Ghilzay, son of the late Mohammad Shah 
Khan (who, together with the late Wazir Akbar Khan had 
forced the British x^ithdrawal about forty years ago) ,
116 'Abd al-Rahman to Griffin, 6 July 1880; negotiations 
with Abdur Rahman 1880, A.37.
117 Ghose, 119.
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were among his new supporters* Sardar Hashim, for
the first time, leaned towards an active anti-British
role, hut it was too late. The gathering at Maidan,
with ahout 10,000 G-hilzays and Wardaks, scattered in the
villages, was the higgest at the moment. Its spokesmen
were Mohammad Afzal Wardak (brother of Mohammad Jan
Wardak), and Ismat Allah G-hilzay, who were against any
119compromise with the British. However, a dramatic
development cooled down the anti-British excitement.
The man responsible for this was none other than MuHa 
Mushk-i-’Alam.
Bor an early settlement, G-riffin thought it advisable
to get in touch with MuHa Mushk-i-’Alam. In mid-June, he
wrote to him that 11 The Government does not wish to take
the country, and is with a single mind endeavouring to
find some Chief who shall be both wise to rule and strong
to protect his subjects. If quiet be maintained, then a
120happy settlement will be speedily made.” In his first
letter to Griffin, the MuHa stressed two points; the 
Amirate for Musa Jan, and a cease-fire between the 
ghazis and the British troops, which were engaged against 
each other in the Maidan and Charikar areas. The Mulla 
wrote ”If your object be the peace and friendship of
121Afghanistan, then you should restrain your troops...”
118 ED, 12 July 1880, PSLI, 26,pt 5, 455.
119 KD, 6 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3, 454.
120 Griffin to Mushk-i-’Alam, ED, 6 July 1880, PSLI,
26, pt 3, 454.
121 Mushk-i-!Alam to Griffin, ED,- 24 June 1880, PSLI,
26, pt 2, 100.
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G-riffin must have given him such an assurance, because
the Mulla, who had recently been elected as "Imam al-
Mujahidun-a-wa Al-Muslimun / sicJT'11'^^ (leader of the
holy warriors and Muslims) vigorously restrained the
ghazis in M a i d a n , a n d  worked for a " .. .reconciliation
between Islam and the English.” Ihe Mulla1s next
achievement was his persuasion of 'Ismat Allah, Mulla
'Abd al-G-hafur and some others to accept any one, be
it Ya'qub, 'Abd al-Rahman or Ayub, whom the British chose
as Amir.^*^ On July 20, G-riffin wrote to them that 'Abd
al-Rahman was the choice, faithful to his promise, the
Mulla now even persuaded Mohammad Jan Wardak and swore
with him on the Quran to uphold 'Abd al-Rahman.^^
Although the amirate of 'Abd al-Rahman was "...most 
1 91distasteful" to them, they accepted him, as G-riffin
had anticipated "...for a temporary purpose, such as the
120expulsion of the English from their country" mainly
because Ya'qub was not restored, Musa Jan not accepted
and Ayub failed to join them. Otherwise their opposition
to the British was so strong that they threatened 'Abd
al-Rahman, even when he became Amir, that they would
desert him if he persisted in paying a courtesy call on
129the British camp in Charikar.
122 KD, 19 June 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 19*
125 KD, 11 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 5, 420.
124 KD, 6 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 5, 454.
125 Mushk-i-'Alam and others to Griffin, KD, 19 July 1880, 
PSLI, 26, pt 4, --- -
126 KD, 26 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 5, 493*
127 KD, 7 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 215.
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66
Now, Gharikar had "become the biggest centre where
the G-hilzays, Kohistanis, Tagovis were congregating daily.
Griffin already had sent there an unofficial deputation
led by the Khan-i-Mulla Khan (chief judge) of Kabul.
'Abd al-Rahman writes that "On 20th July all the chiefs
and heads of the Afghan tribes proclaimed me as their
King and Amir at Charikar and wrote my name in the Khutba
1^0as their ruler."  ^ Two days later, Griffin, instructed
by the Gcrernment of India, also held a darbar in Kabul
where Amir 'Abd al-Rahman was "...formally acknowledged
and recognised by the British Government as Amir of 
1^1Kabul." None of the anti-British Barakzay sardars
of the National Party, including Mohammad Hashim as well
as Raiz Mohammad Ghilzay, attended the ceremony either
in Charikar or in Kabul. They set out for Kandahar,
after they had been disappointed to hear from Mushk-i-
'Alam at Maidan that he had accepted 'Abd al Rahman and
1*52did not wish to encourage dissension.
Shortly after assuming the Emirate, 'Abd al-Rahman 
moved to Ak Serai (south of Charikar) with more than
20,000 followers, and the influential elders of the Tajiks, 
Ghilzays and Safays, including elders like Ismat Allah 
Khan, Mazullah Khan of Hisarak, Bahram Khan of Iaghman, 
and Badshah Khan of Logar. Mohammad Jan Wardak and 
Mushk-i-'Alam were absent. News reached Kabul and India 
that Sardar Mohammad Ayub had gained a.decisive victory
130 Mahomed, S. 1, 195.
131 Griffin to Stewart, 23 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3, 403.
132 Griffin to Stewart, 26 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3? 493*
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over a British force at Maiwand along the Helmand river 
in Kandahar on 27 July* One of its immediate effects 
was that it "brought the British and Amir fAhd al-Rahman 
still closer* A common enemy was seriously threatening 
the position of "both at Kabul and Kandahar, and if he 
were not quickly defeated the recent arrangements might
collapse and the whole country rise. Compelled by the news 
133of the defeat, Griffin arranged, with all possible speed, 
to meet the Amir at Zimma (about 15 miles to the north of 
Kabul) - the place he had already suggested - for a 
settlement. On 31 July and 1 August they had two meetings 
which lasted well over six hours.
Regarding the territorial question, the Amir told
134Griffin that he had no desire either for Kandahar or Herat.  ^
Neither did he raise any demand on the frontier districts. 
Instead, he concentrated on asking for arms, money and a 
formal treaty, in order to establish himself as quickly 
as possible in anticipation of Ayub's possible advance on 
Kabul. But the Amir failed to obtain all that he had asked 
for. Only some light guns (the heavy guns of the late 
Amir had already been removed to India), 10 lakhs of rupees 
(in addition to 9v lakhs of rupees left in the treasury 
of Ya'qub), and a formal letter of statement, in conformity 
with the detailed letter sent to him to Khanabad, defining 
his relationship with the British, were given or promised 
to him. In trying to win the friendship of Britain, the 
Amir went so far as to contradict his earlier statement
135 Griffin to Stewart, 4 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 5, 864- 
134 Ibid, 869.
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by telling Griffin that in Russian Turkistan he had been
135kept "...more as a prisoner than as a free agent.”
Perhaps his greatest service to the British was his
persuasion of the Ghilzay elders (by no means a small
task) to consent to the passage of a British force through
136Ghazni to Kandahar, ostensibly to leave Afghanistan but 
in reality for the defeat of Ayub in Kandahar, against 
whom the British found it difficult to send troops from 
Quetta. Griffin promised the Amir the immediate retreat 
of all British forces from Kabul, and this began on 
10th August. Thus the Anglo-Afghan conflict in the Kabul 
area, which had lasted for about two years, came to an 
end.
The accession of 'Abd al-Rahman was the result of a 
complicated process involving a number of conflicting 
factors. The factors which favoured his accession were 
firstly the almost general opposition to the British 
occupation, secondly the choice by Eytton of 'Abd al- 
Rahman, and finally the flexible attitude of 'Abd al-Rahman 
himself.
Except for short intervals, the general opposition 
to the British occupation of Kabul was continual. Only 
the cities of Kabul, Jalalabad and later Ghazni were in 
the British hands. All efforts, including the spring 
operation, to subdue the country as a whole had failed.
The bulk of the population such as the Ghilzays, Wardaks, 
Tajiks and the Pashtuns of the outlying districts opposed 
the British, while only a few groups such as the Qizilbashes
135 Griffin to Stewart, 4 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 5, 875*
136 Ibid, 872.
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and the Jaghuri Hazaras and a number of chiefs such as a 
few Barakzay sardars, the Badshah of Kunar, and Akbar 
Khan of Lalpura, supported the British. Kindled by 
religious feelings, the popular anti-British movements 
were basically against an alien infidel rule, and for the 
preservation of independence. But contrary to the notion 
that circumstances create leaders, this prolonged resis­
tance had failed to produce one until the appearance of 
’Abd al-Rahman.
The choice by Lytton of ’Abd al-Rahman was another 
significant contributing factor to ’Abd al-Rahman’s successor. 
This choice was based on the belief that ’Abd al-Rahman 
was the only alternative to the ex-Amir. Although Lytton’s 
policy concerning Afghanistan had been mainly abandoned 
by the new Liberal Administration in England, yet the 
negotiations with 'Abd al-Rahman were continued by Ripon, 
despite the suggestions by Griffin and Stewart that they 
should be stopped. This was due to the statesmanship of 
Ripon. Later, Griffin's efforts in winning the support of Mulla 
Mushk-i-’Alam and others for 'Abd al-Rahman proved a 
significant factor in 'Abd al-Rahman's ultimate success.
Respite all this, 'Abd al-Rahman might have failed 
had he persisted in his original claim. In mid-June his 
flexibility became apparent, as he no longer insisted on 
the Afghanistan ruled by his grandfather, but expressed 
his willingness to accept the throne of the reduced and 
dependent state of Kabul. This change of attitude can 
be explained when the movements of his cousin, Sardar 
Ayub, in south-west Afghanistan are considered.
70
For the obvious reasons that Ayub was a son of the 
late Amir and popular with the National Party as well as 
the Barakzays of Kandahar while 'Abd al-Rahman was not,
'Abd al-Rahman would not form an anti-British alliance 
with him. On 9 June 1880, about three weeks before 
'Abd al-Rahman set out for Kabul, Ayub had left Herat 
to march on Kandahar. This must have been known by 
'Abd al-Rahman and he must have feared the almost certain 
alliance of the Barakzays and Grhilzays under Ayub, should 
he come to Kandahar. In such an event 'Abd al-Rahman, 
knowing that the British were determined to leave 
Afghanistan, must have feared that Ayub might come to 
terms with the British before he did. In this context, 
his acceptance of the British terms is not surprising.
Again, 'Abd al-Rahman might have failed even in 
obtaining the throne of Kabul if Ayub had advanced on 
Kandahar a few weeks earlier than he did. To gain the 
throne of Kabul the support of the G-hilzays was essential. 
They were the supporters of Ya'qub and Ayub, but their 
opposition to the British was stronger than their loyalty 
to them. Hence, in the absence of Ayub, they reluctantly 
accepted 'Abd al-Rahman as Amir at the last moment.
As a Barakzay sardar, 'Abd al-Rahman stood almost 
alone. The late Amir had liquidated the Barakzay sardars 
who had supported the family of 'Abd al-Rahman during 
the civil war. The remainder of the Barakzay sardars 
at Kabul were either pro-Ya'qub, pro-British, or had 
ambition for themselves. As a keen realist, 'Abd al-Rahman 
therefore bypassed them and appealed directly to the
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popular feelings. It is a great tribute to his diplomacy 
that ’Abd al-Rahman succeeded in gaining the support of 
those opposed to the British, along with those who, like 
Grhilzays and Wardaks, were committed to the family of 
the late Amir, while at the same time successfully trying 
to come to terms with the British. But by doing so, he 
cannot escape the criticism that his acceptance of Kabul 
meant the division of Afghanistan which had been united 
under Amir Dost Mohammad and which ’Abd al-Rahman had 
originally claimed.
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Chapter 3
The Reunification of Afghanistan, 1880-84
In accordance with the British scheme of disinteg­
ration, the province of ICandahar was placed under a nominally 
independent ruler, while Herat was offered to Persia on 
certain conditions favourable to British India. Ultimately, 
however, these arrangements failed and Afghanistan emerged 
as a reunified kingdom under Amir ’Abd al-Rahman. The 
object of this chapter is to analyse firstly these 
arrangements and the reaction against them and secondly 
the subsequent struggle between the two rival cousins,
’Abd al-Rahman and Mohammad Ayub, for the control of 
Afghanistan.
Broadly speaking, the province of Kandahar was 
bounded on the north by the Taimini country which was 
subject to Herat and by the Hazarajat and Muqur districts 
which were subject to the province of Kabul; on the south 
by Baluchistan and on the west by Parah. Its inhabitants 
were predominantly Durranis (formerly called Abdalis) whose 
number in the nineteenth century had been estimated between
500,000 and 1,200,000. Although with the transfer of 
the capital to Kabul in the latter part of the eighteenth 
century Kandahar had lost its original significance, it 
was still associated with the ruling dynasty and the 
Durranis were still a privileged tribe. The other inhabitants 
of Kandahar were the G-hilzays in the east, the Hazaras in 
the north, the Brahuis and Baluchis in the south-west, 
with smaller communities of Qizilbashes (Parsiwans) and
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Hindus in the city*
Lytton considered Kandahar to he of immense
importance hoth strategically and commercially. Its
control, whether direct or indirect, was therefore
considered to he essential. He wrote, "Although our
primary reason for holding and improving this route
/ Quetta-Kandahar-Herat-Central Asiaji^is, no doubt,
the undisputed command of southern Afghanistan Kandahar^/*
and the means of forestalling Russian influence at Herat,
we cannot lose sight of the fact that this route has been
at all times one of the main tracks of Central Asian 
2traffics.*' To maintain an effective hold over the 
province, the construction of a railway line to the city 
was started, which was scheduled to he completed at the 
end of 1880*^
For maintaining the ’'undisputed command’1 over Kandahar, 
indirect rule hacked by military force was attempted.
Sardar Sher ’Ali, a son of Mehrdil Khan and a cousin of 
the late Amir Sher 'Ali was made ruler. Sardar Sher 'Ali 
was already the governor of Kandahar when it was occupied 
by British troops after the disturbance of September 1879* 
He was closely related to the mother of the late heir- 
apparent, 'Abd Allah Jan, and was not on intimate terms
1 GA Kand, i-iv, 118-159* IGA, 72. Elphinstone, 2, 84-136.
Yapp, M.E., Disturbances in Western Afghanistan, 1839-40, 
BSOAS, xxvi, pt 2, 1963, 288. Tully, E., Topographic and 
Sanitary Report on Kandahar City, 1 June 1881, PSLI, 29, 1102.
2 Lytton to Cranbrook, 20 Hov 1879, PKEA, 110.
3 Ibid.
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with Ya'qub Khan.^ To obtain Kandahar, Sardar Sher 'Ali 
threw in his lot with the British and so fitted well into 
the scheme of disintegration. Lytton wrote that British 
officials at Kandahar "...are of the opinion that Sher 
vAli Khan is well able to hold his own and entirely 
subject to our control." Consequently, Sher 'All's 
provisional acceptance of Kandahar in November 1879 was 
followed by his official recognition in May 1880 as the 
Wali (governor) of Kandahar.
Apparently the Durranis of Kandahar, unlike the 
inhabitants of Kabul, did not prove turbulent. Perhaps, 
owing to the nature of the flat, open country and the lack 
of a leader, they were unable to oppose the British forces. 
However, sporadic activities and surprise attacks, even 
by small boys, were widely reported. But the December 
rising against the British at Kabul encouraged the ghazis 
in Kandahar and alarmed the Wali. To keep the Wall in 
Kandahar, General Stewart considered it necessary to 
give him some definite assurances. On 12 March 1880, the 
Government of India decided that the province of Kandahar 
would be placed under the hereditary rule of Sardar Sher 
'Ali as Wali. He would enjoy complete internal independence 
but his foreign relations would be controlled by a 
political representative. On 11 May 1880, Kandahar was 
publicly bestowed on the Wali. The Viceroy's letter, 
which was addressed to him as "The Wali of Kandahar and 
its dependencies, partly ran "...I have great pleasure in
4 BCA, 188.
5 Balfour, B., 382.
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announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has 
heen pleased to recognise Your Highness an independent 
ruler of the Province of Kandahar..." The Wali was 
given the right to have the Khutba read and coin issued 
in his name. He was also given weapons and a subsidy 
which subsequently enabled him to raise 5*000 infantry 
and about 1,500 horsemen. The Wali requested the Viceroy
7
to allow a British force to remain in Kandahar.
After his official recognition the real troubles of 
the Wali began. It was generally understood that he was 
a British puppet. This brought him into direct conflict 
with the family of the late Amir Sher ’Ali. Even with the 
acceptance of the provisional governorship of Kandahar, 
Ayub had warned the Wali, by pointing out that 1 ...if 
Yakub has abdicated, I, the next heir to him, have not
O
done so.11 After the official recognition of the Wali,
g
Ayub denounced him as a "Kafir11. In Kandahar, the
mullas also declared him to be a "Kafir" and expressed
10
their willingness to join Ayub against the Wali. The
Wali’s own brother, Sardar Mohammad Husayn, and his
11family advised him to oppose the British. But the Wali 
remained loyal to the British. Only among the Barakzays, 
the Wali had a few supporters. They were Sardar G-ul 
Mohammad (half-brother of the Wali) who held Girishk 
(a district on the right bank of the Helmand river),
6 PEEA, 109.
7 St. John to Lyall, 20 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1155.
8 Ayub to Wali Sher ’Ali, 11 Dec 1879, PLEA, 109.
9 Ibid, 110.
10 Kand.D, 1-8 June 1880, PSLI, pt 2, 26, 41.
11 Stewart to Lyall, 12 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1025-
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and Mir Afzal, a son of Pirdil Khan (brother of Amir Dost 
Mohammad) who was the governor of the province of Farah. 
Although Mir Afzal was anti-British, at home he supported 
the Wali against Ayub because, being the father of the 
late Amir1s favourite wife, Mir Afzal was opposed to Ayub. 
But he was too old to be active and soon retired to Meshed. 
In Kandahar, Sartip Nur Mohammad, a Mohammadzay sardar, 
was the only influential supporter of the Wali. But his 
hostility to the British was so strong that he left the 
Wali in a critical moment for Ayub.
The task before the Wali was to establish and consoli­
date his power, but this he found difficult, if not 
impossible. On the day of his investiture, the land-owners 
of the Arghandab valley and Zamindawer (a district on the 
right bank of the Helmand) defied his authority by refusing 
to pay revenue. So did the landowners of more remote 
districts. Only those G-hilzays in the immediate neighbour­
hood of Qalat paid their revenue. His own Durrani elders 
boycotted him, and he was left without adequate advisers. 
The whole arrangement for Kandahar seemed to have collapsed 
but the British officials were convinced that eventually 
the Wali would be able to establish his authority. From 
Kabul, General Stewart wrote ,fHis /""the Walifs_7 was,
and still is, the want of trustworthy advisers and 
subordinates, and his principal difficulty in which he
is held, and must be held for some time, on account of his
12
fidelity to us.ft
12 Stewart to Lyall, 12 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1025*
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Early in June there were strong rumours of an
advance by Ayub on Kandahar, The Wali had to move up to
Girishk to fortify his frontiers and to stir up opposition
to Ayub, in Earah and Taimani (a district of Herat to the
north-west of Zamindawer). But the Wali .. .made it
clear that without the support of the British he will be
1^unable to move beyond G-irishk.ff Late in June, when 
Ayub’s advance had been established beyond doubt, a 
British force of 2,400 under General Burrows was despatched 
to the Halmand. But with the arrival of the British force 
the Wali lost the support of Sartip Nur Mohammad who, 
after inciting the troops to rise against the Wali, 
joined A yub.^
The province of Herat comprised an area of about
6,000 square miles, bordering Persia on the west, the 
Turcoman country on the north, Siestan on the south, and 
the Hari Rud on the east, was inhabited by a mixed 
population of over half a million, with the Pashtuns 
(Sadozays and Ghilzays) in a minority.^
During the first half of the nineteenth century,
Herat had been in dispute between Persia and Afghanistan, 
but since 1863 it had formed part of the latter. Early 
in 1879, following his accession to power in Kabul,
Yafqub invited his younger brother Ayub to assume the 
administration of Herat. Until then Ayub had lived in
13 St. John to Lyall, 21 June 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 209.
14 St. John to Lyall, 12 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 216.
15 GAH, i-v, 93-110. Hamilton, A., Afghanistan, 1906,
London, 147-177.
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Meshed, fearing that, like Ya*qub, he would be
imprisoned by his father, Sher fAli, if he returned to
Afghanistan. At Herat he had no money, the troops
were unpaid, and he had to spend a year1s revenue in
advance in order to raise 2,000 horsemen. Because of
discord between his Kabuli and Herati troops, his
immediate intended advance on Kandahar had to be post- 
17poned. He then concentrated on building up his army 
until his pbsiiion improved at the beginning of 1880.
Meanwhile Britain started negotiations with Persia
over Herat, in complete disregard of Ayub. The view in
London was that, unlike Kandahar, Herat should not be
ruled by an Afghan ruler who might easily be influenced
by Russia. Persia was, therefore, to be allowed to take
possession of Herat provided she accepted indirect
1 R
British control. The British ambassador at Tehran, 
Ronald Thomson, was instructed to sound out the Shah of 
Persia as to his willingness to accept Herat.
But the question of Herat was not so easily disposed 
of, owing to its strategic location and also to the fact 
that it was beyond the physical control of Britain.
Russia took a keen interest in it. Believing that the 
new proposed arrangement would give Britain a predominant 
influence in central Asia, some Russian newspapers
16 BCA, 52.
17 PHEA, 111.
18 Por details see PHEA, 120-121.
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Novoye Vremia (20 January 1880), Golos and the Journal
de St. Petersburg - suggested the invasion of Persia
itself - an obvious warning to the Shah against his
19acceptance of Herat. J Russia proposed Russo-British
joint supervision of Herat and gave an implied warning
against any arrangements made in a spirit of hostility 
20to Russia. Earlier, in November 1879 > Lord Salisbury,
Foreign Secretary, had declined the promise of material
support to Persia which had been requested by Malcom
Khan, Persia's Minister in London, in the event of a
Russian attack on Persia. On the other hand, members of
the Indian Council were unanimous in objecting to the
surrender of Herat to Persia arguing, each on different
grounds, that the proposed arrangement would legalise
and thereby increase Russia1s influence in Herat - a
21threat, from their point of view, to India. Consequently 
the negotiations with Persia fell into abeyance. About 
this time the Government of India had decided to offer 
Kabul to 'Abd al-Rahman and withdraw its forces from 
northern Afghanistan. Failing with Persia, the Home 
Government agreed to offer Herat to 'Abd al-Rahman, but 
at the Zimma meeting 'Abd al-Rahman showed unwilling to 
accept it because of its control by Ayub.
Considering himself to be the heir to Ya'qub, Ayub 
aimed at rule over Afghanistan. Early in January 1880
19 Ibid, 127.
20 Ibid.
21 For details see Notes by Members of the Political 
Committee on the Herat Question, A.55, IOL, 1880.
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he was able to reconcile the two parties of his army.
His Kabuli troops were said to be composed of men from 
the north-eastern tribes, a loose term and it is difficult 
to identify them precisely. At any rate, they were anxious 
to return to their homes. So were his advisers who were
connected with Kandahar. Consequently, pressure for an
22advance on Kandahar was great, especially when the 
unpopularity of the Wali had become known.
Although Ayub had declared that his purpose was 
1f...to commence a religious war and drive the infidels
2*5
out of the country1’ it seems doubtful, as will be 
discussed later, whether he really intended to oust the 
British by force of arms. But he must have sent many
24letters and emissaries to this effect so that St. John, 
the Political Officer at Kandahar, had come to the 
conclusion that ” ...for many months Ayub Khan and his 
partisans have used every effort to inflame the religious 
and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against 
us and our protfegfe, Sher Ali Khan.”^  Already apprehensive 
on account of having been denounced as a kafir, the Wali 
was also ” ...fearful of Ghaza and Jehad against him.”^
22 Ripon to Hartington, 17 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 4, 718.
23 Ayub to Yard. Khan, elder of Khakrez, Kand. D,
1-28 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 6 , 1618.
24 St. John (1837-1891)* Educated Marwish Grammar School 
and Addis" Combe. Entered ICS 1859* Held posts in 
Baluchistan and Persia (Meshed); Chief Political 
Officer in Kandahar 1878-1881. Later Governor General’s 
Agent in Baluchistan. Before arriving at Kandahar he 
knew a good deal about south-west Afghanistan, and
his diaries are therefore very informative.
25 Kand. D, 17 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3, 495*
26 St. John to Lyall, 31 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1373*
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Elders of the most influential families of Kandahar 
were either with Ayub or were in communication with him. 
They included the descendants of the ’Dil’ brothers 
(Kohandil, Mihrdil and Purdil, who were half-hrothers of 
the late Amir Dost Mohammad and had ruled Kandahar indepen­
dently during most of the first half of the nineteenth 
century), except Mir Afzal who had retired to Meshed, but 
his son !Abd al-Wahab was an active supporter of Ayub in 
Herat. The Shahghasi family, possessing a large estate 
in Tirin (a district about 80 miles to the north of 
Kandahar), was next in importance to the ’Dil’ family.
The Shahghasi family, whose members were mainly govern­
ment senior officials, was named after Shahghasi Sherdil 
Loynab. His son, Loynab Khushdil was Ayub's Commander- 
in-Chief. Abu Baler, the most powerful of the Alizai
Durranis of Zamindawer, who had opposed the British and
27the Wali, was also with Ayub. To the eiders and officers
of the Kabul province, Ayub was reported to have sent
28about 1 , 2 0 0 letters, but it is not known who these elders 
and officers were. It may be assumed that the latter were 
the officers of his father’s scattered army, while among 
the former were elders of the G-hilzays. Ayub had Ghilzay 
officers in his army, among them Hafiz Allah Gadakhel 
Ghilzay, Naib Salar (Deputy Commander-in-Chief) and Sardar 
Sher ’Ali Tarakay. Nevertheless, despite the attachment 
of the Ghilzays and Wardaks to the family of the late Amir 
Sher ’Ali, Ayub's relationship with them remains obscure.
27 St. John to Lyall, 3 Nov 1880, PSLI, 27, 553.
28 Kandahar to Simla (T), 28 June 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 53*
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Before his advance on Kandahar, Ayub seems to have
gained the support of the important tribes of Herat,
His relationship with them would be discussed later, but
for the moment it is sufficient to record that he left
the city in charge of Sardar 'Abd al-Wahab, assisted by
a General and elders of the important tribes?^ except
Anbia Khan Taimini. Ayub was invested with the title of
50Amir, He also had money coined in his name. Having 
despatched two groups of troops separately in advance,
Ayub set out for Kandahar on 9 June 1880,
From Herat to the Maiwand, Ayub received free supplies
from the villagers. In Farah he was joined by "...Ghazis
’SIand tribesman...from all s i d e s . W i t h  his approach
near G-irishk, the Wali's troops (except 500 horsemen),
under Sardaru Khan and Saman Khan, deserted him, taking
52a few guns with them which were later recovered.
From Girishk, Ayub created a diversion. Instead of 
following the main route he moved upwards along the 
Helmand towards Zamindawer. Apparently either he hoped 
to be joined by many Zamindaweris (which they did in 
large numbers) or intended to avoid confrontation with the 
British forces, or, by bypassing them, he wished to cut 
the British forces into two parts. Evidence suggests that 
he hoped to avoid a confrontation, and reach a settlement
29 Kand D, 1-28 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 6 , 1612.
30 St. John to Lyall, 2 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 2, 54.
31 M. Akbar (a Secretary of Ayub) to St. John, Jan 1881, 
PSLI, 27, 595.
32 St. John to Lyall, 17 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3, 495-
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with the British. But St. John, who was with the British 
forces, made the war of Maiwand inevitable.
At the suggestion of St. John, General Burrows withdrew
his forces and the remainder of the Wall's to Kishk-i-
Nakhud (about 30 miles from Girishk)?^ The plan was that
in the ICishk-i-Nakhud area the Ayub would be met in a
34plain, chosen by the British army, where, in view of
past experience, Ayub's forces would be routed. Later,
when the result had proved quite otherwise, Ripon also
supported the plan, arguing that if Ayub had been left
unchecked he, in accordance with his original plan, would
have advanced on to Qalat and Ghazni in which case f* ...the
effect upon our military reputation, and upon the
political situation generally in Afghanistan, would have
been exceedingly d a m a g i n g . T h e r e  is no evidence to
suggest that Ayub had such a plan. On the contrary, Ayub
later stated that he did not want a collision, and St. John
36believed this statement to be true.
In July the main body of Ayub's troops reached the 
Helmand (about 12 miles above Girishk), followed by Ayub 
himself, who crossed the Helmand at Haiderabad on 22 July.
Having heard that Ayub's advance force had occupied
Maiwand {a village then in the possession of the Wali in 
the centre of the Maiwand valley about 3 miles from
33 Ripon to Hartington, 3 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3> 485.
34 St. John to Lyall, 17 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3> 495.
35 Ripon to Hartington, 17 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 4, 719•
36 St. John to Lyall, 1 Nov 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 1972.
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Kishk-i-Nakhud), General Burrows arrived there on July 27*
Ayub's forces were surprised. Details of the hattle
which took place in the vicinity of Maiwand village do not
concern us. Suffice it to say that General Burrows1
37forces were totally defeated.' According to St. John, 
Afghan losses (killed or wounded) were about 1,350 
regulars, 800 ghazis and the English killed were about 
1,100. Ayub's army was 4,555 infantry, about 3,200 
cavalry and 4,000 ghazis, with 30 guns of various sizes, 
xtfhile that of Burrows' was 2,800 regulars with 2,000 
followers.
After the defeat, the remainder of the British forces 
(3,400) in the city of Kandahar shut itself up in the 
citadel, having expelled the Pashtun inhabitants (18,000) 
from the city, leaving the merchants and the bulk of the 
Parsiwans. General Primrose assumed supreme political and 
military authority. The Wali, who had taken refuge with 
the British, was disarmed, and any outsider approaching 
the walls was shot at. Thus the besieged army was cut 
off from the outside world. St. John complained "I found 
it necessary to point out to General Primrose that the 
indiscriminate firing on / any_/ human being that [_ sicJ  
appears within shot of the walls is fatal to the
39acquisition of intelligence or letters from the outside."^
37 St. John to Lyall (through a messenger to Quetta)
29 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3, 304.
38 St. John to Lyall, 21 Sept 1880, PSLI, 27, 1051, 1055.
39 Kand. D, 21 July-1 Sept 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 7, 1916.
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On August 6 , Ayub arrived at Kokaran (6 miles from
the city) having been joined on the way by ghazis to the
number of between 20,000 (St. John) and 50,000 (Ak-bar).^
But contrary to general expectation, and much to the
41annoyance of his officers, Ayub opened negotiations with
the besieged army, after an unsuccessful sortie by the
besieged army in which 215 British soldiers were killed 
42and wounded.
On 16 August, Bibi Hawa, an elderly widow of Sardar
Rahimdil Khan, known as the Walidah (the mother) opened
negotiations with St, John and Ayub. Ya’qub ’Ali Khafi,
who was with Ayub, maintains that the leader of the
British army, presumably Primrose, obtained 40 days grace
from Ayub, through the Walidah, who had adopted the
45British leader as her son. At any rate, a number of 
letters were exchanged. Ayub’s letters are revealing.
On 20 August he wrote to the Walidah ” •..from the beginning 
we had no intention of fighting; with the British Govern­
ment, but / had_ 7  only wishes of friendship and peace.
And to St. John, ”My open object is this, that the kindness
which was extended by the British Government to the late
45Amir should be granted to me.”
Meanwhile, the general rising had spread, with 
remarkable speed, as far as Qalat in Baluchistan. Consequently
40 Akbar to St. John, Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 595.
41 Khafi, Y.A., The Recent Kings of Afghanistan. (Persian),
Kabul, 1556, A.H., 2, 192.
42 Macmunn, General Sir G., Afghanistan, London, 1929, 202, 
45 Khafi, 2, 192.
44 Kand. D., 29 July-1 Sept 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 7, 1925.
45 Kand. D. , 29 July-1 Sept 1880, VSifl, 26, pt 7, 1924.
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the despatch of a relief force from Quetta had become very 
difficult, if not impossible. Fearing attack on Baluchi­
stan, Robert Sandeman (b. 1835)> British Agent there, 
suggested the despatch of a force from Kabul, no doubt
partly to create a diversion from the side of Kandahar.
A ft
He reported ffSituation very serious.11
In Kabul, although as a result of the agreement with
the Amir, anti-British activities had stopped, the Maiwand
spark could easily upset the arrangement there. The
Ghilzay elders were still not attached to the new Amir.
Their acceptance of him was only a means of removing the
British. The triumphant appearance of Ayub in their
country was sufficient for them to rise and rally round
him. A day after Maiwand, Griffin wired Lyall, "The
Kandahar news entirely alters (?) £~slej the position
here; and, unless Ayub can be beaten decisively and
quickly, may cause all arrangements to collapse. Amir
will not be able to stand against Ayub, victorious.
Many of his adherents will abandon him and his troops
here and in Turkistan may mutiny. If he /.""Ayub^ T* marches
47to Ghazni, the country will join him.'1
The result of Sandeman1s and Griffin’s suggestions 
was a prompt and successful settlement with the Amir in 
Zimma. Realising that the British were driving away the
46 Agent, Governor-General (Quetta) to Foreign, Simla,
(T) 2 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 4, 630.
47 Griffin to Lyall (T) 28 July 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 3, 479.
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4-8main danger to himself, the Amir became "most friendly11 
with the British, At the request of G-riffin, the Amir 
obtained the consent of the Ghilzay elders to the passage 
of British troops through their land. It was a remarkable 
achievement, because the Ghilzay elders must have known 
that the so-called withdrawal of the troops via Kandahar 
was meant to be for the defeat of Ayub. With all probab­
ility the Amir obtained their consent, with the promise 
of high positions, as he subsequently conferred the title 
of Khan-i-’IJlum (the chief of learnings) upon Mulla ’Abd 
al-Karim, son of Mulla Mushk-i-1Alam, and let Ismat Allah 
act for Amir fAbd al-Rahman as a kind of Prime Minister 
for a brief period. The only condition made by the
Ghilzay elders was that the troops should avoid unnecessary
49halts. They agreed to provide provisions and facilities. 
Hence the easy and quick march of a select force of 10,000 
under Roberts to Kandahar (10 - 50 August).
It was with the news of the arrival of this force at
Qalat that the British in Kandahar dropped their interest
80in reaching agreement with Ayub. On 50 August, Roberts 
arrived at Kandahar, and the next day he defeated Ayub 
in the village of Mazra (in Arghandab) where he had taken 
up his residence. Ayub lost all his guns and left for 
Herat where he arrived on 22 September, leaving Sardar 
Mohammad Hashim in charge of Parah.
48 Ibid.
49 Amir to G-riffin, supple. G-riffin to Stewart, 4 Aug 1880, 
PSLI, 26, pt 5, 872.
50 Primrose to Ayub, 25 Aug 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 7, 1924*
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However, the victory of Ayub at Maiwand was the 
death blow to the projected "independence” of Kandahar.
Lyall concluded that "...the Durranis of Kandahar are now 
much opposed to the occupation £ of Kandahar_J7*, either 
directly through Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly
Cl
through our officers." The Wali refused to take charge
CO
of the province again. He asked the Viceroy for permis-
c ^
sion to settle with his family in Karachi. This was 
granted, and he left Afghanistan forever in December 1880.
In September, the question of Kandahar was discussed
in the Council of the Governor-General. All members,
except E. Baring (later Lord Cromer and General Councillor
in Egypt), were against the abandonment of Kandahar. To
some members Kandahar was necessary to India, for commercial
and strategic reasons, and to others for political and
moral reasons. Robert Sandeman proposed its take-over by
the Amir 'Abd al-Rahman on condition that he expelled
Ayub from Herat and established his authority in Kabul.
But owing to the illness of the Viceroy a decision on
Kandahar was deferred. Meanwhile, in October, Lyall was
54sent to Kandahar on a fact finding mission.
The main argument for the retention of Kandahar was
its strategic value to the defence of India, especially
now that a Russian army under General Skobelef was
51 Lyall on Kandahar, Eov 1880, PSLI, 27, 547*
52 Memorandum of R. Sandeman, 31 Oct 1880, PSLI, 27, 541*
53 Wali Sher 'Ali to Ripon, 30 Oct 1880, PSLI, 27, 133.
54 Por details see Memoranda on Kandahar, PSLI, 27, 541, 
547, 5 6 6 , 1354, 1143, 1137, 1141.
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operating in the Turcoman country, near ’Ishqabad, along
the eastern border of Persia. General Haines, the Commander- 
in~Chief of India, believed that Merv, Herat, and finally 
India were the ultimate objective of Russia1s military 
operations there. To Haines, Kandahar was the point on 
the line from which alone a serious attack on India 
could be delivered by Russia. But to Ripon the retention 
of Pishin and Sibi (the frontier districts of Kandahar, 
bordering on Baluchistan) were sufficient to ensure the 
requirements of the defence of India. The Liberal Govern­
ment went even further. They reiterated the opinion that 
the true defence of India lay only in the good government 
of India. But Ripon stood firm against the abandonment 
of the frontier districts, which were first temporarily 
retained and then annexed to India. On 20 January 1881, 
despite the opposition of the Council, it was decided to 
leave Kandahar and hand it over to the Amir of Kabul.
The next problem of the Government of India in
connection with Kandahar was to persuade the Amir to
occupy it. Because Ayub was ’’...the most popular
candidate for rule in southern Afghanistan”-^ the Amir
feared its immediate occupation by him following the
56British withdrawal. Apart from that, the Amir had made
himself unpopular in Kabul by treating harshly the late
57Amir’s senior officials.' But the principal reason for
55 Lyall on Kandahar, Nov 1880, PSLI, 27, 547*
56 Mahomed, S., 1, 208.
57 PL, 26 Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 842.
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his unpopularity was his alleged friendship with the 
58British, Consequently most of the Khans were reported
50
to be in correspondence with Ayub. The Amir made 
concessions to the Ghilzays and ICohistanis by upholding 
the grants which the Kohistan elders had enjoyed under 
Amir Dost Mohammad^ and exempting the Ghilzays from paying 
poll-tax. Nevertheless, a "popular rising" and 
"...danger for Kabul"  ^ during any possible absence of 
the Amir were generally feared. It was against this 
background that the Amir was reluctant to occupy Kandahar 
immediately, saying that " .. .1 do not know why and where­
fore the representatives of the sublime Government are so 
hasty and are going to abandon Kandahar so soon."^
However, believing that "...the kingdom of Kabul without
65Kandahar was like a fort without any gate^" the Amir
agreed to occupy Kandahar about 15 April, wihout fixing 
a definite date. Although the position of the Amir was 
far from being satisfactory, yet he exaggerated his fears 
to obtain additional assistance from the Government of 
India.
Anxious to withdraw its troops from Kandahar before 
the summer heat, the Government of India responded favourably 
to the Amir. Unlike the policy of "masterly inactivity"
58 PD, 28 Mar 1881, PSLI, 28, 238.
59 Ibid.
60 PD, 30 Mar 1881, PSLI, 28, 241.
61 St. John to Lyall, 20 Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 991.
62 St. John to Lyall, 22 Mar 1881, PSLI, 28, 226.
63 Mahomed, S., 1, 203.
64 Amir to W.G.Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, 
6 Mar 1881, PSLI, 27, 1657.
65 Mahomed, S., 1, 208.
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and "active interference", the policy then was to strengthen
Afghanistan under the Amir with money and arms without
committing Britain to take sides in the imminent civil
war. By 20 April, the Government of India had given to,
or promised, the Amir an additional amount of 20 lakhs of
rupees (including 5 lakhs of the treasury of Kandahar),
with rifles, artillery and a further temporary allowance
of 50,000 rupees a month. But the Viceroy deferred the
personal interview which had already "been requested by
the Amir, arguing that such a meeting "...would be
universally construed as a public manifestation of our
66resolution to adopt his cause and interest."
Before occupying Kandahar, the Amir took over Qalat, 
which had been agreed upon at the Zimma meeting to be 
part of Kabul, though at no time, except during the brief 
period when Dost Mohammad was the Wali of Kabul only, had 
it been part of Kabul. On 16 April, the Amir* s officials, 
accompanied by an army of 4,000 and 8 guns, also took over 
the administration of Kandahar, and the British withdrew 
from Afghanistan altogether. The Amir appointed his 
cousin, Sardar Mohammad Hashim (b. 1863), son of A'zam 
Khan, as governor. He was assisted by a committee of 
three, composed of Sardar Shams al-Din Khan, Qaai S fad al- 
Din, and General Ghulam Haydar Charkhi. Since the 
governor was young and inexperienced, civil power was 
actually exercised by Shams al-Din, and military by 
Ghulam Haydar.
66 Ripon to Hartington, 19 Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 365*
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In an effort to win over the people, the governor
repeated the Amir1s earlier declaration that fresh taxes,
such as the sarmarda (a poll-tax on non-Durrani males),
67
imposed by the late Amir Sher !Ali would be remitted.
But the promise of special treatment to those who had
helped the British did not help the cause of the Amir,
During the British occupation these were mainly the
Parsiwans who, working as tax collectors, spies and
junior clerks, had made themselves , f .particularly
68obnoxious to the Afghans.M
After his retreat from Kandahar, Ayub had some 
serious problems to face at Herat. However, in his 
reports, St. John had slightly exaggerated their serious­
ness, forgetting the fact that Ayub was now joined by 
persons such as Sardar Mohammad Hashim, Sardar Mohammad 
Hasan, Sardar * Abd Allah and others, with whose help he 
was able to suppress opposition easily. The Taimini 
tribe (in the south-east of Herat), one of the most 
numerous of the Char Aimaq (the four tribes), was 
r e b e l l i o u s S i n c e  May 1880, Sardar Anbia Khan, Chief 
of Taimini, had refused payment of taxes to Ayub, and 
during the latter’s absence had held correspondence with 
the ex-VJali and St. John in Kandahar. Anbia Khan, who
received allowances from St. John, had declared that his
70tribe was loyal to the British: Ayub’s own father-in-
law, Khan Agha, chief of the Jamshidis (a small tribe of
67 St. John to Lyall, 12 Apr 1881, PSLI, 28, 293.
68 St. John to Lyall, 15 Apr 1881, PSLI, 28, 707.
69 St. John to Lyall, 28 Hov 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 1979-
70 Sardar Anbia to St. John, Kand.D., 28 Mar 1881,
PSLI, 28, 767.
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the Char Aimaq, occupying the district of Kushk in the 
north of Herat), not only joined the opposition, he also
put forward Mohammad Haydar Alkozay, the eldest surviving
son of the late Wazir Yar Mohammad Khan of Herat as a
71candidate for the governorship of Herat; He asked St. John 
that the Wall’s son and General Baiz Khan he permitted
no
to join him in Taiwara (the capital of the Taim&ni country), 
hut as the Government of India did not wish to he involved
f7»7
in the affairs of Herat, the Khan was discouraged.
Before these trihes could plan any joint action,
Ayuh crushed them easily. Khan Agha was put to death and 
Sardar Anhia Khan managed to escape to the hills. Although 
Kushk and Taiwara were henceforth governed for Ayuh hy 
Sardar Mohammad Hasan Khan and ’ Ahd al-Wahah Khan respect­
ively, the Jamshidis and Taimanis, and later the Birzokohis 
(another of the Char Aimaq trihes, occupying Murghah, north 
of Herat), proved dangerous when Ayuh again advanced on 
Kandahar. Through a respectable Sayyed, Sardar Anhia Khan,
chiefs of the Birozkohis, and the Qipchaq trihe of Herat
74-offered their allegiance to the Amir. The Sunni Hazaras 
of Kala-i-Nao (a district in the north-east of Herat) 
remained loyal to Ayuh.
Among the Pashtuns of Herat, the Alkozays and 
Ishakzays - two clans of the Durranis - had also heen
71 St. John to Lyall, 8 Dec 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 2173.
72 St. John to Lyall, 28 Hov 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 1979-
73 Lyall to St. John, 3 Dec 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8,-1980.
74 H>, 21 June 1881, PSLI, 29, 233*
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opposed to Ayub. Having enjoyed power in former years,
through their elder the late Wazir Tar Mohammad (d. 1863)5
the Alkozays had never hesitated to reassert their
independence when Barakzay rule was shaken in Herat.
Recently when Ayuh was in Kandahar the two clans made a
combined hut unsuccessful attack on the city under
Faiz Allah Ishaqzay, the leader of the Herat troops, and
Behbud Khan, a grandson of Yar Mohammad Khan. But in
early 1881, Ayuh succeeded in overcoming their opposition
and put to death the son and grandsons of Yar Mohammad 
76Khan; This further alienated the Durranis of Herat from
him. With the Parsiwan inhabitants of the city of Herat,
who formed a larger proportion of the city, Ayub's
relations were strained for the simple reason that they
were turned out of their homes to make room for Ayub’s
77Kandahari soldiers. '
Since Ayub had now been joined by capable Barakzay
sardars, he suppressed the opposition easily and concentrated
on building up his army. Soldiers of the old Kandahari
regiments were continually arriving from Kandahar. By
19 July he was said to have built up an army of 4 ,4 0 0 ,
78with about 19 guns; His gun foundfy and arms factory 
began to work, but he was short of funds and was dependent 
on trade dues. He taxed the people very severely and was 
still short of money to pay his troops. Soon he became
75 St. John to Lyall, 8 Dec 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 2173.
76 St. John to Lyall, 2 Mar 1881, PSLI, 27, 1661.
77 St. John to Lyall, 8 Dec 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 2173*
78 St. John (Quetta) to Lyall, 19 July 1881, PSLI, 29, 508.
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short of war materials (fire-arms, iron and percussion
caps) too. Under pressure from Ronald Thomson, British
Minister at Tehran, the Shah prohibited the export of
80war material to Ayub from Meshed. Still the army 
remained loyal to Ayub.
After his retreat from Kandahar, Ayub seems to have 
abandoned his original claim for the whole of Afghanistan. 
With Herat already in his possession, he now tried to 
obtain Kandahar from the British by diplomacy.
As early as November 1880, Ayub asked Nawab Hasan
' Ali, Political Adviser to St. John, to use his good
81
offices so that Kandahar might be given to him. In all 
probability he received a discouraging reply. Still, on 
the advice of councillors, especially of Sardar Mohammad 
Hashim, Ayub sent to St. John a mission composed of 
Hazrat-i-’Umar Jan Sahibzadah and Sardar ' Abd allah Khan. 
Through them Ayub expressed his deep regret over the 
murder of L. Maclain, an English prisoner of war, who 
had fired the shots which began the battle of Maiwand. 
Although Ayub considered himself to be the rightful heir 
to the sovereignty of Afghanistan, he placed his affairs 
in the hands of the British G-overnment, looking upon
op
himself as its friend. But on 21 March 1881 his envoys 
were told that Kandahar had already been assigned to
80 St. John to Lyall, 15-21 Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 1059.
81 Ayub to Hasan !Ali, 24 Nov 1880, PSLI, 26, pt 8 , 1981.
82 !Abd Allah to St. John, 1 Mar 1881, PSLI, 27, 1 6 6 1 .
96
Q ' Z
’A M  al-Rahman. The envoys failed in their open mission,
hut their very presence as Ayub's representatives stirred 
up popular anti-British feelings.
At Kandahar, when it was publicly known that the
British were leaving the city, the Kandaharis increased
their activities on behalf of Ayub. They were reported
to be buying and repairing arms and thinking of nothing 
84but Ayub, and were confident of his ultimate victory over 
the Amir.
Girishk had been strongly garrisoned by the Amir’s
forces with about 6,000 (regulars and irregulars) with 
85
18 guns, composed predominantly of Ghilzays, Kabulis and
Durranis under Haib Salar Ghulam Haydar Charkhi. In
mid-July 1881, the Amir1s forces defeated the first
advanced force of Ayub under Sardar Mohammad Hasan at
Miskarez (near Girishk). But at a subsequent engagement
at Karez-i-'Ata (near G-irishk) on 20 July, Ayub's forces,
comparatively smaller in number (just over 5, 0 0 0 regular
86
and irregular) defeated the Amir's forces. Accounts of 
this engagement vary, but the defeat proved decisive. 
According to the Amir's officials the defeat was caused 
by the action of part of the Amir's own army, known as the 
Qalati (presumably the Ghilzays), who, at a critical
87moment, commenced a general onslaught on the Kabulis.
83 St. John to Lyall, 21 Mar 1881, PSLI, 27, 1667.
84 Ripon to Hartington, 21 May 1881, PSLI, 28, 911-
85 St. John to Foreign (T) 25 July 1881, based on statement 
of Sardar Shams al-Din, PSLI, 29, 481.
86 St. John to Foreign (T), 4 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 621.
87 General Ghulam Haydar Charkhi to Amir, AB, Kabul 
Correspondent, 6 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 773.
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The Amir*s Governor and Ghulam Haydar Charkhi, now Sipah 
Salar (Commander-in-Chief), finding the city of Kandahar 
closed, retreated to Qalat where they joined the army 
already sent there from Kabul. Towards the end of July, 
Kandahar fell peacefully to Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, 
who was followed by Ayub, accompanied by his senior 
officials, including Sardar Mohammad Hasan, Mohammad 
Husayn Qizilbash Sipah Salar, Hafiz Allah Ghilzay Ha’b 
Salar and Sartip Hur Mohammad.
As always, at Kandahar too Ayub was short of money.
Although Muslim and Hindu merchants contributed voluntarily
88to his treasury, this contribution was hardly sufficient 
for his immediate needs and he attempted to raise a loan
oq
on the security of the customs.
Ayub’s biggest problem was what to do next. Should
he make an advance on Kabul, where the Amir’s position
90was reported to be ’’extremely critical” or should he 
fortify his position in Kandahar and meet the Amir there? 
What would be the attitude of the Government of India, 
whose forces at Quetta were so close to Kandahar? In the 
end Ayub remained at Kandahar and, by doing so, missed 
his opportunity.
Firstly, Ayub was apprehensive of the British, mainly 
because his early attempts to come to terms with them had
88 St. John to Lyall, 11 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 788.
89 St. John to Lyall, 20 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 781.
90 AB, Kabul Correspondent, 4 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 771-
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failed and, after his occupation of Kandahar, they had 
strengthened their frontier districts with considerable 
forces. Ayub feared that in the event of his march on 
Kabul, British forces would occupy Kandahar, cutting him 
off from his base. Hoping for a change of heart by the 
British, Ayub opened communication with St. John, who had 
succeeded Sandeman, informing him of his victory, expres­
sing his desire for friendship with the British, and
91stating that he intended to march on Kabul. St. John's
original draft, expressing the British attitude of no
interference in Kandahar affairs, was changed to one of
92having received "no instructions" - a vague and 
ominous reply.
Secondly, there were some indications that the 
Durranis were not enthusiastic about marching on Kabul. 
Ayub's initial efforts to raise a large number of regular 
troops from among them did not meet with the expected 
success. Thirdly, the timely arrival of the Amir's 
forces at Qalat, and their junction with the remainder 
of the defeated forces under Sipah Salar G-hulam Haydar 
Charkhi also deterred Ayub from marching on Kabul.
Circumstances had placed Ayub in a position which 
required greater enterprise from him than he could 
possibly offer. Had he been a forceful personality, he 
would have pushed a large body of his Durranis on to
91 Ayub to St. John, 7 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 721.
92 St. John to Ayub, 10 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 721.
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Kabul, and in alliance with the Ghilzays, who were reported
to be ” .. .particularly dangerous’1 ^  to the Amir and on 
Ayub’s side, he would have turned the discontented people 
of Kabul against the Amir.
In sharp contrast to Ayub the Amir, after the fall
of Kandahar, acted swiftly and with determination. Within
a week he announced his intended march on Kandahar. After
consulting the most important elders of the Kohistan and
of the Ghilzays, he set out for Kandahar on 11 August,
accompanied by Ismat Allah Ghilzay, Riaz Mohammad Khan,
94Bahram Khan and others.
Before his departure the Amir entrusted the administ­
ration of Kabul to a committee of four, led by his eldest 
son Sardar Habib Allah Khan (b. 1872). Actual power, 
however, was exercised by Parwana Khan, a member of the 
committee, and the most reliable servant of the Amir. 
Parwana Khan was a Kafir slave of the Amir, presumably 
from Badakhshan, who had been in exile with the Amir in 
Samarqand. Soon after 1Abd al-Rahman became Amir, he 
appointed Parwana Khan as Deputy Commander-in-Chief,
and Kotwal of Kabul, a post equivalent to that of Minister
95of the Interior.
The Amir’s departure was by no means smooth. He 
imprisoned all those suspected of intriguing with Ayub,
93 BCA, 1 7 .
94 AB with Amir from the Zarni Camp (between Ghazni and 
Maidan), 16 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 1013.
95 Mahomed, S., 1 , 216.
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Including Mohammad Jan Wardak, his elder brother, Mulla 
1Abd al-Ghafur, Sardar Nek Mohammad (a son of the late 
Amir Dost Mohammad), and others. Sayyed Ahmad, the eldest 
son of Sayyed Mahmud, the ruler of Kunar, deserted the 
Amir. So did Sultan 'Ali and Safdar 'Ali (sons of Sardar 
Sher 'Ali, chief of the Jaghuri Hazaras who had been a close 
friend of the late Amir). But their intended purpose of 
making disturbances against the Amir did not seem to have 
been successful.
With the liberal use of the large funds at his disposal 
the Amir, while on his march, bought the allegiance of 
most of the G-hilzays. In about 100 letters to their elders 
between Kabul and Qalat, the Amir promised them that after 
restoring peace and order "...the prosperity and welfare
96
of the nation will be the primary object of his rule.”
The Amir undertook to feed the entire camp, elders with
97their followers, and animals. Seeing that the Amir had
opened "a free restaurant1’ Ghilzay volunteers joined him
98at every stage in large numbers. Supplies, furnished 
by the people, were allowed for by the remission of revenue. 
Further, the Amir presented elders and mullas with money 
and chapans (loose coats). This innovation won over to 
him the undecided and hesitant Ghilzays including some of 
the Tarakays who had recently turned away the Amir's 
sub-governor from their country and who were in correspon­
dence with Ayub.
96 AB (Puli-i-Maidan), 15 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 965*
97 Ibid.
98 AB (Zarni Camp), 16 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 1013.
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Both the Amir and Ayub obtained fetwas (religious 
endorsements) from mullas and thereby justified bloodshed 
between Sunni Muslims. In Maidan, the Amir obtained 
expressions of allegiance from about 400 mullas as well 
as their fetwas to the effect that Ayub was a "rebel".
In Kandahar the mullas denounced the Amir as a "kafir" 
and called upon Muslims "...to fight against the nominee 
and coadjutor of the infidels..." While styling himself 
"Grhazi" and the Amir a "Farangi" (the Persian form of the 
word Frank but with the meaning of infidel), Ayub called 
on the people to join him in a jehad! ^  The Kandaharis 
also styled themselves "religious warrior si* On the
whole, Ayub had the better of these exchanges. Because 
the Amir had come to terms with the British he was 
associated with the "infidels", and as far as religious 
opinions went, the Amir was in a very unfavourable position. 
Only by the liberal use of money was the Amir able to 
denounce Ayub as a rebel whereas the Amir was easily 
denounced as a kafir.
But Ayub was no match for 'Abd al-Rahman in diplomacy. 
In Kandahar Ayub entertained the naive idea of compromising 
with the Amir. 1Abd al-Rahman was an unscrupulous 
opportunist who was determined to exclude the family of 
Sher 'Ali from reigning over any part of Afghanistan.
When the Amir arrived at Kandahar, Ayub sent him a peace 
mission composed of sayyeds and mullas, led by Sardar 
Mohay al-Din, the only surviving son of Sardar Kohandil.
99 Amir to RipOn, 22 Shawal 1298, A.H., PSLI, 33> 8 6 .
100 AB, 4 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 771.
101 Amir to Ripon, 26 Sept 1881, PSLI, 3 3 , 8 8 .
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Ayub also sent, subsequently, a proposal for peace in a 
sealed Quran by the hands of Sardar Shams al~Din (an 
official of the Amir who had been imprisoned by Ayub in 
Kandahar). Ayub’s proposal was reported to be as follows:-
”We were both exiles, but now G-od has given us 
Afghanistan between us. I am small / younger_/, 
and you are great /^ eldieTjJ. Nevertheless, do 
you so act that we may become one and join against 
the Farangis. If you will not, then let me alone.
What I propose is this: do you go to Turkistan, 
which was your father’s share. Let the son of 
Azim Khan take Kuram. Let Kabul go to Yakub;
Kandahar to the sons of Amin Khan; G-irishk to Hashim; 
Herat to me. I Hill fight the infidel; and if 
you will be my friend, will obtain the release 
of Yakub. If not, I will ruin myself. Should 
you not agree to this, I will not on that account
attack you; but if you come on, that is your own
• || 102 affair.”
Although the Amir detained the mission for some time, 
he was not willing to listen to a proposal which would 
give him only Turkistan and commit himself to an under­
taking which would mean the release of the ex-Amir. A 
final show-down between the two cousins was then unavoidable.
102 St. John to Foreign (Simla) (T), 5 Sept 1881,
PSLI, 29, 977.
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The coming conflict has been depicted by St. John,
•whose reports are our main source, as a -war between the
103two 11 hereditary foes"  ^ - the Ghilzays and Durranis
whose“ancestral animosity” he thought to have been ” ...by 
far the strongest political passion in Southern Afghan­
istan”’! ^  Thus he had concluded that the Durranis flocked 
to Ayub - “ ...the representative of Durrani against
Ghilza;!” - to defend “ ...their city against the Ghilzai 
invader
No doubt the Durranis rushed to defend their country 
against invasion, but the conflict was not intra-tribal.
It was a conflict which was shaped mainly by factors 
such as religion, fear of foreign domination, and the 
acquisition of material reward. In the first place, the 
loyalty of both Ghilzays and Durranis was evenly divided.
On the eve of the engagement, the Tarakay Ghilzays, who 
supported Ayub, rebelled against the Amir and closed the 
road behind h i n n ^  The Hotakay Ghilzays were almost 
equally divided. The Qalati regiment which went over to 
the advanced force of Ayub in Girishk was, in all probability, 
composed of the Ghilzays. No doubt the larger number of 
the Ghilzays was with the Amir, but he bought their 
service with money and a promise of plunder. There is 
no evidence to suggest that the Ghilzays offered their 
service because they had a feud with the Durranis. The 
same may be said, though on a smaller scale, of the
103 St. John to Lyall, 22 Sept 1881, PSLI, 30, 117.
104 Ibid,
105 Ibid, 1, 118.
106 St. John to Lyall, 22 Sept 1881, PSLI, 29, 1063a.
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Barakzays of south-east of the city of Kandahar who
107joined the Amir. Furthermore, there were about 2,000 
Kandahari (i.e. presumably including Durranis) horsemen 
in the army of the Amir. The main feature of this struggle 
was the popular, but mistaken, conviction among the 
Durranis that the Amir was ”a creature of the British” 
and Ayub ”a champion of Islam.” Hence, the presence of 
a large number of mullas and talibs (students of Islamic 
studies) on the side of Ayub. Besides, the struggle 
showed a general opposition by the Kandaharis against 
the idea of being ruled by another puppet ruler as, in 
their opinion, the Amir was.
On 20th September, after the Amir had entrenched his 
forces in camp at Karez-i-Neko (about 6 miles to the 
south-west of the city), Ayub withdrew his main body of 
forces from the city to Chil Zina (a pass to the west of 
the city). The exact numbef of troops on both sides is 
not known. The number of regulars and irregulars together 
on the side of the Amir was reported to be about 14,000, 
while on the side of Ayub about 17,000. The Amir had 
18 guns and Ayub 14. On 22 September, the Amir’s infantry 
advanced and the battle started. In the beginning Ayub’s 
troops were successful. But a dramatic development in 
the midst of the fighting turned the scale entirely 
against Ayub, when his own Kabuli and Herati regiments 
from the rear fired on his Kandahari regiments in the
107 St. John to Lyall, 16 Sept 1881, PSLI, 29, 1062a.
108 M. Hashim (Native Agent) to St, John, 26 Sept 1881, 
PSLI, 30, 8 . According to S. Mahomed (1,212), the 
Amir's troops (regular and irregular) were about 
22,000, and Ayub's 20,000.
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front and the irregulars on the flanks. Ayub’s Kandahari
regiments and irregulars who fought bravely had no
109alternative but to retreat and disperse, Ayub again 
fled to Herat, The victorious army plundered the city 
and many houses of the Hindu and Muslim merchants for 
24 hours.
Shortly the city of Herat also fell to the forces 
which the Amir had already sent there, Ayub had entrusted 
Herat to Musa Jan, leaving Loynab Khushdil with a small 
force in the city and Sardar ’Abd al-Wahab at Tiwarah.
But against a concerted assault'of some 20,000 Taimanis, 
Firozkohis, and the Hazaras of Lehzangi / led by
Sardar 'Abd al-Qudus (the Amir's sub-governor at 
Tashqurghan in Turkistan), and Sardar Anbia Khan Taimani*^^ 
Herat succumbed easily on October 2, 1881. While on his 
way to Herat, Ayub learnt of its fall. The hero of Maiwand, 
whose name has remained to this day a symbol of national 
pride and honour, fled to Meshed, to spend the life of an 
exile, first in Persia till 1888, then in India (Lahore) 
until 1924.
The victory of the Amir was a great relief to the
Government of India. After having obtained the approval
of the Home Government, Ripon now addressed ’Abd al-Rahman
111
as "The Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies."
109 St. John to Lyall, 30 Sept 1881, based on account of 
an eyewitness, PSLI, 30, 111.
110 Sardar ’Abd al-Qudus (Ghore) to Amir, AB, Kabul 
Correspondent, 16 Aug 1881, PSLI, 29, 1013*
111 Singhal, 91 *
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The reunification was finally completed when Maimana, 
ruled more or less independently by Mir Delawar since 
1879) was subdued in 1884* Until then the Amir had left 
the Mir largely unmolested, mainly because the Amir was 
busy in subduing other tribes, and Maimana did not present 
a problem to him. But in early 1884} when the Russians 
approached the north-western border of Afghanistan,
Maimana was pacified.
The reunification of Afghanistan was mainly a result 
of the massacre in 1879 nnd the subsequent prolonged 
resistance to the British occupation of Kabul. In 1880, 
the Liberal Government reversed the policy of the previous 
Conservative Government and decided to withdraw all 
British troops from Afghanistan, except from Kandahar.
But after the defeat of their troops in Maiwand, the 
British Government, oh the initiative of Ripon, also 
decided to withdraw from Kandahar, except from the 
frontier districts. With the withdrawal of the British 
troops, the biggest single danger to a unified Afghanistan 
came from Ayub (the favourite of the majority of the 
people), when he challenged the Amir. His challenge was 
not only a threat to 'Abd al-Rahman, but also to the 
Government of India which now pursued a policy of bringing 
about a strong and unified Afghanistan under Amir 'Abd 
al-Rahman. Hence her liberal assistance in money and 
arms which helped 'Abd al-Rahman to expel Ayub easily. 
Finally, with the incorporation of Maimana in 1884, the 
reunification of Afghanistan within the frontiers which, 
on the whole, remain to the present day, was completed.
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Chapter 4
The Pacification of Eastern Afghanistan
A considerable problem was presented to !Abd al- 
Rahman by the results of the British occupation of 
Eastern Afghanistan - the easternly extension of the 
province of Kabul* During their occupation of Jalalabad, 
the British came to understandings with the Shinwaray tribe, 
the Khan of Lalpura and the Badshah of Kunar. The first 
two continued to administer the road leading to the 
Khyber as before ivhile the latter tried to prevent the 
emergence of a popular jehad against the British* In 
return they were paid.a subsidy and allowed to enjoy a 
large degree of autonomy. After the British withdrawal, 
these concessions clashed with the measures the Amir took 
to consolidate his authority there. The result was 
disturbances which lasted until the early nineties.
But the Amir's efforts to regain territories further 
east failed.
Lalpura
The only Khan who retained his nominal position during 
the reign of 'Abd al-Rahman was Mohammad Akbar Khan 
Mohmand, the Khan of Lalpura, the main seat of the Upper 
Mohmand, on the left bank of the Kabul river near 
Jalalabad. The territory of the Upper Mohmand is situated 
between the Uthman Khel in the east, the Kunar valley in 
the west, Bajaur in the north and the plain of the Kabul 
river in the south. Upper Mohmand was inhabited by the 
Mohmand tribe. In its plain there were a number of small 
communities of Arabs, Dehgans, Tajiks, Sayyeds, Piranchas,
108
Hindkis, and Lodius 1906, the Mohmands
1
may have numbered 5 5 ,0 0 0 .
In December 1879, the deportation to India of the
ex-Amir was followed by a general rising in Kabul as well
as in the Mohmand country, where the rising was led by
Mulla Khalil Mohmand (a religious leader of the Mohmand),
and others. Sadiq Khan, the then Khan of Lalpura, who was
related to the ex-Amir, joined the rising with about
5,400 Mohmands near Dakka. (a village on the road to Kabul,
about 12 miles from Landai Kotal). But soon a split in
the leadership occurred, when Akbhr Khan, half-brother of
Sadiq Khan, accepted the khanate of Lalpura from the
British " ...on condition of his loyalty and good services
%
to the British Government."  ^ Akbar Khan also received
small loans. In return, he supplied the British forces
4with provisions and opposed the jehad movement, so 
keeping the intractable Mohmands in as good order as 
could be expected.
Griffin described the guarantee of the khanate to
Akbar Khan as "absolute11 and urged that it "must be 
6maintained." Further, G-riffin informed 1 Abd al-Rahman 
that Lalpura was under "...the protection of the British 
Government." £his was a clear breach of the agreement
1 Blphinstone, M . , 2, 40. Jenkyns, ¥., Report on the 
Jalalabad District. Chiefly in Regard to Revenue, 1879< 
Calcutta, pp4,xii-xv, Government of India. FTHK, 419*
2 FThK, 459
5 B,C,A, 12 January 1880, 31*
4 Ibid.
5 Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1257*
6 Ibid.
7 Griffin to Amir, 22 Aug 1880, PSLI, 33, 512.
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reached "between him and the Amir, apart from the fact 
that from the days of Ahmad Shah the Mohmands were 
subject to the Kabul rulers.8 In regard to the eastern 
province, Griffin was an expansionist who, in May 1880 
while the negotiations with ’Abd al-Rahman were in 
progress, had unsuccessfully urged the necessity of
Q
retaining Jalalabad as far as Gandamak. That the British 
Government did not pursue the claim suggests that it was 
largely Griffin's personal contribution..
As the Khan of Mohmands, Akbar Khan held an important
position. By tradition, the Khan of Lalpura was a
guardian of the Khyber, in which the authority of the
Mohmands was so great that it was said that a single
10
Mohmand will pass a whole caravan. Akbar Khan collected 
road tolls at Lakka from merchants and travellers, and 
levied dues on the rafts on the Kabul river. His annual 
income which he collected with his own men was about 
one lakh of rupees.^ Because of the special position 
of Akbar Khan, and the fact that the only alternative to 
him was Sadiq Khan, who was related to the ex-Amir,
Amir 'Abd al-Rahman did not take drastic measures against 
him. Besides, the Amir feared a coalition of Akbar Khan 
and the Badshah of Kunar. Instead the Amir gradually 
stripped Akbar Khan of power and made him a kind of 
government official. Finally he kept him in Kabul.
8 FIBK, 4 1 9 .
9 Griffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1245.
10 Blphinstone, 2 , 41.
11 PL, 10 May 1882, PSLI, 32, 962.
110
Shortly after the British withdrawal, the Amir
summoned Akbar Khan to Kabul and confirmed him as Khan,
but imposed certain conditions on him. In 1882 the Amir
further reduced his power by appropriating half the tolls 
12of Lalpura, and garrisoning Lakka with a force of his
13
own, which took over the management of the road.
Akbar Khan acquiesced. In the first place, his
request ,f ...for the intervention of the British Government”"^
met with the reply that he should comply with ” ...the orders
15received from...the Amir.” In the second place, among 
the elders of his own tribe he was, by tradition, only 
nrimus inter pares and he had formidable rivals in the 
persons of his elder brother and cousins.
Aware of his position, Akbar Khan at no time dared
to oppose the Amir who, in 1883, took over the collection
of the Lalpura tolls from the Khan and leased them but.
But the proceeds were equally shared between Akbar Khan
and the A m i r ^  Kext, on the grounds that the Khan was
17exercising oppression and tyranny over the people, the
"I o
Amir confiscated the whole of the Lalpura tolls, and
made him an allowance of only a thousand rupees cash a
19month.
12 PD, 4 July 1882, PSLI, 3 3 , 234.
13 PD, 18 Sept 1882, PSLI, 3 4 , 9.
14 BGA, 3 2 .
15 Ibid.
16 KD, 27 Mar 1883, PSLI, 36, 262.
17 KD, 31 July 1883, PSLI, 3 7 , 927.
18 Akbar Khan to the Commissioner of Peshawar, 30 Mov 1883, 
PSLI, 38, 999.
19 PD, 31 May 1883, PSLI, 44, 860.
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Meanwhile the Khan rendered valuable services to the
Amir’s army under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Charkhi in
suppressing the Shinwarays in the late eighties for
which, in 1890, the Amir granted a rent-free village to
20the Khan and an allowance to his son in Kabul. But in
early 1893 the Amir confiscated all his rent-free villages
21and gave him a fixed cash allowance, owing to his failure
to crush Umra Khan of Jandol against whom the Khan had
taken the field in support of Safdar Khan, the Khan of 
22Kawagai, who was an ally of the Amir. In late 1893
Akbar Khan was told that his power would be limited to
23Lalpura alone. In 1894, certain allowances hitherto
paid to to the Mohmands through the Khan were dispersed
through a certain Lalunai, an agent of the Sipah Salar.
Soon, Lalunai became more powerful than the Khan who was
24detained first at Asmar by the Sipah Salar and in the 
following year in Kabul.
Kunar
The district of Kunar, bounded on the east by the
Mohmand range, north-west by the Kashmund range, west by
the district of Laghman and south by Jalalabad, was
inhabited predominantly by the Safays with small communities
23of Shinwarays, Mamunds, Kafirs, Durranis and Tajiks.
20 PD, 6 Dec 1890, PSLI, 61, 953.
21 PD, 10 Jan 1893, PSLI, 69, 583-
22 FINK, 470.
23 KD, 9-12 Dec 1893, PSLI, 73, 118.
24 FTIMK, 470.
25 OAK, 317* Udny, R., to Chief Secretary to Government 
of Panjab, 12 Aug 1892, PSLI, 67, 1077.
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For centuries Kunar had been ruled by a sayyed 
family whose ancestors were believed to have been the 
descendants of Mohammad through his daughter, Fatima.
This accounts for the title of Eadshah (probably a 
corruption of Padishah) and Sayyed used by the rulers of 
Kunar. According to tradition, the ancestors of Sayyed 
Mahmud, the then Badshah of Kunar, had migrated 
through Termiz (on the right bank of the Oxus) from 
’Arabia, Kunar had been granted as revenue - free by 
the Mhghul emperor Humayun (1526-1530, 1555-1556) to 
an ancestor of Sayyed Mahmud whose descendants gradually 
became secular rulers, taking revenue at the rate of 
one-third of the produce.^
From the time of Humayun up to the reign of Shah
Shuja’ al-Mulk Sadozay (1803), the sayyeds of Kunar held
27undisturbed possession of Kunar, but under the Barakzays
there began a series of attempts to bring the area under 
28
control. Family dissension among the sayyeds of Kunar
helped Amir Dost Mohammad to annex a portion of Kunar
and make Sayyed Baha al-Din, the then Badshah, his
29
tributary vassal. During the British occupation of
Afghanistan, Baha al-Din maintained relations with the
"50British and accepted the rule of Shah Shuja* . After 
the British wi thdrax^al, Amir Dost Mohammad annexed Kunar
26 Statement of Sayyed Mahmud, 1892, PSLI, 67? 1078.
27 MacGregor, GAK, 321.
28 Yapp, M.E., Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 1839-42, 
BSOAS, xxv, pt 3? 1962, 504.
29 Sayyed Mahmud, 1078.
30 Yapp, M.E., 50,
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entirely to his kingdom, hut later divided it between
Sayyed Baha al-Din and one of his brothers, Sayyed
Hashim, while annexing a large portion of it to his
kingdom, Amir Sher ’Ali, in both his reigns, kept the
arrangement, while Amir Mohammad Afzal removed Sayyed
31Baha al-Din from Kunar and had him arrested in Kabul,
During the second British occupation of Afghanistan,
Sayyed Mahmud, who had succeeded his father Sayyed Baha
al-Din, probably in 1868, took possession of the whole
of Kunar, Believing that, by assisting the British,
he would be able to regain and retain the whole of
Kunar "... independent of any ruler in Kabul and only
32subordinate to the British,'1 Sayyed Mahmud tried to
prevent resistance to the British and established
friendly relations with them. In return the British
33Government guaranteed his "hereditary possessions" 
and promised him assistance and protection.
When Griffin was on his way to Kabul, Sayyed Mahmud 
met him in Jalalabad, Besides renewing his loyalty to 
the British, Sayyed Mahmud advised Griffin on the country 
as a whole, suggesting to him that Afghanistan should be 
divided up into minor principalities, independent of each 
other, but subordinate to the British. Further, he 
advised him that "...no final settlement should be made
31 Sayyed Mahmud, 1078.
32 Griffin to Roberts, 29 Mar 1880, PSLI, 33, 546.
33 Major-General Bright (Commanding officer, Khyber 
Field Force), to Sayyed Mahmud, 21 Dec 1879, 
PSLI, 33, 542.
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until Muhammad Jan Khan and his adherents had been
thoroughly defeated and broken, and the power of the
'1%
British Government fully vindicated. ^ Griffin was 
so impressed by him that he gave him another guarantee, 
to the effect that H...he might rest assured Government 
would fulfil literally and fully all promises made to 
him, and would take care, happen what might, he would 
not suffer for having placed himself upon the side of 
the B r i t i s h . G r i f f i n  granted him a cash allowance 
of twenty thousand rupees and two pieces of mountain 
art illery?^
Griffin strongly recommended Sayyed Mahmud to the 
Amir saying that lf...the British Government would hear 
with special pleasure that Your Highness had maintained 
him in the enjoyment of his present possessions of 
Kunar-i-Kuhna /"the old Kunar/7 and Pishat /"the principal 
town of Kunar/7, and the country east of the river and 
that he had been granted the privilege of holding Shewa 
Shiggi / a collection of villages about eight miles from 
Jalalabad,/7 in farm. But for reasons which will be 
discussed later, the Amir took measures which compelled 
Sayyed Mahmud to take refuge in India*
In late 1880, the Amir confirmed Sayyed Mahmud’s 
personal possessions / landsJ  on both sides of the Kunar
34 Sayyed Mahmud to Griffin, 12 Mar 1880, PSLI, 33> 547.
35 Griffin to Boberts, 29 Mar 1880, PSLI, 33, 348.
36 Sayyed Mahmud, 1079*
37 Griffin to Amir, 17 Aug 1880, PSLI, 33, 311*
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river but made them subject to revenue. The Amir farmed
out the right to collect taxes only in the districts of
Kashkot (Behsud) and Pashat to the Sayyed. But no sooner
had the Badshah arrived at Kunar from his recent visit to
the Amir than the Governor of Jalalabad, on instructions
from the Amir, despatched khassadars to collect the revenue
from Kashkot and Pashat?^ Sayyed Mahmud acquiesced, but
the landowners refused to pay the revenue. In the
following year Sayyed Mahmud* s position became worse when
his son, Sayyed Ahmad, deserted the Amir while he was on
his march to Kandahar. The Amir determined to ruin his
*50
father, Sayyed Mahmud.J
Aware of the Amir* s attitude toward him, Sayyed
Mahmud refused to obey a new summons to Kabul in 1882.
Meanwhile, on instructions from the Amir, the Governor
of Jalalabad claimed arrears of 370,000 rupees from Sayyed
40
Mahmud for the revenue of the previous years. According
to the estimate of Sayyed Mahmud, the annual revenue of
Kunar with the districts which he had ruled since 1878
was about 240,000 rupees^1 but he was willing to pay only
42
60,000 rupees as nazrana (gift).
In declining the summons Sayyed Mahmud must have had 
other considerations in mind too. His father had been a 
supporter of Amir Sher *Ali against the father of *Abd
38 BCA, 126.
39 Amir to Ghilzay elders, A.B. from Zarni, 16 Aug 1881, 
PSLI, 29, 1014.
40 PD, 11 June 1882, PSLI, 32, 1269.
41 Sayyed Mahmud, 1080.
42 PD, 11 June 1882, PSLI, 32, 1269.
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al-Rahman during the civil war. But in the eyes of the 
Amir "...the sole difficulty" J was the fact that Sayyed 
Mahmud himself was "...a strong partisan of ShersAli 
Khan"f^ to whose family he was related by marriage.
The Amir had either imprisoned or executed a number of 
influential supporters of Amir Sher 'Ali. Sayyed Mahmud 
was therefore reluctant to wait on the Amir without some 
guarantee by the G-overnment of India.
Several letters were exchanged over Sayyed Mahmud.
In one of them the G-overnment of India wrote to the Amir 
that the Viceroy "...is assured that the feelings of 
justice for which Your Highness is so distinguished will 
make you hesitate before you think of visiting upon Syud 
£ Sic_7 Ahmad £ Mahmud^/ ^ke sins of his son."^ In reply 
the Amir wrote, "If he £ Sayyed Mahmud_J7* comes with the real
purity of heart to pay his respects to me.... I will not
punish him for the sins of his son... Should his actions 
prove contrary to his professions, I shall have no other
A /"
course but to drive him away..." Hone of the letters
helped Sayyed Mahmud. G-riffin even held the view that
47they "annoyed' the Amir. G-riffin1 s conclusion might
be true, but in view of his general attitude towards 
influential elders throughout the country, it was unlikely 
the Amir would have left Sayyed Mahmud in his position in 
any case.
43 Amir to W.G-.Waterfield (Commissioner of Peshawar),
18 Apr 1885, PSLI, 49, 235.
44 PL, 18 Apr 1885, PSLI, 44, 235.
45 Lyall to Amir, 12 Jan 1882, PSLI, 33, 514.
46 Amir to Lyall, 1 Peb 1882, PSLI, 33, 514.
47 G-riffin to G-overnment of India, 4 Mar 1882, PSLI, 33, 514.
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For the Government of India there were the questions
of the explicit guarantees which had been given to the
Badshah, and their effects on the neighbouring independent
tribes if the guarantees were not upheld• Rawlinson feared
that if the Government " ...abandon the Badshah we
shall incur incredible disgrace along the frontier and
must be prepared for further aggressions on the part of
the Qabul £ Government^/ against Swat, Bajor and Dir and
4.8
ultimately against Chitral," Hartington also held a 
49similar view, although he had been of the principal 
advocates of withdrawal from Afghanistan, Furthermore, 
Kunar was considered to be strategically important. It 
was on a passable route to Badakhshan and ultimately to 
central Asia. AlSo, from Kunar, there was an easy access 
to Kafiristan, Chitral, Jalalabad and, more important, 
to the tribes along the north-western border of India.
But Ripon was not willing to go further than recommen­
ding Sayyed Mahmud. As had been pointed out elsewhere, 
the policy of the Government of India was to work towards 
a strong Afghanistan under the Amir, free in the internal 
affairs of his kingdom. Ripon argued that because of 
their geographical locations "...the possessions of the
Badshah are so situated as to render it impossible
to give him any active assistance without the violation
of the Amir1s territory in a manner amounting practically
50to an act of war.1'
48 Memorandum by Sir H. Rawlinson, 16 Sept 1882, PSLI,
33 525.
49 Hartington to Ripon, (T), 11 Sept 1882, PSLI, 3 3 , 519«
50 Ripon to Hartington, 23 Oct 1882, PSLI, 34, 221.
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There seemed to be only two courses left for the
Government of India, either to abandon the Badshah or to
fulfil the guarantee by force. It chose to abandon the
Badshah. In excuse, Ripon wrote, "...the Badshah of Kunar
has persistently neglected to follow our advice / to wait
on the AmirJ7* *•••• We have reason to doubt whether, in
his relations with the present Amir, he has not played a 
61double game."
For the Amir, Kunar was not simply a matter of
personal hostility towards the Badshah. He was prepared
52to keep the Badshah at Kabul with a good allowance.
The real problem was the Amir's determination to prove 
that he was not a puppet ruler. Also, for the same 
strategic reasons, his direct control over Kunar was 
essential for the extension of his authority into the 
territories further east. Because of this he even 
threatened to relinquish the amirate and to retire either 
to Herat or to Turkistan in face of the threatening attitude 
taken by Lepel Griffin, once his admirer, now his critic. 
Ripon had commissioned Griffin (Agent to the Governor 
General in the Central Province) to see if he could 
influence the Amir through the Amir's Agent at Calcutta 
to whom Griffin had said, in an interview at Calcutta, that 
"The British authorities are thinking of arranging the 
Amir's affairs."^
51 Ibid.
52 Amir to Colonel Afzal (British Agent at Kabul), 
6 Apr 1883, PSLI, 36, 383.
53 Griffin to General Amir Ahmed (Amir1s Agent at 
Calcutta), 28 Oct 1882, PSLI, 34, 740.
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Relying on the British guarantees, Sayyed Mahmud
•was still hopeful for the exercise of yet stronger influence.
To Griffin he wrote, "My visit to Kabul would be deferred
until I get an assui'ance from the British Government. Up
to date, as far as lay in my power, I had served the
Government, and incurred a bad name among my clansmen*
This service was not rendered with the ob.iect that it should
54bear good fruit in the next world.*1
For some time past the Amir had been threatening
Sayyed Mahmud. In his last warning, the Amir gave him
twenty days to wait on him, failing which he was told
that he would be driven away from his kingdom. In Kunar
itself opposition to Sayyed Mahmud had grown stronger, in
all probability with the encouragement of Mulla Khalil.
In an undated letter to the Amir, some people of Kunar
had already complained of Sayyed Mahmud's alleged atrocities
and the mull as of Bajaur, Asmar and Shiggal j_ had
declared him as a "kafir" for his having prevented the
56ghazis from fighting the British. In November 1882, 
the Sipah Salar drove Sayyed Mahmud away from Kunar. 
Abandoned by the British and opposed by his own people,
Sayyed Mahmud offered but a feeble resistance and fled to 
Mittai (a village on the frontier of the Mohmand country ) 
where he remained until 1886, hoping to.return if some 
misfortune happened to the Amir, Finally he went to Hasan 
Abdal (India), receiving a subsidy of 2,000 rupees a month
54 Sayyed Mahmud to Griffin, 25 Feb 1882, PSLI, 35, 514.
55 Amir to Sayyed Mahmud, 15 Apr 1882, PSLI, 33» 516.
56 Elders and mullas to Amir, undated, PSLI, 33, 575*
120
from the British Government. Only after the Amir1s
death was the Badshah allowed to return in 1905, hut
_ _
without being restored to power.
The Shinwarays
Except for Kot, the Shinwaray tribe occupy all the 
valleys and a number of passes of the Safed Koh (Spin 
G-har). Their country, the Shinwar, is encircled by the 
Khugianay tribe in the west, the Afriday and Mohmand tribes 
in the south and east, and the Kabul river in the north.
The tribe is divided into four main divisions of the 
Sangu Khel (Sun Khel), Ali Sher Khel (with a portion of 
it in loargai cis-Khyber), the Sipai and the Mandozay 
(Mandezay). With them live a people in subordinate 
position (hamsayas)« called Mulagoris. Of all the tribes, 
the Shinwarays, despite their small number of 70,000 
(in 1906), refused to accept the authority of the Amir for
CO
the longest period. They were not pacified until 1892.
The Shinwarays not only received different kinds of 
allowances such as malikana (for each head-man of the 
village) and tankhwah-i-wilayati (for the whole tribe)
'r " g Q
amounting to 30,000 rupees a year, but they were also
g-i
exempt from paying revenue. Only the Mando.zay section,
who were less turbulent than the other sections, paid
57 G-AK, 321.
58 Elphinstone, M., 1, 42. Jenkyns, W., ii. MRA, 100.GAK,485-500
59 Jenkyns, W., 15-
60 Amir in darbar, (Mazer), 5 Nov 1889, 'PSLI, 58, 849*
61 Jenkyns, W., 12.
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revenue but, like others, they also received allowances.
The Shinwarays also received allowances for keeping the 
62road open. Allowances were also paid to the various
religious groups among the Shinwarays such as the 'Ulema,
63Savveds. Sahibzadas. Khoriazadas and Faairs.
As guardians of the Khyber, the Shinwarays also located
watchmen on certain portions of the Kabul road leading to
Peshawar, and levied tolls. This was their right by
tradition to which the British G-overnment agreed when
they were in control of the land between Dakka and Landai
Khana (in the Khyber) in the war of 1879-1880. In return
the Shinwarays, as before, took the responsibility of
fiA
keeping the road open and safe. The denial by the Amir 
of the road tolls to the Shinwarays became the signal for 
a long conflict, which in the course of time was intensified 
by other factors.
In 1882 the Amir garrisoned Dakka with a force and 
took over the management of the road from the Shinwarays 
as well as the Mohmands.^ In an attempt to restore their 
traditional rights, all sections of the Shinwarays sent 
two large jjir&as to the Amir. But the Amir, in contradiction 
of tribal custom, imprisoned and executed members of the 
second dirga in Kabul. About this time, Sardar Mohammad 
Hasan and Mir Bacha of Kohistan were inciting the Shinwarays 
in the Shinwar against the Amir, The first step was taken
62 Elphinstone, M., 1, 43*
63 Jenkyns, W., 14.
64 GAK, 495.
65 PD, 18 Sept 1882, PSLI, 34, 9.
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*by the Sangu Khel, -who raided the Amir1 s territory. By
early 1883 they were attacking caravans on the Kabul
66road, which became completely unsafe.
On 2 February 1883 the Amir arrived at Jalalabad. He 
unsuccessfully attempted to keep some influential Shinwarays 
as hostages near Jalalabad. It was about this time that 
the Amir introduced the se-kot (three portions) system 
in accordance with which one third of their land produce 
was demanded from the Shinwarays as well as other people 
of the eastern province as revenue.^
After their refusal to pay the revenue, the Shinwarays 
were routed by the Amir’s army under G-eneral Ghulam Haydar 
Orakzay in an engagement at the village of Sarak in April 
1883. Impressed by his victory, the Amir determined on 
either bringing the Shinwarays ug^er complete control or 
expelling them from their homes. By his order, the 
heads of about 140 Shinwarays, who had fallen in the battle, 
were piled in the vicinity of Jalalabad, and a large number 
of Shinwarays were imprisoned, some in the SiabChah (black 
well) in Kabul. Mass imprisonment was also an innovation
69to the Shinwarays, as the Jalalabad district had no prison.
The Amir also promised to give the land of the Shinwarays
70to the Khugianays.1 The brutal measures of the Amir only
66 GAK, 496.
67 Ibid, 495.
68 M. Afzal, (British Agent with Amir in Jalalabad),
1 May 1883, PSLI, 36, 741.
69 Jenkyns, A., 17.
70 M. Afzal (Jalalabad), 27 Feb 1883, PSLI, 35, 935.
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hardened the attitudes of the Shinwarays, especially
when, after the death of many of their elders in the battle,
the leadership among them passed on to the more radical
71younger leaders.
Nevertheless, many .jirgas went to and fro. For 
keeping the western part of the Khyber pass open, the 
Shinwarays insisted on their traditional allowances. 
Although the Amir reduced the revenue demand from one-third 
to one-tenth, in return he insisted on their being disarmed 
and hostages taken from them.^ The net result was a 
failure.
The failure of the negotiations was followed by
many encounters at Sarak, the Nargas* Pass, the Bandar
Pass, the Nazian Pass in which about 1,000 Shinwarays were
killed and as many forts destroyed. The Shinwarays fled
to the upper hills, while their houses were burnt down and
73their crops destroyed. Besides, the Amir stopped the
74allowances to their mullas, for failing to dissuade the
Shinwarays from fighting. Although the Amir declared
an amnesty and promised the release of the prisoners of
75war on the good conduct of the Shinwarays, they declared
76that they had lost confidence in him. They demanded, in 
addition, the permanent annulment of the revenue demand 
which the Amir, of course, was not willing to accept.
71 GAK, 488.
72 PL, 1 June 1883, PSLI, 36, 1549-
73 M. Afzal (Jalalabad), 3 June 1883, PSLI, 36, 1336.
74 M. Afzal (Jalalabad), 10 Apr 1883, PSLI, 36, 587.
75 M. Afzal (Jalalabad), 26 June 1883, PSLI, 3 7 , 160.
76 Mir Kazim (Amir's messenger to Shinwarays) to Amir, 
3 July 1883, PSLI, 3 7 , 26.
124
The Amir left Jalalabad for Kabul without having
reached any settlement with the Shinwarays. After his
departure, the Shinwarays, especially the Sangu Khel, the
most determined and numerous of all sections, made regular
raids on the neighbouring lands. Indeed, robbery was the
only occupation left by which the Shinwarays could support
themselves. As, much later, they themselves put it,
f,We have no mind to return to our country, and we do not
care for the Amir. We will support ourselves by plunder 
77and robbery.”
Meanwhile the Sipah Salar took over the expedition
against the Shinwarays, and acted as a viceroy of the Amir
in the eastern province. He sent Mulla Na;Jm al-Din, the
most influential religious leader in eastern Afghanistan,
to the Shinwarays, to advise them to expel Sardar Wur
Mohammad Khan, son of Sardar Wali Mohammad, former Wali
of Kabul, and Sadu, the famous G-aru Khel Ghilzay robber
who, for some time, had been with the Shinwarays and were
inciting them against the Amir. But it was to no avail.
A similar attempt had already failed when 80 released
Shinwaray prisoners failed to induce their fellow tribesmen,
despite their promise to do so, to submit to the Amir and
7R
pay the revenue. However, by now a split had occurred
among the Shinwarays, some willing to submit, others
79opposed to the Amir’s rule. In the absence of evidence, 
it is difficult to know who they were, but it may be
77 Shinwaray elders to G-hulam Haydar Orakzay, 11 May 1885 , 
PSLI, 44, 1079.
78 MM, Aug 1886, PSLI, 48, 55.
79 MM, Sept 1886, PSLI, 48:, 511.
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assumed that the Mandozays and the Sipai, who occupied 
the territory west of Shinwar, were for, and the Ali Sher 
Khel and the Sangu Khel were against conciliation* By 
their proximity to the Khyber, the Sangu Khel were affected 
materially more than others by the loss of tolls* This may 
account for their most stubborn attitude throughout the 
struggle.
In the meantime, the Shinwar had become a centre for
a number of rebel leaders* Sadu and Sardar Nur Mohammad,
who had earlier joined the Waziris against the Amir,
returned to Shinwar. So did Maghul Khan, the former Khan
of G-oshta, who had already joined Sayyed Mahmud, the
Badshah of Kunar, against the Amir. Soon, Mulla Bajm
al-Lin also returned, this time in opposition to the Amir.
The Mulla had recently escaped assassination by the Amir
in Kabul, where the Mulla had advised the Amir to relax
80his demands upon the population. In Shinwar, the Mulla
81
denounced the Amir as an "infidel” for his tyranny,
82
while the Shinwarays declared Najm al-Lin their Badshah, 
but subsequent events showed that the Mulla took no part 
in activities against the Amir.
Because of the seriousness of the situation in Shinwar, 
the Amir did not recall his troops from there in the 
height of the G-hilzay rising in 1887* But operations 
against them were slowed down. This may account for the
80 Colonel fAta Allah (British Agent at Kabul), 19 July 1887, 
PSLI, 50, 1669.
81 PL, 29 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1877.
82 PL, 13 Aug 1887, PSLI, 50, 1887.
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frequent kidnappings of the Amir’s soldiers, and nightly
attacks by the Shinwarays upon soldiers who had been
83garrisoned in Deh Bala in the heart of the Shinwar,
84so much so that the soldiers became sick and feeble.
But the Shinwarays were not strong enough to force the 
army out of their country.
On 6 January 1888, the Amir returned to Jalalabad,
with the object of bringing about the submission of the
Shinwarays and conquering Dir, Swat and Bajaur. The Amir
tried to employ such means as presenting each Shinwaray
elder with a thousand rupees®^ and warning them of the
danger from the infidels who, according to the Amir,
menaced their country from two sides. In particular, he
warned them of the insult to their women in the event of
the invasion of their country by the infidels, and asked
the Shinwarays to be prepared for jehad. Once again many
jirgas were held. For the first time, the Sangu Khel
made their submission, by agreeing to pay ’Ushr (tithes^
and retaining a Qazi (judge) of the Amir in their land.
Also, they asked Sardar Bur Mohammad to leave their 
87
country. About 700 elders entered into an agreement
for payment of revenue, graduating according to the
88quality of their'land. At the same time the Amir gave 
taqavi (money advanced for the improvement of agriculture) 
to the Khugianays of the Gandamak area who had been
83 Sipah Salar to Amir, 10 June 1887, PSLI, 5 0 , 1189.
84 Sipah Salar to Amir, 8 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1449*
85 Colonel 'Ata Allah (Jalalabad), 30 Dec 1887, PSLI, 52, 569.
86 PD, 22 Feb 1888, PSLI, 52, 753.
87 MM, Feb 1888, PSLI, 52, 768.
88 Colonel 'Ata Allah, 7 Feb 1888, PSLI, 52, 1073.
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settled in Deh B ala.^
After their return home, the elders held ,jirgas,
hut failed to induce their clansmen to accept the agreement
they had made with the Amir. Together they sent the
following message to the Amir; **We are ready to submit
to Your Highness*s authority but two things prevent
us from carrying these our wishes into effect; first, that
we are in poverty and are compelled to commit depredations;
allowances should be fixed upon us; secondly, Your
Highness*s subjects are in great straits; both days and
nights arrests are made. Most of the Mohmands and
Khugianis have fled on account of oppression. How then
can we be consoled and assured that we will be treated 
90
well?**-' Besides their loss of confidence, in the Amir, 
for his tyrannical rule, the fact was that the Shinwarays 
and their land were too poor to pay the revenue. Never­
theless their former tribal unity was now broken. Even
91the Sangu Khel split into two parties. Those who
lived in the lower parts of the valleys, north of the
Nazian glen (the main land of the Sangu Khel) accepted
the terms, while those in the upper parts still asserted
92
their independence. But despite this split, the
rebellious Shinwarays inflicted a loss of about 400 (killed
and wounded) on the Amir*s army in two engagements in 
9*5July. Moreover the Shinwarays killed nearly all of the
89 Colonel *Ata Allah, 24 Feb 1888, PSLI, 5 3 , 3 4 2 .
90 Shinwaray elders to Amir, 16 Mar 1888, PSLI, 5 3 , 5 1 1 ,
91 PP, 31 May 1888, PSLI, 54,
92 PD, 10 July 1888, PSLI, 54, 425.
93 MM, July 1888, PSLI, 54, 753*
128
one hundred members of a jirga, which the Sipah Salar
had sent to them for their peaceful submission. This was
no doubt in revenge for the treatment of their own jirga
which the Amir had seized in 1883, and the recent mis-
94conduct of the soldiers towards their women.
The Amir's conciliatory attitude towards the Shinwarays 
over the past two years and their successes were probably 
due to the risings of the G-hilzays, and of Sardar Mohammad 
Ishaq in Turkistan. With the collapse of both risings, the 
attitude towards the Shinwarays hardened and large scale 
operations against them were undertaken, especially when 
other efforts failed.
95In February 1889, the Sangu Khel were routed, with
the help of about 3,000 tribal levies from M n g r a h a r ^
and about 2,000 from Tagao (a valley to the west of Laghman),
97the latter under Mohammad Shah Khan Safay* In this major
battle, even the Shinwarays of Leh Bala and some Afridays
also took part. The Nazian valley was occupied and many 
Shinwarays taken prisoner. The Sipah Salar revenged 
himself upon the Shinwarays by imprisoning their .1irga,
but the Sangu Khel still did not submit and fled further
into the hills, from where they made unsuccessful raids.
The Sipah Salar established military posts in all
94 Colonel ’Ata Allah, 7 Aug 1888, PSLI, 54, 925.
95 MM, Mar 1889, PSLI, 56, 1072.
96 PL, 28 Nov 1888, PSLI, 55, 1243*
97 PL, 22 Dec 1888, PSLI, 5 5 , 1 3 6 8 .
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the villages along the foot of the hills, In one of the
posts, opposite the Nazian pass, the Sangu Khel of the
98lower valleys were employed. It was apparent that the 
power of the Sangu Khel was now broken, and their tribal 
unity ended.
Recognising the hopelessness of their position, all
the Shinwarays, except a few sections of the Sangu Khel,
made their submission. A tax of li rupees per jarib of
land was levied and their land measured.^ In 1890, the
last of the Sangu Khel also made a truce, agreeing not to
injure the Amir’s subjects and giving two of their elders
as h o s t a g e s . B u t  the truce was soon nullified when
the Sangu Khel failed to restore the cattle they had
1 01plundered from a village.
In retaliation, the Amir imposed economic blockade
on the Sangu Khel, so preventing their export of timber.
Further, the Amir threatened them with the occupation of
102their upland valleys. " Still the Sangu Khel refused to
submit and went still further into the hills in the face
10’3of the repeated attacks by the Sipah Salar. In 1892, 
however, the tribe as a whole settled down,^^ in all 
probability on the Amir’s terms.
98 PD, 3 May 1889, PSLI, 5 7 , 383.
99 Colonel ’Ata Allah (in Mazar with Amir), 5 Nov 1889, 
PSLI, .5 8 , 849.
100 PD, 11 July 1890, PSLI, 60, 952.
101 PD, 19 July 1890, PSLI, 60, 992.
102 Amir to Shinwaray elders through Malik Zaman Afridi,
5 Nov 1890, PSLI, 61, 843.
103 MM, Mar 1891, PSLI, 62, 938.
104 OAK, 500.
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The extension of the central authority is exemplified 
in the struggle with the nominally subject Shinwarays.
The taking over of the Peshawar road by the Amir started 
a struggle which intensified with the introduction of 
se-kot and the seizure of the jirga elders. It was to 
take ten years before the Shinwarays finally accepted the 
Amir*s authority. After their pacification, the Amir 
attempted to regain territories further east. However, 
the Government of India had fixed the eastern limits for 
Afghanistan and the Amir found his progress checked. If 
the Amir had advanced into the unsubdued eastern territories, 
postponing his confrontation with the Shinwarays whose 
territory was not in dispute with India, he might have been 
successful. Thus it could be argued that this victory 
of the Amir over the Shinwarays was achieved at too great 
a price.
The Safays of Kunar
After the pacification of the Shinwarays, the entire 
body of troops were moved to Kunar, with the apparent 
object of regaining territories further east. But before 
that Kunar had to be pacified. In the early eighties, 
such an attempt had been postponed, because the troops 
were moved to Shinwar. As had already been mentioned,
Kunar up to Chagaserai (three villages on the right and 
left banks of the Kunar river, 57 miles from Jalalabad) 
was occupied predominantly by the Safays, a Pashtun 
tribe scattered over the narrow and difficult valleys 
(Pech, Badel, Dewagal, Chowkai, Challus and Ghaziabad) on 
the right bank of the Kunar river.
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In late 1888, the Safays of Kunar rose. Their
rising was connected with the construction of a road in
105the valley of Chowkai. Whereas agents of Mulla Khalil 
urged the Safays to submit to the Amir, as the rightful 
Muslim ruler, those of Mulla Wajm al-Lin incited them to
"1 A  /*
rise against the "infidel” Amir, as, in their opinion,
fAbd al-Rahman was. However, early next year a settlement
was reached whereby the Safays agreed to pay the revenue
in kind. The construction of the road was abandoned and
107Chowkai evacuated.
A year later the Safays, encouraged by Umra Khan of 
Jandol, and the Shinwarays of Shigal (villages along the 
Kunar river about 11 miles from Chagaserai) again took up 
arms. But because they were assisted by about 2,000
■J Q O
Kafirs, the Safays lost the support of all Muslims and
they again submitted. They accepted the se-kot system of
the payment of revenue, but the administration of their
109country was retained by their elders. However, the
Safays of Badel and Dewagal (who were reported still to
be pagan) soon broke the agreement and they were not
110
pacified until 1896.
Asmar
Asmar was a small independent Khanate (about 8 miles
105 MM, Aug 1889, PSLI, 58, 75.
106 PL, 24 Aug 1889, PSLI, 58, 90,
107 PL, 15 Jan 1890, PSLI, 59, 153-
108 PL, 8 Mar 1892, PSLI, 65, 951.
109 PL, 22 Mar 1892, PSLI, 66, 88.
110 PL, Ho. 6, 20 Mar 1896, P.L.0. Ho. 881 - P(l896),
PSLI, 85.
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from Shigal on the left bank of the Kunar river), occupied 
predominantly by Tarkalanays, with a small community of 
Kafirs in the highlands. The Khan of Asmar enforced his 
authority with a body-guard of about 200 men (Tayar Khor) 
and realised revenue on the basis of se-kbt. He also 
imposed duties on exports and imports, and exacted escort 
duties (badraqa) from travellers.
In 1890 the Khan of Asmar, Tahmasp Khan, was murdered
by a Kafir slave, whereupon Umra Khan of Jandol and Safdar
Khan of Uawagai tried to gain possession of the khanate.
Finally in 1891? Umra Khan succeeded in establishing his
nominee, G-hulam Khan (half-brother of the late Khan of
ill
Asmar) to the khanate.
During the struggle over Asmar, the Sipah Salar was
engaged with the Safays. Shortly after the settlement
with the Safays, the Sipah Salar occupied Shigal, without
112
being opposed. On 18 March he sent tribal levies to
Asmar, who occupied it without opposition. Umra Khan's
nominee fled to Chitral, taking with him his niece, a minor
who had been betrothed to Sardar Habib Allah, the eldest
113son of the Amir. Soon the Sipah Salar moved to Asmar
with his troops.
The occupation of Asmar was an important step in the
111 GAK, 24.
112 Sultan Mahomed gives the date of the occupation of 
Asmar to be December 1891, 2, 159-
113 MM, Mar 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 161.
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extension of the authority of the Amir, either by
diplomatic or military means, over the territories of
Dir, Swat and Bajaur. Although the Amir claimed Asmar to
he a part of Kunar^1^ it was, in fact, geographically and
115tribally much nearer to Bajaur. From Asmar, roads led 
into Bajaur, Dir and the Salarzay country and Asmar was 
on the frontier between the districts of Kunar and Chitral.
The greater part of the inhabitants of Asmar, the 
Tarkalanays, lived in Bajaur and they were kin to the
116Yusufzays who occupied Dir and Swat up to the Indus river.
As far as the eastern territories were concerned, Asmar
held a key position in Kunar, whose importance has already
been discussed. To the Amir, Asmar was strategically as
117important as Herat, f^ljakh or Kandahar.
With the concentration of a large force at Asmar 
(at one time, in addition to his regular troops, the
118Sipah Salar was reported to have about 24,000 tribal levies)
and with the existing feuds among the khans of Bajaur, the
impression grew stronger among the local inhabitants that
119the Bajauris would accept the Amir's rule. J It would, 
therefore, be useful to look briefly into the affairs of 
territories beyond Asmar.
114 PD, 23 Nov 1891, PSLI, 64, 1452.
115 Khan of Asmar, MM, Sept 1889, PSLI, 5 8 , 376a.
116 For Yusuizays see Bellew, H.W., The Races of Afghanistan.
Calcutta,' 1880, 67-76; Davies, C.C., The Problem of the 
North-West Frontier. 1890-1908. Cambridge, 1932, 60.
117 Mahomed, S., 2, 500.
118 PD, 9 May 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 528.
119 PD, 23 Feb 1892, PSLI, 65, 722.
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Bajaur, Dir and Swat
From Chitral down to the Khyber or further east of 
the Kunar river, lay the quasi-independent principalities 
of Dir, Swat, Bajaur, Uthman Khel, Mohmand and Afriday.
We are concerned here with the first three principalities, 
each of which was ruled by a khan who collected revenue 
on the basis of fUshr (one-tenth) and maintained a few 
troops of his own. But the authority of the khans was 
limited by tribal jir^as, on whom they depended for inter­
tribal and external wars. Of all the khans, Umra Khan,
the Khan of Jandol (situated in Bajaur, but an hereditary
120part of the Dir state) was the most powerful.
Allying himself first with Mian Gul, son of the famous
Akhund of Swat, by 1882 Umra Khan had occupied half of
Dir, then in the possession of Mohammad Sharif Khan. But
in 1883 the position of Umra Khan became difficult. Mulla
Makrani, who was said to have been sent by Amir !Abd al-
Rahman to the Uthman Khel, organised a combination of
Dir, Uawagai (the main seat of Bajaur), Swat, Uthman Khel
and others against Umra Khan. But these allies were
defeated, quarrelled one with another, and dispersed. By
1890, the Mulla having fled the country, Umra Khan was the
master of the whole of the Dir territory. Mohammad Sharif
121Khan, the former Khan of Dir, fled to Swat. By the 
middle of 1891, Kawagai and Swat were also under the threat
120 Caroe, 0.. The Bathans. 550B.C.-A.D.1957. London, 
(Papermac), 1965, 384.
121 ONWFP, 129.
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122of Umra Khan. Because Umra Khan had already Brought 
under control the Shamozay section of the Uthman Khel 
(a tribe inhabiting the country between the borders of 
Bawagai and Jandol), his threat to Bawagai was much more 
serious.
The rapid extension of Umra Khan's authority turned
many khans against him. Safdar Khan, the Khan of Bawagai,
entered into an agreement with Mohammad Sharif Khan who,
after having visited the Amir in Jalalabad, took refuge
in Bawagai. While Mian Gul of Swat incited the Swatis
124against Umra Khan the Mohmand of Mittai supported the
12R
rivals of Umra Khan. Maghul Khan, the former Khan of 
Goshta, and the Mihter of Chitral, were the supporters of
"IQ f.
Umra Khan. But since the former was himself an exile
and the latter the traditional suzerain of the Kafirs
(who were also threatened by Umra Khan) their support was
ineffective and doubtful. The support of Bajm al-Lin for
Umra Khan was moral in the sense that the Mulla stigmatised
127the Amir (the main rival of Umra Khan) as a "kafir".
At best, the Mulla could be considered a counterpoise to
Mulla Khalil who supported the Amir.
For some time past the Amir had been fomenting troubles
for Umra Khan. In the early nineties, he redoubled his
activities against him by increasing the allowance of
122 MM, Apr 1891, PSLI, 63, 120.
123 MM, May 1891, PSLI, 63, 497.
124 PL, 21 July 1891, PSLI, 63, 1086.
125 PL, 13 June 1891, PSLI, 63, 624.
126 PL, 9 Bov 1891, PSLI, 64, 1175.
127 PL, 23 Sept 1891, PSLI, 64, 229.
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Safdar Khan to one lakh of rupees a year and promising* him
128
tribal levies and, if necessary, regular troops. " He
had already commissioned mullas, among them the noted
Mulla Khalil, who invited the Mohmands to ,iehad against
Umra Khan for his alleged rebellion against the ruler of
Islam. In 1892, after the concentration of troops
and tribal levies at Asmar, the balance of power was
completely upset, and the defeat, whether by diplomacy
or war, of Umra Khan, and with it the extension of the
Amir’s authority in Bajaur, seemed more than probable.
But at this juncture, the Government of India warned both
Umra Khan and the Sipah Salar of their advance against
each other. The Sipah Salar was told that his advance into
Bajaur would be 11.. .regarded as an act of hostility to
130the Government of India.” The Amir postponed further
operations in that direction, although he maintained his 
claim to Bajaur as a part of Afghanistan until the Durand 
Agreement of 1893* But ultimately he was obliged to 
abandon his ambitions in Bajaur in the face of the 
determined opposition of the Government of India.
Kurram
Kurram, situated between Spin Ghar in the north and 
Waziristan and Kohat in the south and south-east, is 
inhabited by a Shi'ite Pashtun tribe of Turi. With the 
exception of some Shi'ite Bangash in the east, the Turis of 
Kurram are surrounded on all sides by the Sunni Pashtuns,
128 PD, 8 Aug 18919 PSLI, 6 3 , 1183*
129 PL, 8 Sept 1891> PSLI, 64, 84*
130 PD, 28 June 1892, PSLI, 67, 308.
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and this fact has "bedevilled their relations with them.
In 1880, while negotiating with ’Abd al-Rahman, 
the G-overnment of India told him that the frontier districts, 
including Kurram, which had been secured under the treaty 
of Candamak, would not be restored to him, Kurram remained 
under nominal British occupation.
Prom late 1891 onwards, Kurram became a hotbed of
conflict. Expeditions against the Turis were led by
neighbouring tribal elders, mullas and adventurers.
Finally, one of these adventurers, Sarwar Khan of Chinarak
nicknamed as Chikkai, who had already given much trouble
to the British at Kohat, took possession of the Lox^er
131Kurram and the Turis agreed to pay him revenue,
Chikkai allowed the Waziris and others to occupy and
cultivate the Turi villages and land on payment of one-
132tenth on the produce.  ^ Having given up the hope of
133recovering the Lower Kurram,  ^ the Turis finally made a
truce with Chikkai, according to which they agreed to the
retention of the Lower Kurram by Chikkai while he under-
134took to refrain from further advances in future.
The invasion of Kurram took place after Chikkai and
his 150 armed men returned from Kabul, where he had been
135received 11 with unusual honour’1 by the Amir. The
131 KD, 4-8 Dec 1891, PSLI, 69, 1706.
132 KD, 23-25 Mar 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 71*
133 MM, June 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 1323.
134 MM, May 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 884.
135 MM, Oct 1891, PSLI, 6 6 , 1334.
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Governor of the Pariah was of the opinion that Chikkai’s
156actions were .directly encouraged hy the Amir himself*”
The Amir wished to make the Turis his subjects, but at the
same time he was careful not to displease the British
Government* He therefore incited Sunni mullas against 
157them without supporting the mullas with his own troops*
The Amir’s view was that the Turis ” ...have thrown off 
the yoke / Sic_7 of Islam and become friends of outsidersv  4mav mmmr
whom they helped enter Afghanistan..
But the Government of India, after some correspondence 
with the Amir, decided to expel Chikkai and others. The 
Amir gave his consent, and in early October 1892 British
159troops entered Kurram and brought about a settlement there.
The Afridays
The Afridays are included among the Khyberis, and 
together with the Orakzays they occupy the country 
immediately to the south-east of Spin Ghar. After the 
second Anglo-Afghan war an agreement was reached between 
the Government of India and the Afridays by which, in 
return for allowances and a guarantee of non-interference
in their domestic affairs, they allowed the Khyber pass
* . 140 to remain open.
156 MM, Dec 1891, PSLI, 65, 107*
157 Derajat Confidential Diary, 15 Dec 1891, PSLI, 65, 515.
158 Amir to Sipah Salar, PD, 8 Jan 1892, PSLI, 65, 175.
159 Harris, L., British Policy on the North-West Frontier
of India, 1889-1901 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis at the 
University of London, I960), 8 8 .
140 Ibid, 55.
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The Amir1s attitude towards the Afridays was similar
to that which he had adopted towards the Turis. He
encouraged the Afridays to look towards Kabul, mainly
through the mullas without supporting them with troops.
Jirga after nirga from Tirah proceeded' to Kabul, one of
which consisted of 144 and another of 250 tribal elders
and mullas. To the usual offer of allegiance by the elders
and mullas, the Amir kept replying that " ...the Afridis
must be unanimous in accepting his rule before he could
address the Government as such."^^ In 1892, it was
reported that all the Afridays had offered their allegiance
to the Amir and informed the Deputy Commissioner of
142Peshawar of their decision. But no report of this was 
recorded by the Deputy Commissioner. It seems likely that 
the Amir did not take the matter up with the Government of 
India. The Amir's officials had already occupied Wana, 
a Waziri district, where they were trying to win over the 
rest of the Waziris.
The Amir's overall advance into the territories
further east can be understood when the connection of the
143eastern Pashtuns (Pathans) or "Berdooraunees" (the 
Upper Durranis), a name given to them by Ahmad Shah, with 
Afghanistan, as a whole, is taken into account.
In the eighteenth century, Afghanistan began to 
emerge as a political entity through the efforts of the
141 MM, Dec 1891, ESDI, 65, 108.
142 KD, 2-5 July 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 1729.
143 Elphinstone, M . , 2, 2,
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Pashtuns who lived almost exclusively in the south and 
eastern parts of Afghanistan including the areas occupied 
by the eastern Pashtuns. Previous rulers, like 'Abd al~ 
Rahman, considered the eastern Pashtuns to belong to 
Afghanistan. Amir ’Abd al-Rahman spoke of them as people 
"...of my nationality and my religion"^^ and called their 
land Yaghistan (the land of rebels), thus implying their 
rebellion against him. Through his paternal grandmother 
and mother, the Amir was related to the eastern Pashtuns.
However, the weak point of all rulers in the past was 
that none of them had direct control over the eastern 
Pashtuns, but this was also the case with almost all the 
outlying districts. Moreover, with regard to some 
districts in eastern Afghanistan, Amir ’Abd al-Rahman was 
in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had 
been. In 1880, the British Government told him that the 
frontier districts mentioned in the treaty of Gandamak would 
never be returned to him. At that time, the Amir neither 
accepted nor rejected this position. Presumably he wished 
to leave room for manoeuvre in the future depending on 
circumstances. As is clear from the preceding pages, the 
Amir certainly wished to extend his authority over the 
eastern Pashtuns. But until the early nineties, military 
means were not contemplated. Instead, the Amir concentrated 
on the peaceful penetration of the tribes by giving large
144 Mahomed, S., 2, 158, 159*
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allowances to their elders, Nowhere so much as in these 
areas did the Amir employ so many mullas as his emissaries. 
His pamphlets on the ,jehad were also addressed mainly to 
the people of the eastern province. His progress was slow 
and costly, hut it was steady. Had the G-overnment of India 
not checked his advances, the Amir might have extended his 
authority over a larger number of the eastern Pashtuns.
The Kabul Convention of 1895
The Amir's advances to the east coincided with what 
was called the "Forward Policy of the Nineties" or the 
"Scientific Frontier", which received its greatest impetus 
from the Marquis of Lansdowne, who was the Viceroy of 
India from 1888 to 1894. The aim of this new policy was 
the speedy occupation of the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line 
in the event of Russia's advance towards India, or in the 
case of domestic troubles in Afghanistan following the 
Amir's death. The idea of a "Scientific Frontier" had 
been suggested first after the Second Anglo-Afghan War 
and by 1888 it had been accepted by the military 
authorities in England and India.
The problems of the new policy were, among others, 
to acquire control over the main passes leading to the 
"Scientific Frontier" and to devise means of political 
control over the tribes in whose territories these passes 
lay. It necessitated the fixing of a boundary with 
Afghanistan, The Amir must be made to give up his claims
145 Harris, 2, 46.
146 Ibid, 41.
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over these tribes. The fixing of the boundary was considered
so essential that it was decided that "...the Government
147of India will pursue the course they have marked out"
whether the Amir co-operated or not. Arrangements for the
eventual occupation of the Kabul-Kandahar Line were made.
These included the completion of the Khojak tunnel, the
extension of the railhead up to Hew Chaman, the storing of
sufficient supplies to carry the line to Kandahar, the
opening of the Gomal Pass and of the Zhob Valley, the
building of roads and posts on the Samana Range, and
finally the survey of the Kabul River Valley, with a view
148to the construction of a railway to Jalalabad.
For some time past, the Amir was disturbed over the 
activities of the Government of India along the frontier 
with Afghanistan, especially with the construction of the 
Khojak tunnel and the reception given to Sardar Mohammad 
Ayub in Lahore, where he arrived with his numerous followers. 
While the Amir kept the spirit of .1 ehad alive, he unsuccess­
fully tried to enter into direct contact with London.
Humerous letters were exchanged between the Viceroy and 
the Amir for the settlement of the problems connected with 
the nex-7 policy, but they too failed. The Government of 
India brought pressure on the Amir by detaining his 
purchased war supplies, which were urgently needed by the 
Amir for the prosecution of his war with the Hazaras in 
Afghanistan. In early 1893> the Amir had a most severe
147 Harris, 49-
148 Ibid, 106.
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attack of gout which left him unable to move his legs and
14q
hands for a long time.
At this juncture, Russia urged Britain to fulfil the
"agreement” of 1 8 7 3 • In that year, an understanding
rather than an agreement had been reached between Britain
and Russia that the Oxus was to be the boundary between
Afghanistan and Bokhara. The Viceroy, hoping for a
settlement with Russia, urged the Amir to receive a British
officer who would explain to him the claims of the Russians
and ascertain his views on them. The Amir welcomed the
proposal and requested that a high official be sent to him
150so that other matters might also be discussed.
The outcome was the arrival in Kabul on 2 October 1893 
of a British mission, led by Sir Mortimer Durand (foreign 
Secretary to the Government of India).
On 12 November 1893 two agreements - one about 
territories north and south of the Oxus, and the other 
about those to the south and east of Afghanistan - were 
signed between the Amir and Durand. Parts of the second 
agreement, known as the Kabul Convention or the Durand 
Agreement, read that HThe Government of India will at no 
time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond 
this line [_ the line indicated on the map attached to the 
agreement marking the territories from Wakhan in the east 
to the Persian border in the south_7 on the side of
149 MM, Feb 1893, PSLI, 69, 1177.
150 Singhal, 144.
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Afghanistan,. while the Amir on his part agreed that 
11.. .he will at no time exercise interference in Swat,
Bajaur or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley." 
The Amir relinquished his claims on Wana, Chageh, and 
accepted the British activities at Chaman, in return for 
Asmar, Birmal (in the Waziri country) and six lakhs of 
rupees per annum in addition to his subsidy.
By pledging India to an undertaking of "no interference"
in the territories beyond the line in Afghanistan, the
Government of India was not strictly honest, as that pledge
was contrary to the very nature of the "Scientific Frontier",
Besides the pressure which was brought upon him, the Amir
was misled by, or misunderstood, the map (which is missing)
attached to the agreement. Because of this "...he did not
really understand all the implications of the line drawn
on the map before him" and "...refused to agree to some
151of the details shown on the map..." Thus, contrary to
expectation, the practical demarcation of this line took
a long time and the result was that the Mohmand country
was left undemarcated. Three years later, when the Amir
insisted that the Bashgal valley was on his side of the
map and not in the British sphere of influence (as had been
indicated on the map), Lord Elgin, the Viceroy, gave way
152and admitted that it "...was an unfortunate error."
151 Rostogi, R.S., Indo-Afghan Relations 1800-1900. 
Lucknow, 1965, p.180.
152 Elgin to Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, 
22 Apr 1896, F.L. No. 77 (1896), PSLI, 85.
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In accordance with the English text, the Amir had under­
taken not "to exercise interference1' in the territories
within the British sphere of influence * This is not the
153renunciation of the Amir’s claim, as stated by Durand, and
154Sultan Mahomed. To the Amir, and indeed to all rulers of
Afghanistan, interference meant armed interference and they
did not consider themselves debarred from influencing the
155 156tribes without regarding this act as a breach of contract.
In the words of Lord Elgin, the Viceroy, "The Durand Agreement
was an agreement to define the respective spheres of influence
of the British Government and of the Amir. Its object was to
preserve and to obtain the Amir’s acceptance of the "status
quo.-^V
By fixing the respective spheres of influence, the Durand
Line checked the extension of the Amir’s control over the tribal
areas but it took no account of ethnic considerations. It left 
tribes (Tarkalanays, Mohmands and Waziris) who had the strongest 
ties of unity among themselves and with other Pashtuns on both 
sides of the line.
Even the "Status Quo" was not observed, for it was
158Lord Elgin’s policy to extend control over the tribal
area which had come within the sphere of influence of the
Government of India. By 1896 a number of measures had 
been taken, among them the exploration of the Gomal and 
Tochi passes, the establishment of the right of use of
153 Durand to A. Cunningham, Officiating Secretary to the 
Government of India, 3 Dec 1893, PSLI, 73, 14.
154 2, 161.
155 Rastogi, 180.
156 Harris, 263.
157 Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr 1896, E.L.Wo.77(1896), PSLI, 85,
158 Davies, C.C., 89.
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the Dir-Chitral road and the extension of control over
Kurram. -\klso, by 1896, demarcation of the Line itself had
been completed except in the Khyber area*^^ and in the
Mohmand country* But these measures were opposed by the
great tribal Uprising which started in June 1897 under the
leadership of Mulla Najm al-Din, the Mulla of Mankai, and
the Palam Mulla* By late August the Uprising was joined
by all the tribes except the Turis of Kurram. More than
16170,000 troops were employed, before the Uprising was 
suppressed*
How far did the Amir support the Uprising? The main 
charge brought against him was that he failed to prevent
162his regular soldiers and subjects from joining the insurgents*
As far as movement of the tribes on both sides of the Line
was concerned, the demarcation had not made any difference*
The leaders of the Uprising had followers on both sides.
The expectation of support among the insurgent tribesmen
not only from their fellow tribesmen on the Afghan side but
165also from the Amir himself was "universal." ^ Thus, tribal
support from the Afghan side was not only likely but 
inevitable. But whether the Amir had supported the Uprising 
with soldiers in civilian clothes is doubtful. He may 
have stirred the tribes for action, but the largest single 
contributory factor in the Uprising was the Durand Line, 
the demarcation of which must have suggested visibly and
159 Harris, 271*
160 Davies, 162.
161 Harris, 276 .
162 Davies, 164. 
165 Ibid.
147
forcefully to the tribes that they were no longer 
inhabitants of completely independent territory but were 
brought within the circumference of British influence and 
control ,-^4
164 Harris, 278.
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Chapter 5
The Great Ghilzay Rising and its Suppression
Soon after the defeat of Ayub in 1881, the Amir's 
relations with the Ghilzays became strained. The Amir 
imprisoned and executed some Ghilzay elders, and tried to 
impose a wide range of taxes on the tribe. This led first 
to the opposition of Mulla Mushk-i-1 Alam and later to a 
general rising of the Ghilzays in late 1886. Because of 
the general discontent in the country, the Amir failed to 
obtain the support of other tribes, except the Durranis, 
against the Ghilzays. Nevertheless, by 1888 the Amir was 
able to suppress the rising with his army. Through their 
support of the Amir, the Durranis became a privileged 
tribe.
After the Durranis, the Ghilzays were the most important 
Pashtun tribe, occupying an area of approximately 59,000 
square miles, extending roughly from Jalalabad in the east 
to Qalat in the south-west, and including the adjoining 
slopes and spurs of Spin Ghar, Sulaiman Koh and Gul Koh 
(west of Qalat). Some Ghilzays lived in Parah, Herat and 
Kohdaman as well. But the area, which was most densely 
populated by the G-hilzays, was between Kabul and Qalat, 
including Ghazni and Muqur. Although Barakzays, Tajiks, 
Qizilbashes, Hazaras and some Hindus also lived within 
this area, the Ghilzays exerted a predominant influence, 
except in the city of Kabul. Jaghuri and Jaghatu Hazaras 
in the west, and the Pashtun tribes of Waziris, Mangals 
and Kakars in the east were their immediate neighbours.
In this chapter we are concerned mainly with the Ghilzays 
of this area who were, for administrative purposes,
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unevenly divided between the provinces of Kabul and 
Kandahar. The nomadic Ghilzays (Powindas) and the 
eastern Ghilzays (between Kabul and Jalalabad) will be 
referred to only in so far as they influenced events which 
led to the rising among southern Ghilzays.
The Ghilzay tribe is divided, traditionally, into 
the main divisions of Burhan (Bular) and Turan (Tular), 
but this seems to have lost its original significance. 
Smaller subdivisions include the Sulaiman Khel, Hotakays, 
Tokhays, Andars, Nasirs, Tarakays and Kharotays. Towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, they were estimated to 
be about a million in number. They were engaged in both 
settled agriculture and pastoral activities. Their 
nomadic sections (Powindas) who consisted mainly of the 
Kasirs, Sulaiman Khel and Kharotays made regular movements 
from the central highlands of Afghanistan in the summer 
to India in the winter. They were also engaged in trade, 
and sent their goods as far as Calcutta, Khurasan and 
Bokhara.^
In December 1881, Mulla Mushk-i-'Alam, accompanied by 
about 300 mullas and elders, unsuccessfully asked the Amir 
in Ghazni to release Mohammad Jan Wardak. The Amir had 
imprisoned Mohammad Jan Wardak in the previous July, 
following the allegation that he had plotted to assassinate
1 Elphinstone, 2, 137-180, Bellew, H.M., The Races of 
Afghanistan, 97-108. GAK, 133-149. GAKand., 88-91*
M r A , 99-1 0 0 .
Estimated number of Powindas (1878-79) - 57>000 (GAK, 432).
» 11 " " (1 9 0 6 ) - 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 (mra, 1 0 0 ).
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him. There is no evidence to suggest that Mohammad Jan 
had done so, hut much to suggest that the Amir was 
distrustful of him. Because of his campaigns against the 
British, Mohammad Jan had attracted substantial popular 
support. Also, the Wardak tribe, as a whole, was associated 
with the late Amir Sher 'Ali and Mohammad Jan was a staunch 
supporter of his family. In collaboration with other 
leaders of the National Party, Mohammad Jan had tried to 
effect the release of the ex-Amir Ya'qub. This may have 
been the reason why the Amir did not fulfil his earlier 
promise to Mohammad Jan of appointing him as Supreme 
Commander of the army. Instead he gave him an allowance 
of a thousand rupees a month. Peeling cheated, Mohammad 
Jan showed signs of independence of the Amir. The 
intercession of Mulla Mushk-i-'Alam did not help Mohammad 
Jan. By the Amir’s order, Mohammad Jan and others, 
including Mulla 'Abd al-G-hafur Akhundzadah (a relative 
of the Mulla) were murdered on Kotal-i-Abdu in Balkh*^
Mulla Mushk-i-'Alam was still further alienated from the 
Amir when he did not try, as the Mulla requested, to 
effect the release of Mustaufi Habib Allah Wardak and 
General Baud Shah, who had been deported earlier to 
India.5
In January 1882, ’Ismat Allah Ghilzay was imprisoned 
by the Amir, ostensibly on the grounds of his alleged
2 A.B., Kabul Correspondent, 7 Bee 1881, PSLI, 31, 305*
3 PB, 26 Bee 1881, PSLI, 26, pt 8, 2208.
4 PB, 1 Jan 1882, PSLI, 3 1 , 217.
5 A.B., Kabul Correspondent, 7 Bee 1881, PSLI, 31, 308.
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correspondence with Ayub. In all probability, the
Amir!s motives were the same as those which applied to
Mohammad Jan Wardak. An important exception, however, was
the fact that, being Jabar Khel (a subsection of the
Sulaiman Khel), *Ismat Allah had a strong following among
the eastern Ghilzays. During the brief honeymoon between
the Amir and the Ghilzays, the Amir made *Ismat Allah
Prime Minister, but feared his influence. Por this reason,
the Amir rejected the idea of deporting him to India, lest
the British use 1Ismat Allah against him. In October
1882, he was secretly hanged and his body given to his 
7relatives.
Apart from his ghazas against the British in 
collaboration with Mulla Mushk-i-*Alam, 'Ismat Allah had 
been a devoted follower of the Mulla who asked, again
Q
unsuccessfully, for his release. The Mulla then raised 
the standard of rebellion and joined the Sulaiman Khel 
in Zurmut and Katawaz (two districts to the south of the 
Sulaiman mountain).^
The Sulaiman Khel (the most numerous section of the 
Ghilzays) occupy a large area, stretching from Pishin and 
Qalat-t-Ghilzay as far as Jalalabad, including the 
district of Logar, to the south of the city of Kabul. jn
6 Amir to Mir Mohammad Husayn, an ex-Mustaufi, A.B.,
Kabul Correspondent, 9 Peb 1882, PSLI, 31, 739*
7 KD, 6 Oct 1882, PSLI, 3 4 , 333*
8 Mulla Mushk-i-*Alam to Amir, KD, 16 Jan 1882, PSLI, 31, 721.
9 Colonel Afzal, British Agent with the Amir in Mama Khel 
(Jalalabad), 17 Aug 1883, PSLI, 37, 1001.
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the early nineteenth century, they were said to have
numbered about 35,000 families. Hitherto, the central
government in Kabul had very little influence over the
Sulaiman Khel of the remote areas, including those of
Katawaz who levied tolls on travellers along the Gomal 
11river.
Having roused the Sulaiman Khel, Mulla Mushk-i-’Alam
joined Sardar Nur Mohammad and the famous adventurer,
Sa’d ud-Din, nicknamed Sadu in the Mangal country (situated
between G-hazni and Upper Kurram). The Mangals (inhabitants
of the Mangal country) were in open rebellion and the Mulla
incited them still further and informed Sardar Ayub in 
12Persia. The Amir tried to reconcile the Mulla, calling
him his kind friend and religious leader^ but the Mulla
did not trust him, replying that by similar treachery the
14Amir had killed many people. In September 1885, the 
Mulla was reported to be inciting people between G-hazni 
and Kabul, but a year later he died at the age of 96.
After his accession, the relations of the Amir with
the Tarakays, who occupied the Muqur area from Chisham-i-
Panjak in the south to Jamrud in the north, also became
strained. In the last quarter of the last century, the
15Tarakays were reported to be 25,000 families with about
1650,000 fighting men. They were mainly pastoral. The
10 Elphinstone, M., 2, 149.
11 GAK, 279.
12 KD, 4 Jan 1884, PSLI, 39, 525-
13 KD, 21 Sept 1883, PSLI, 38, 153.
14 KD, 21 Dec 1883, PSLI, 39, 338.
15 GAKand., 91.
16 B,C,A, 187.
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Tarakays levied tolls on the caravans on the Kabul- 
Kandahar road.
Alone among the Ghilzays, the Tarakays had openly
supported Ayub against the Amir, Several attempts of
17the Amir, including the remission of the poll-tax, failed
to bring the Tarakays, who had declared Sardar Sher ’ Ali
18Tarakay as their Badshah, under control. However, in
mid-1882 their rising was reported to have been suppressed,
and they were called upon to pay the revenue of the previous 
iq
two years. During this brief period, the Hazaras of 
Jaghuri and some other Ghilzays supported the Tarakays 
against the Amir.
In early 1882, all the elders of the Andars, who 
occupied mainly the rich district of Shilgar (south of 
Ghazni), and some adjoining territories, were also imprisoned, 
for their refusal of payment of revenue for the previous 
two years, and for their opposition to the stationing of 
the Amir’s troops in Muqur. In the early nineteenth century 
the Andars were reckoned to be about 12,000 families.
The Hotakays and Tokhays occupied the area from 
Pulisang (about 8 miles to the south of Qalat) to Chasma- 
i-Panj in the north, including Qalat, the Tarnak valley,
Gul Koh and Surkh Koh. In the west they were neighbours
17 Kand. D., 25 Feb 1881, PSLI, 27, 1464.
18 Kand. D., 16 Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 1040.
19 Kand. D., 25 Apr 1882, PSLI, 52, 986.
20 Kand. D ., 1 Feb 1882, PSLI, 51, 9 9 7 .
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to the Durranis of Arghandab and in the east to the
Kakars of Zhob. In 1880, the Hotakays were reckoned to he
PI
about 12,000 families and the Tokhays 20,000* The
Hotakays were the Khan Khel or Badshah Khel (ruling section)
of the Ghilzays and in the early eighteenth century, many
of the kings had been Hotakays while the Tokhays had
22produced many wazirs and high officials. Because of
their special position, the Hotakays were not only exempted
from paying taxes, their elders also received an annual
23allowance of about 40,000 rupees from the government.
In 1883, the Amir imprisoned Mir Afzal, son of Mir
’Alam Khan, a powerful khan of the Hotakays, on charges
that during the reign of the late Amir Sher ’Ali he
24aspired to the sovereignty of Afghanistan. In all
probability the charges against Mir Afzal were untrue,
for he was a supporter of the family of the late Amir.
Ya’qub had appointed him Khan of the Hotakays and he had
joined Ayub in Kandahar in 1880. However, during the
British occupation of Afghanistan, Mir Afzal had been
neutral, mainly because the British at Kandahar had used
his feeble, but popular, uncle Sadu Khan Hotakay, as a
25
counterpoise to him. Afzal’s support of the family of 
Sher ’Ali may have been the real reason for his imprison­
ment .
21 GAK, 135.
22 Elphinstone, M . , 2, 147•
23 GAKand., 89.
24 Oolonel Afzal, with Amir in Mama Khel (Jalalabad), 
■ 13 July 1883, PSLI, 37, 543-
25 Kand. D., 11 Jan 1881, PSLI, 27, 577.
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The Amir1 s relations with the eastern G-hilzays were also 
strained. Because of the introduction of se-kot and the 
demand of the Amir for revenue for previous years, the 
eastern Ghilzays were disturbed, insubordinate and a 
number of their sporadic revolts were suppressed by force 
and their elders eliminated. In late 1883, Mazullah Khan 
Jabar Khel of Hisarak was expelled to Meshed. In 1885,
Khan Mohammad Khan was thrown into prison and a year later 
his brother, Biaz Mohammad Khan, who had been appointed 
as Khan of the eastern Ghilzays, fled to Peshawar. Thus 
by 1886, the Amir had disposed of all the influential 
elders of the eastern Ghilzays.
Also, by 1886 mutual distrust between the Amir and 
the southern Ghilzays began to increase. But their 
disturbances, being generally in the form of isolated 
revolts, were easily put down by the khassadars. General 
Ghulam Haydar Tokhay, who had been in exile with the Amir 
and was his trusted adherent, was also suspected by the 
Amir of being concerned with the intrigues of the Ghilzays. 
Although he was the Amir’s General in the army of Kandahar, 
he fled to Sibi.
following the imprisonment of the Ghilzay elders and 
the suppression of their sporadic revolts, the Amir 
imposed a wide range of taxes over them. Although these 
taxes followed a pattern which was becoming general through­
out Afghanistan, they were new and a heavy burden on the 
Ghilzays. In 1885, zakat had been demanded by which one 
out of every forty (chehel-wa-yak) cattle was to be given 
to the government every year. House tax (khanawari) to 
which even mullas and sayyeds were subject had also been
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imposed* A birth tax of 4 rupees on the birth of every
male child and 2 rupees on each female child was also 
26demanded. Marriage taxes entailed payment of 10 rupees
27on the marriage of a virgin and 5 rupees on a widow.
A succession tax of chehel-wa-yak which an inheritor must
po
pay to the Government was also imposed*
To the Ghilzays these taxes were all new and 
differed sharply from the old quota system. Previously 
each section of the Ghilzays paid their fixed quotas to the 
Government through their Elian. Their quotas, comprising 
mainly cattle, were of poor quality, but credited by the 
Government at a high price. The Khan usually took half
of what he received and gave the rest with an apology to
the king. Sometimes the kings allowed the Khan to take
OQ
certain additional shares also.
Again, the Amir had introduced drastic changes in the
payment of revenue from the land. In the early years of
the nineteenth century, the kings had derived but a
moderate revenue from the Ghilzays, part of which went to
the Khan of the Ghilzays and part to the Durrani Sardar
"50who commanded their contingents of troops. But the Amir 
introduced se-kot on land irrigated by streams (nahri), 
one-fifth on land irrigated by springs (chishmai), and
26 KD, 13 Jan 1886, PSLI, 46, 193.
27 PL, 7 Jan 1886, PSLI, . ....
28 Kand. D., 13 Mar 1886, PSLI, 46, 1533.
29 GAK, 141 *
30 Elphinstone, 2, 157.
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one-tenth on land irrigated by subterranean canals (karezi).
Further, the Amir discontinued the allowances of the 
deceased Mulla Mushk-i-1Alam and his son and successor,
Mulla 'Abd al-Karim (b. 1835), and assessed a revenue of 
about 15,000 rupees on the previously rent-free lands of 
the Mulla which had been partly purchased by him and partly 
granted to him by followers in Shilgar, Oharkh, Logar,
G-hazni and other places. The Amir had also demanded three 
years revenue from the Tokhays, Hotakays, Tarakays, Andars, 
Sulaiman Khel, and the Kharotays.^
Mulla 'Abd al-Karim, the second son of Mulla Mushk-i- 
fAlam by his Andar wife, was on reasonably good terms with 
the Amir until the expulsion of Sardar Ayub in 1881.
The Amir had conferred on the Mulla the honorary title of 
Khan-i-' Ulum (the prince of learnings) while the Mulla had 
accompanied G-eneral Roberts (on the Amir1 s instructions), 
and the Amir in their marches against Ayub. Mulla 'Abd 
al-Karim assisted his father against the Amir. After the 
death of his father, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim was looked upon 
as his successor.
The new assessment proved a crucial point in the 
relations of the G-hilzays with the Amir. All the discon­
tented G-hilzay elders, among them Mir Afzal Hotakay 
(presumably released from prison) went to the Mulla to 
his residence in Shilgar and there they planned the rising.
31 Amir to Colonel Afzal, 9 Aug 1887, PSLI, 51, 510.
32 Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir to Peshawar Commissioner, 7 Lee 1886, PSLI, 
49, ill.
159
The first major event which led to the rising occurred 
in the Muqur area in October 1886, and involved a newly 
recruited regiment of Durranis from Kandahar, which was 
on its way to Kabul. About 4,200 Andars and Sulaiman 
Khel sent a message to the Durranis, saying that they had 
no quarrel with them whatever, but demanding from them the 
Amir1s property. Seeing that they were outnumbered, the 
Durranis complied, handing over 140 camels, 80 tents and
30,000 Kandahari rupees. The Durranis were not molested 
and were left at liberty togo wherever they liked.  ^ The 
Ghilzays then marched on Ghazni.
At Kabul the Amir seted swiftly. He despatched an
army of five regiments of cavalry and infantry with 12 guns
34under General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay, At the same time, 
the Amir expelled to India a number of Barakzay sardars, 
including his uncles, lest "...the people of Kabul should 
rise and set up one of these Sardars as their ruler.
36The Amir also mounted guns in strategic places in the city. 
Further, he took strict measures and forbade people to 
talk about the rising.
With the approach of General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay 
near Ghazni, the Ghilzays sent him a message, similar to
33 MM, Nov 1886, PSLI, 49, 75.
34 In Sultan Mahomed's biography of the Amir (1,254),
General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay has been confused with
General Ghulam Haydar Tokhay, who had already left
the country.
35 Amir in jdarbar, PD, 13 Nov 1886, PSLI, 4 8 , 1261.
36 Ibid.
37 PD, 7 Dec 1886, PSLI, 49, 111.
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that which they had sent to the Durranis, asking him to
38refrain from shedding blood among Muslims. But the 
General rejected their request on the grounds that 
11 ...they had rebelled against the Badshah £~KlngJJ 
Accounts of the battle at Talkhakzar / Talkha Guzar?^ 
near G-hazni on 28th October are conflicting, but the net 
result was a complete defeat of the Ghilzays, either 
through treachery or sheer force. Twelve leading insurgents, 
including Mulla !Abd al-Karim, fled to the country of the 
Kakars and the heads of about 2,000 fallen Ghilzays were 
sent to Kabul where a kala minar (tower of skulls) was to 
be made of them as a "warning”^  to other people.
Following his round of victories, the Amir took 
severe measures against the G-hilzays. These measures, 
which were intended to suppress the Ghilzays, incited them 
still further and led to a rising which became the greatest 
of all the tribal risings against the authority of the
Amir. But before describing the major rising, and the
campaigns which ensued, it will be convenient to consider, 
briefly, the diplomatic and other negotiations which took 
place before the Ghilzays were finally crushed in the 
autumn of 1887*
The rising appeared to be suppressed but, in fact, 
it was the advent of the cold winter which made it die
down. The Amir was as impressed by the victory as he had
38 MM, Bov 1886, PSLI, 49, 76.
39 Ibid.
40 Amir to Colonel ’ Ata Allah, British Agent, KD, 
2 Bov 1886, PSLI, 48, 117.
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been by a similar victory over the Shinwarays in 1883,
He instructed the army to disarm the Hotakays and Tarakays.
The task of disarming the Hotakays, who had been on 
the point of rebelling when the rising suddenly collapsed, 
was entrusted to Sikandar Khan Orakzay, Commander of the 
Kandahar Khassadars and father of General Ghulam Haydar. 
Each Hotakay family was ordered to surrender a sword, a 
gun £  musket?_7 five rupees.^ Meanwhile, the Orakzay 
General moved with his army to the Andar country. Each 
Andar family was ordered to surrender a shield, a knife,
A O
a musket and a horse, besides the payment of enhanced
revenue for seven years. Stores of grain were taken away
from them and soldiers were quartered in each house, where
they and their horses were to be fed by the householders.
Besides, many Andars were employed as labourers without 
43pay.  ^ They were "...greatly oppressed and their women
insulted."^ Because of this, over 700 families of
Tokhays, Andars and Tarakays left their lands. Some went
43to the country of the Kakars, others to the Mangal 
territory
During the cessation of hostilities, both the Amir and 
the insurgent leaders tried to draw in other tribes and 
groups in support of their respective causes. On the 
whole, the Ghilzays were more successful than the Amir.
41 Kand. D, 22 Feb 1887, PSLI, 49, 625.
42 KD, 18 Feb 1887, PSLI, 49, 736.
43 KD, 4 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1124.
44 KD,  ...........PSLI, 49, 1137.
45 PD, 12 Feb 1887, PSLI, 49, 575.
46 PD, 12 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 797.
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These activities ■will be dealt with in the following 
pages.
The Amir turned to his own tribe, the Durranis, and 
tried to exploit the old animosity between them and the 
G-hilzays, just as he had done six years ago in his 
confrontation with Ayub. The Amir warned the Barakzay 
sardar&that "They / Mulla Karim and others 7 now aspire
47to the sovereignty of the country and to your position.” 
Hitherto, the Durranis, who had supported Ayub, were on 
bad terms with the Amir. He refused them government jobs; 
the Durranis believed that his rule would collapse.
The Ghilzay rising changed this. The Amir let the 
Barakzays enjoy, as before, their land free of revenue, 
whereas just before the rising he had pressed them for 
revenue.^ The Barakzays of Kandahar willingly accepted
49employment with the government and enlistment in the army.
The Amir instructed the Durrani regiment that they might
50keep the plunder for themselves. The Qizilbash community 
of Kabul was also instructed to wean the Hazaras from the 
Ghilzays. Meanwhile, the Amir reminded a deputation of 
Hazaras elders ” ...of the cruelties exercised over them...
r-j
by the Ghilzais during the late Anglo-Afghan war."
At the same time the Amir made a direct approach to 
the rebel leaders. In a sealed Quran, he agreed to take
47 KD, 29 Oct 1886, PSLI, 48, 1173-
48 Kand. D, 18 Jan 1887, PSLI, 48, 487.
49 KD, 25 Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 557.
50 PD, 8 Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 283.
51 PD, 8 Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 283.
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revenue from them at the rate paid during the reign of
52Amir Dost Mohammad, if they desisted from rebellion*
He also impressed upon them that, with the two infidel
powers to the north and the south, their internal
53disruption could be the downfall of Islam* But to no
avail* While rejecting his proposal, the insurgent
leaders identified the Amir with the Russians and considered
54themselves to be 1 ...the sincerest friends of the English.'’
The rising was an indication of the unpopularity of 
the Amir with his subjects. Sensing this, he did not 
venture, as was usual on such occasions, to collect tribal 
levies, after the implied refusal of the Kohistanis 
(the Amir's closest allies).
The Amir’s efforts to obtain a fetwa for his campaigns 
against the G-hilzays were not a success either. Religious 
groups in Afghanistan were known as the mullas, sahibzadas» 
kho.iazadas and faairs. They received nearly half the
56
revenue of the country from the State and one-tenth of
57the land produce directly from the landowners, as charity. 
Among them the mullas were most influential with the 
people who looked upon them as their leaders.
Ever since his accession, the Amir had been on bad
52 PB, 8 Jan. 1887, PSLI, 49, 283-
53 Amir to Ghilzay elders, KD, 25 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1141.
54 Ghilzay elders to Amir, KB, Ibid.
55 KB, 5 Apr 1887, PSLI, 5 0 , 269.
56 Mahomed, S., 1, 252.
57 PB, 10 Hov 1884, PSLI, 42, 856.
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terms with all religious groups and in particular with the
mullas. The mullas considered the Amir to he an associate
of the infidels, and therefore condemned him as an
”infidel” at the time of his confrontation with Ayub.
The execution of two of their members by the Amir after
his victory in Kandahar further alienated the mullas.
The Amir accused the mullas of being ” ...false leaders of 
58religion.” In order to weaken their power and reduce 
State expenses, he introduced reforms among the religious 
groups. Payment of allowance to the mullas was made
59subject to their passing a test in religious knowledge.
Stipendiary sayyeds and sahibzadas had to prove their
60
descent before they were paid their allowances.
Because of a major role of the mullas in the Ghilzay
rising, the Amir resolved to weaken the power of the mullas
still further. The G-hilzays were noted for having many
mullas^ who, besides their religious functions, also
acted like local magistrates.^ The Amir resolved to
compel these mullas to repay the allowances they had
65received during the past seven years,  ^ but whether he 
succeeded in doing so is not certain. However, he was 
successful in considerably reducing the number of religious
59 Amir*s firman, Col. Afzal (Jalalabad), 4 May 1885* 
PSLI, 36, 904.
60 Kand. D, 23 Aug 1886, PSLI, 48, 561.
61 According to the Amir, the Andars alone had 2,500 
mullas during the time of Amir Dost Mohammad. KD, 
29 Oct 1886, PSLI, 48, 1173*
62 Elphinstone,•E., 2, 154.
63 I0D, 29 Oct 1886, PSLI, 48, 1173.
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groups in Kandahar.^ But his reforms had an immediate
setback when the Ghilzays rose again and the Amir felt
that he needed the assistance of the mullas in denouncing
the Ghilzays as rebels. Many mullas were summoned at
Kabul and a great debate began* A section of them,
represented by Mulla Sa'd of Laghman alias as Khosa,
issued a fetwa that it was lawful to wage war against the
Ghilzays because of their rebellion against the king of 
65Islam* The great majority, however, did not support
this view and told the Amir that he was only justified
66in fighting those who were most dangerous to Islam, 
a reference which could hardly be applied to the Ghilzays 
who were led by a distinguished mulla.
0During the rising tthe Amir, again unsuccessfully, 
tried to bring about a peaceful settlement. A deputation 
of elders from Kabul and Qarabagh undertook to settle 
the dispute, but was not heard of again. Another deputation 
of about 60 mullas also failed* The exact terms of the 
Amir were not known, but in reply Mulla fAbd al-Karim 
agreed to suspend hostilities provided the Amir released
67all Ghilzay prisoners and desisted from further oppression.
68Since the Amir had executed over 50 prisoners and had
69hanged about 12 mullas of the Tarakays and Andars the 
fulfilment of the terms was impossible. The fact was that
64 Kand. D, 11 Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 631.
65 KD, 16 Aug 1887, PSLI, 51, 257-
66 PD, 7 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 244.
67 PD, 24 Aug 1887, PSLI, 51, 242.
68 KD, 28 June 1887, PSLI, 50, 1281.
69 MM, Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 221.
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the rebel leaders had lost confidence in the Amir.
70Although the Amir relaxed his rigid rule, his oppressive 
measures which had been a main cause of the rising were 
by now too well known for the rebel leaders to take much 
notice of this sudden change of heart.
Mulla Karim induced the mullas to denounce the Amir
as a "kafir" , so that his campaigns against him would be
justified on religious grounds. About 500 mullas issued
71a fetwa to that effect. It is not known on what precise 
grounds they based their fetwa. It seems likely that, 
besides his harsh treatment of the mullas, the Amir's 
general cruelty and oppression may have provided adequate 
argument. The Amir had executed many of those who had 
campaigned against the British and who were ghazis in the 
eyes of the public. He had even executed such persons 
as Sahibzadah Mohammad 'Umar Jan of Herat, who was not 
against the Amir but had religious influence in south­
west Afghanistan. The fetwa of Mulla 'Abd al-Karim was 
that the Amir was "...an infidel, the extirpator of
Islam, worshipper of himself, and the friend of an alien 
72G-overnment
An important leader of the rising was Mulla 'Abd 
al-Karim who, in one report, declared himself to be a
IJ'Z <7 A
"King" while in another a Khalifa. He was also
75reported to have read the khutba and issued coins in
70 PD, 14 Sept 1887, PSLI, 51, 545.
71 PD, 8 Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 285-
72 PD, 29 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1320.
73 PD, 29 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1320.
74 PD, 7 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 243.
75 Amir in darbar. KD, 29 Oct 1886, PSLI, 48, 1173-
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76his own name. It is possible that the title "King11 has
either heen mistranslated, or the Mulla later abandoned
it for Khalifa. He justified his claim by stating that
"...if 12,000 Musulmans should offer their allegiance to
any Musulman, the latter, according to Mahomedan religion,
77can declare himself a King."
There is considerable confusion over the division of 
authority between Mulla Karim and Mohammad Shah Hotakay, 
another important leader of the rising. The latter had 
been elected by about 30,000 Ghilzays of all sections as
<70
their leader with the title of Amir. As Mohammad Shah
was son of Mir Afzal (a remote descendant of Mir Wais
Hotakay) and belonged to the ruling section of the Ghilzays,
it may be that the tribe hoped, by declaring him as Amir,
to bring greater unity among themselves. Mulla Karim
seemed to have had temporal as well as religious power,
while Mohammad Shah was the military leader of the 
79campaign. However, they did not seem confident of 
establishing themselves as successful rivals to the Amir. 
This may be considered a weak point in the rising. Like 
Mulla Mushk-i-1Alam before them, they also invited A y u b ^  
presumably to lead the rising.
Among the different sections of the G-hilzays, who 
were at feud with each other, Mulla Karim brought about
76 PL, 20 May 1887, PSLI, 50, 725.
77 PL, 29 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1320.
78 BAG, 178.
79 BAC, 6.
80 PL, 8 Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 283.
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general agreement. He bridged the differences between 
the pastoral Hasirs (one of the wealthiest of the Powindas 
who grazed their herds in the area around the lake of 
Ab-i-Istadah) with the semi-pastoral Sulaiman Khel,^ 
and the pastoral Kharotays and the Lohanays. But the 
reconciliations came too late to be of practical help 
against the Amir.
Among the non-Ghilzays who supported the rising were
the Kakars, Waziris, Mangals and Hazaras. Prom the
accession of the Amir, his relations with the Jaghuri
82Hazaras were strained. The whole tribe became rebellious
when a hakim of the Amir had been killed over a woman by
the Hazaras. However, as advised by Mulla Yusuf, the Khan
of the Qizilbashesf^ the Hazaras kept aloof in the last
days of the rising. Still, their land remained a centre
of refuge for the G-hilzay women. The Kakars of Zhob (in
the British territory) supported the Ghilzays in action
as well as giving them shelter. So did the Waziris of 
84
Waziristan. Hearer Kabul, some Kohistanis and Wardak
elders (unidentified) participated in the assemblies of
86the insurgents, while the bulk of the Kohistanis
stipulated remission of revenue in return for the despatch
86of their levies - a pretext equivalent to refusal.
Still nearer, the inhabitants of Ghazni and Qarabagh, 
presumably Tajiks and Hazaras whose country was occupied 
by the Amirfs army, refused to fight against Muslims
81 MM, June 1887, PSLI, 50, 1238.
82 See p. 208.
83 PL, 29 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1324.
84 ED, 26 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 519-
85 ED, 5 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 268.
86 Ibid.
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(Ghilzays) But Mull a Najm al-Dinf s support turned out 
to be moral rather than practical. Although he agreed to 
raise the standard of jehad against the Amir, as requested
op
by Mulla Karim, Hajm al-Din took no active steps.
In his dealings -with the common people, Mull a Karim
behaved with honesty. He took nothing by force and even
paid compensation to a few merchants whose caravans had
been plundered by the insurgents. As a result, he was
steadily supported with provisions and even the Amir’s
soldiers were deserting to him, at one time at the rate 
89
of ten a day.
The insurgent leaders were also active in the field 
of diplomacy by trying to create an atmosphere of good-will 
between themselves and the British Government. They, 
including a few Hazara elders, wrote to the Queen, 1 If 
ever at any time you proposed to improve and cherish the 
distressed people of Afghanistan, pray do not throw away
90 rm •this opportunity but come to our aid.” This vague
approach had been interpreted, in some publications of
the Government of India, as though the Ghilzay elders
91wished to place their country under the British. It is 
more probable that the insurgent elders simply hoped that 
the British Government would not side with the Amir and 
that they might be able to flee to the adjoining British 
territories in the event of their failure.
87 General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay to Amir, KD, 13 May 1887, 
PSLI, 50, 630.
88 PD, 7 Dec 1886, BSI,I,- '.49, 113-
89 KD, 22 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1673.
90 MM, Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 221.
91 MRA, 100. GAK, 149-
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The Government of India did not answer the letter, 
but it did take the issue up with the Amir. The Amir had 
earlier intensified a ,jehad movement, by warning his 
subjects that threats to their country and religion was 
imminent, from the infidels. In one of his recent 
publications, the Targhib al-Jehad (The Encouragement of 
Jehad), he had ^iven out that it was the intention of the 
infidels to occupy their country a third time - an 
obvious reference to the British who had invaded Afghan­
istan twice in the past. The Viceroy pointed out to the 
Amir by stating that ” ...in this you are merely endeavouring 
to divert to your neighbours the animosity which has 
apparently come to exist amongst a portion of your subjects 
L Ghilzays^/ towards your own person.’* ^  But to avoid 
complications, the Viceroy assured him that the object 
of the policy of the British Government was ” ...to maintain 
a powerful, independent and united Afghanistan under a 
ruler capable of enforcing peace and order within his own 
territories, of conciliating the good-will and confidence
of his people, and of showing a formidable front to an
93invading foe.” Dufferin implied that the formation of 
such a ’’formidable front” in Afghanistan against ”an 
invading foe” - a phrase which presumably referred to 
Russia - was difficult to envisage when the power of the 
Ghilzays, the bravest of the Pashtuns, was broken up into 
insignificance. Subsequently the Viceroy again addressed 
the Amir directly on the subject of the Ghilzays, advising
92 Marquis of Dufferin to Amir, 20 July 1887, PSLI, 5 0 , 1420,
93 Ibid.
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him f,to come to some amicable understanding with the
94.
insurgent Ghilzals'1. At the same time, he offered the 
Amir arms and ammunition worth twenty lakhs of rupees 
as a gift, nevertheless, the Amir suspected the British 
of helping the Ghilzays. In his private darbar he was 
reported to have remarked, f,The English should not think 
that they would reign over Afghanistan. They should be 
grateful and thankful to me that I sent them back safe
q*5
from this country.” Only when the rising had almost
been suppressed, did the Amir assure the Viceroy that his 
treatment towards the Ghilzays in the future would be 
more lenient.
/
In peace-time, the Ghilzay elders (khan, malik, mushr),
0 7
unlike the Durrani elders, were not all-powerful. They
exercised only limited authority over the nearest sections
of their tribe. The Ghilzay tribe, as a whole, was broken
up into small independent groups. But in a state of
emergency such as a war, this was altered. Among the
Sulaiman Khel, chelwashtees (fighting forces?), commanded
by an able person who was given wide power and the title
98of Mir, were organised. During the campaign, each clan 
of the Ghilzays elected leaders, presumably in the above
manner. We read that even a certain Mohammad Akram Hazara
a 99also led the ,Andars in the 6'ampaign.
94 Marquis of Dufferin to Amir, 15 Sept 1887, PSLI, 5 1 , 547.
95 KD, 5 Apr 1887, PSLI, 5 0 , 269.
96 Amir to Marquis of Dufferin, 4 Oct 1887, PSLI, 5 1 , 769.
97 Elphinstone, 2, 151.
98 Ibid, 2, 154.
99 KD, 26 July 1887, PSLI, 5 0 , 1705.
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The engagements between the Amir’ s army and the
insurgents were too many to describe. Only a description
of the major ones, with decisive effects, will be attempted
here. In the spring, the insurrection was resumed. The
total number of the insurgents was reported to have risen
from 20,000 in March^^ to about 100,000 in April.
Qalat fell to them. Mull a Karim and other leaders who had
arrived from Kakaristan surprised and killed from ten to
102twenty of the Amir’s troops every night. Ghulam
Haydar Orakzay was ordered to advance on Qalat from
103Muqur, but he was unable to do so. Finding his direct
advance checked, the General retreated and joined the 
shaken force under his father on the border of the Maruf 
district (about 90 miles to the east of Kandahar in the 
Hotakay country). There, his father had already opened 
a front. But since he was old and feeble and the khassadars 
under him were untrustworthy, his activities were rather a 
mixture of treachery, conciliation and indecisive engagements. 
He had already been defeated by the Hotakays under Mohammad 
Shah who had taken position at Ataghar, an inaccessible 
location surrounded on all sides by hills.
The morale of the combined forces of the Amir 
improved with the arrival of a Durrani levy and the 
despatch of abundant provisions from Kandahar, At Ataghar, 
these combined forces inflicted the first major defeat
100 MM, Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1281.
101 ED, 7 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 243-
102 KD, 5 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 268.
103 Ghulam Haydar Orakzay to Amir, KD, 15 Apr 1887,
PSLI, 50, 281.
104 BOA, 178.
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105on the Hotakays who subsequently made their submission.
The Orakzay G-eneral then made a northward march towards 
Nawa in the Tarakay country where the Governor of Ghazni 
had already arrived with reinforcements. Towards the 
middle of June, the General was reported to have routed 
the Tarakays at Qala-i-Katal in the direction of Ab-i- 
Istadah (about 65 miles south-east of Ghazni), This was 
the second major defeat of the Ghilzays whose loss in 
dead was reported to be over 1,000. Almost the same number 
were taken prisoner. Not long after, the insurgents were
-i f\/T
again routed. Although these rapid major defeats broke
the main power of the Ghilzays, they still maintained their
resistance. Outside the Ghilzay area in Khost (a district
to the north of Waziristan), the Amir* s troops led by the
Governor of Khost were defeated by Sardar Nur Mohammad
107Khan who was joined by the Waziris. Similarly, a large
108combination of Kakars, reported to be about 30,000, and
109Waziris inflicted a defeat on the Amir’s troops, but
the location of the engagement is not known.
In Herat in early June, the Andar regiment rebelled 
and fled to the Ghilzay country to assist their tribe.
In early July they arrived there and together with other 
Ghilzays defeated the Amir’s army and recovered Nawa.^^ 
But at this time about 20,000 troops from certain provinces 
arrived at Kabul. This concentration had ” ...a powerful
105 KD, 20 May 1887, PSLI, 50, 879.
106 MM, June 1887, PSLI, 50, 1239.
107 MM, May 1887, PSLI, 50, 698.
108 ED, 26 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 519.
109 ED, 19 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 283.
110 KD, 5 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1442.
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111effect on the Ghilzays11. Besides, the Amir spread
false rumours that the British Government, in accordance
with her treaty with Afghanistan, had concentrated a
large force along the frontiers to assist him, when asked,
112
in suppressing the internal enemies of Afghanistan.
It was a clever move and though, because of the Amir’s
oppression, the people were opposed to him, they did not
rise, believing that the British Government would uphold
113
his cause with the force of arms. Thus the rising did 
not spread throughout the country.
114In Nawa, all the major clans of the Ghilzays gathered,
their total number being reported under Mulla Karim as
70,000 in July^^ and 200,000 in September^^ It is
difficult to envisage how such a large number could
assemble in such a short time in the face of the Amir’s
troops, especially when further reinforcement had reached
the General, further, the assemblage of so large a number
would have made major confrontation inevitable. But after
July no major confrontation had been reported, only small 
117skirmishes. Although a few insignificant gatherings of 
the Tarakays and Andars were to take place during the next 
two years, from September 1887, the rising began to fade 
out, Winter was setting in and conditions became too 
severe for the homeless and destitute Ghilzays to offer 
any effective resistance.
111 MM, June 1887, PSLI, 50, 1239.
112 Kand. D ., 19 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1680.
113 PL, 19 July 1887, PSLI, 5 0 , 6 5 6 ,
114 Kand. D., 26 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1705.
115 PL, 29 July 1887, PSLI, 50, 1876.
116 PL, 14 Sept 1887, PSLI, 51, 545.
117 Mahomed, S., 1, 258.
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In September, Sardar Ayub made an abortive attempt
to reach the Ghilzay country. In response to the invitation
from the Ghilzays, he managed to reach the Persian/Afghan
frontier secretly, but at the Afghan frontier post of
G-horian the Sardar and his eighteen followers were driven 
118back. hTo rising took place in his favour in Herat,
but his reappearance was to bring harsh repercussions on
the Purranis. In Kabul and Kandahar, a number of
influential Purrani elders were executed. Some were
119deported to India. However, after the disappearance 
of Ayub, the Amir’s relations with the Purranis returned 
to a new improved footing.
For a peaceful return of the Ghilzays to their homes,
the Amir offered to take no further actions against them.
He even promised to rebuild their demolished forts. He
released some Ghilzay prisoners and gave them small
allowances, but the insurgents preferred exile to submission
The Amir then issued a proclamation, pardoning all except
121
Mulla Karim, Mohammad Shah Hotakay, and Sher Jan Tarakay,
who fled to Kakaristan. The total loss of life on the
l P?
Ghilzay side was reported to be about 24,000, while that
on the Amir’s side had not been reported.
The Ghilzays gradually returned to their homes, but 
they were systematically impoverished, especially the
118 BCA, 5 5 .
119 MM, Nov 1887, PSLI, 51, 1332.
120 PP, 6 Oct 1887, PSLI, 51, 803.
121 MM, Pec 1887, PSLI, 52, 62.
122 KD, 18 Nov 1887, PSLI, 51, 1539.
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Hotakays. Economically weakened, they were now politically 
weakened so that they could not rise again. What the Amir 
once had said about the Andars, he now applied to the 
whole tribe, " .. .when they halre no money left with them,
/"theyj  will not again raise disturbances."1^
124All the taxes and revenues were reimposed. Moreover, 
the Tokhays were ordered to pay 80,000 rupees, the arrears 
of revenue since the British occupation of Afghanistan.
Although there is no report available of a similar demand 
on other sections, it may have been the case with them.
125
The Hotakays were debarred from entering G-overnment service.
126
The Ghilzays as a whole were reported disarmed, but it
is not known how this was carried out. Allowances to the
127Tarakay and^  Andar mullas were also discontinued. Since
the mullas were closely associated with the rising, the 
allowances of all Ghilzay mullas may have been discontinued.
In 1880, during the Zimma meeting, the Amir had felt 
uneasy about the influence the Ghilzay elders had acquired 
under the late Amir Sher 1 Ali, and during their campaign 
against the British. But because of Ayub, and his support 
by the Durranis, the Amir had drawn closer to the G-hilzays 
at that time and expelled Ayub, mainly with their support.
After the expulsion of Ayub, the Amir had made extensive 
efforts to widen his authority over the G-hilzays, by taking
123 Amir to Kaib Kotwal of Kabul, KD, 7 Dec 1886,
PSLI, 49, 149.
124 KD, 2 Feb 1888, PSLI, 53, 355.
125 Colonel 1 A1&Allah (with Amir in Mazar), 12 Feb 1889, 
PSLI, 56, 789.
126 PD, 24 Dec 1887, PSLI, 52, 113.
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over the management of the Kabul-Kandahar road, demanding 
arrears of revenue, stationing troops in their country, 
and eliminating their influential elders* The sporadic 
disturbances of the main sections of the G-hilzays were 
easily put down but the activities of Mulla Mushk-i-'Alam, 
once the Amir's supporter and now his opponent, stirred 
the Ghilzays to a great extent* The imposition of 
enhanced revenue and taxes over the Ghilzays and on the 
rent-free lands of Mulla Mushk-i-'Alam, and the discon­
tinuance of the allowances of the Ghilzay mullas, proved 
a turning point in the relations of the Amir with the 
Ghilzays.
Thus the Ghilzay war was essentially a war of the 
landowners who were resisting the new, heavy taxation 
demanded by the Amir in an effort to break their power. 
Popular sympathy was against the tyr^nical and oppressive 
rule of the Amir as was evidenced by his failure to- send 
tribal levies (except Durranis) and to obtain a fetwa 
from the mullas against the Ghilzays, but the tribe, 
having little money and poor arms, had little chance of 
success•
Usually after each disturbance among the non-Pashtuns, 
the Amir relied more and more on the Pashtun elements.
But subsequent to the Ghilzay rising, he drew closer to 
the Durranis and among them to his own Mohammadzays (a 
section of the Barakzays). By granting annual allowances 
to every member (female and male) of it, and looking upon 
it as T< shari k-i-d owl att! (partner of the State), the Amir
178
raised the Mohammadzay section to a privileged position 
among the tribes of Afghanistan, The position of the 
Qizilbashes was also temporarily improved.
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Chapter 6
Struggle with Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan
The extension of the power of Kabul over the 
province of Turkistan marks an important extension of 
the power of fAbd al-Rahman. In the early part of 1880, 
at the same time that ’Abd al“Rahman had established 
himself in Badakhshan, his cousin Sardar Mohammad Ishaq 
Khan took control of Turkistan, of which province he 
remained governor after 'Abd al-Rahman became Amir,
Mohammad Ishaq’s desire for local autonomy in Turkistan 
under the loose suzerainty of Kabul clashed with ’Abd 
al-Rahman's aim to create a strong central power. Mohammad 
Ishaq ruled Turkistan in virtual independence until in 
1888 he revolted, was defeated, and fled to Bokhara.
’Abd al-Rahman then introduced far reaching administrative 
changes in Turkistan, aimed at confirming the power of 
the central government there.
The boundaries of Turkistan were uncertain. Their 
limits depended on the power of local rulers. Writing in 
1869j JT• T. Wheeler included all the territories between 
the Oxus and the Hindu Kush and the Pamir steppe and Herat, 
in Turkistan. It seems that this definition was of more 
geographical than administrative significance, and far 
too wide to be ruled by one governor. Under Sardar 
Mohammad Ishaq Khan, Turkistan, with its capital at 
Mazar, comprised only the plains south of the Oxus, 
between Andkhui and Badakhshan. In 1884 it was inhabited 
by a predominantly sedentary population of about 87,000 
families, made up of Uzbeks (50,000), Arabs (16,000), 
Hazaras (11,000), Turcomans (8,000), Tajiks (10,000),
181
Pashtuns (3,000), Qipchaqs, Pirozkohis, Sayyeds, 
Qizilbashes, and others,
Following the death of Amir Sher 'Ali in 1879, his 
son and successor, Mohammad Ya'qub, appointed General 
Ghulam Haydar Wardak as Governor of Turkistan, The 
General held that province during the British occupation 
of Afghanistan. He favoured the Pashtun elements of the 
Afghan army which, as a whole, was opposed by the Uzbek 
and Turcoman tribes. This was the situation when 'Abd 
al-Rahman, before starting for Badakhshan in late 1879, 
sent Sardar Mohammad Sarwar Khan, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq, 
and Sardar 'Abd al-Qudus Khan to Turkistan. The first 
two, who were sons of the late Amir Mohammad A'zam, were 
full cousins of 'Abd al-Rahman, and the third was a son 
of Sardar Sultan Mohammad. Having crossed the Oxus at 
Kerki, they arrived at the ruined city of Balkh (about 
14 miles to the west of Mazar). They immediately suffered 
a setback. In the face of troops sent against them by 
the General, they retreated to Shiberghan (about 82 miles 
to the west of Mazar), where Mohammad Sarwar, failing to 
win over its Governor, was arrested and sent to Mazar.
At Mazar, he was beheaded by the order of the General,
The execution of Sarwar caused unrest in the army in 
Mazar. The garrison at Takhta Pul (a town close to Mazar)
1 Wheeler, J.T., Memorandum on Afghan-Turkistan. Calcutta. 
1869, 1, Hamilton, A., Afghanistan, London, 1906, 
242-268, Ridgeway, Sir W., Report on Survey Operations 
in Western and Rorth-Western Afghanistan in 1884, 1885, 
1886, Calcutta, 1887, 32. GAT, i-ocii.
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mutinied and its example was followed by the troops in
Mazar itself. At Mazar, the position of the General was
further weakened by the despatch of some troops under
his nephew against Sultan Murad, the most powerful Uzbek Mir
of Eunduz, who, ever since the British occupation of
Afghanistan, had successfully defied the General’s
authority. Though the General’s nephew gained complete
victory over the Mir in Kunduz, his own expedition against
the mutinous troops at Takhta Pul failed. The army turned
against him, and he hurriedly fell back on Mazar from
2where he escaped to Bokhara. Ishaq, who had previously•z
escaped towards the Oxus, reappeared. The warm reception 
accorded to his herald, Qudus, at the town of Aqcha 
(about 56 miles to the north-west of Mazar), encouraged 
Ishaq to appear in person in the city, where he too was 
warmly welcomed. Next, the two sardars moved to Shiberghan 
where the elders of both districts declared Ishaq to be 
their governor. They were also well received in Mazar.
Thus the whole of Turkistan, except the district of Sari 
Pul, whose ruler was later overcome, fell peacefully into 
the hands of Ishaq,
Sardar Ishaq Khan (b, 1851) was a son of the late 
Amir A'zam by an Armenian wife. Nothing is known of his 
youth. In 1869? he commanded ’Abd al-Rahman1s forces in
2 In Bokhara, the General entered the service of the 
Badshah (incorrectly called Amir) of Bokhara. GAT, i.
The General organised a military force of 16,000. He 
died in 1894 in a quarrel with a Russian officer over 
an ill-treated woman who had taken refuge with the General, 
5 According to ’Abd al-Rahman, Ishaq, after the arrest of 
his brother, went to Maimana. Mahomed, S., 1, 177.
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Turkistan and later accompanied ’Abd al-Rahman to Samarkand. 
By 1873, he had made several abortive attempts to enter 
Badakhshan and Turkistan, after which he had to content 
himself with the life of an exile on a small Russian 
pension. ^  In Samarkand, Ishaq seems to have been 
influenced by the mystic Haqshbandiyya order of Islam which 
was to play a significant part in his career in Turkistan.
Little has been recorded of Ishaq1s activities in 
Turkistan in the 1880s, except that, much to the annoyance 
of merchants, he raised some loans for ’Abd al-Rahman, 
and he appointed district rulers, among them Qudus in 
Tashqurghan (about 30 miles to the east of Mazar).
As early as February 1881, Ishaq asked the Amir to 
recognise him as ’’ ...the exclusive owner of Turkistan1’ 
a request which strained his relations with the Amir.
The Amir, however, avoided a clash by promising him that 
he would do so, ’’When all our home and personal anxieties 
and troubles J_ Ayub who held Herat^/ have been removed.”^
In late 1881, when Herat fell to Qudus Khan, Ishaq 
sent his younger brother, Sardar Mohsin Khan, with some 
troops there, instructing Qudus to hand over Herat to him, 
but the latter referred the matter to the Amir. Sardar 
Ishaq then demanded Kandahar for his other younger brother, 
Sardar Mohammad Aziz Khan, and further wrote to the Amir 
in Kandahar, ’’The acquisition of Turkistan cost my
4 BCA, 106.
5 BOA, 107.
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brother, Mohammad Sarwar, his life. You must not think
of Herat or Turkistan. I acknowledge your supremacy, so
do not follow the example of Amir Sher 'Ali... It is right
that you should grant Kandahar to Sardar Mohammad Aziz
Khan / the Amirfs brother-in-law^, and seating yourself
on the throne of Kabul, / and 7  look upon us as your 
6
dependents.’1
The Amir showed his political judgement by recalling
his own nominee, Sardar Yusuf Khan (the youngest son of
the late Amir Host Mohammad), who was on his way to Herat,
and confirming Qudus as the G-overnor of Herat, thus winning
him to his side. Further, the Amir tried to weaken
Ishaq's position by persuading his brothers to join him
in Kabul where, in appearances, he accorded them unusual
consideration but, in fact, kept them as hostages. To
Ishaq the Amir wrote conciliatory letters which had some
effect. Still, Ishaq insisted on keeping the revenue of
7Turkistan, and even demanded that of Herat over which 
he had no control. The Amir agreed not only to Ishaq's 
keeping the revenue of Turkistan, but he even sent him 
money from Kabul, and gave him wide powers. Thus Ishaq 
bad de facto independence iti Turkistan. In return, Ishaq
acknowledged the Amir's suzerainty by reading the Khutba
,...................
in his name. Like other governors, Ishaq too periodically 
sent valuable presents, especially horses, to the Amir.
6 AB, Kabul Correspondent, 7 Bee 1881, PSLI, 31, 306.
7 BCA, 108.
8 Khafi, 2, 160.
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Ho major change in relations between Kabul and 
Turkistan was reported before 1884, although the Sardar
9once asked the Amir to grant him Turkistan in perpetuity.
Otherwise, Ishaq remained loyal to the Amir and would do
"nothing without the Amir1 s knowledge^1'1'^  presumably
in matters relating to Turkistan. But after the
pacification of Maimana, relations became strained between
the Amir and Ishaq. Because he had led the expedition
against the rebel Mir of Maimana, and because Maimana,
in the past, had often been a part of Turkistan, Ishaq
hoped that the Amir would place Maimana under him. But
the Amir appointed Mir Mohammad Husayn, a former Wali of
11
Maimana, as G-overnor, independent of Ishaq.
After his disappointment over Maimana, Ishaq made
strenuous efforts to consolidate his position. Reports
are unanimous concerning the popularity of Ishaq with
the people of Turkistan. His administration was mild in
contrast to the brutal methods of the Amir elsewhere.
Usually, Ishaq did not interfere in legal cases and allowed
12them to be dealt with in accordance with the shari1 at.
There is no report available on land revenue, but the
13poll-tax on non-Muslims and transit duties were light.  ^
Furthermore, Ishaq was of an extremely pious disposition. 
Adhering to the"Naashbandivva" order of Islam, he devoted 
much time to prayer. This piety drew him still closer to
9 ED, 17 Oct 1883, PSLI, 38, 402.
10 The tutor of Ishaq1s son to a certain person, Rasul
Khan, HD, 16 Dec 1883, PSLI, 39, 1039*
11 HD, 5 July 1884, PSLI, 41, 49*
12 Khafi, 2, 161.
13 P D , 19 Dec 1884, PSLI, 43, 72.
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14the Uzbeks, who observed Islam in its "utmost detail,"
and the Turcomans in particular, among whom the Uaqshbandivva
order was widespread. J This also may account for the
fact that Ishaq ordered his people to call him not a
16sardar but a Faqir (mendicant), or a Mulla. Ishaq was
17also popular with his army, which he paid regularly.
Turkistan being a frontier province, the Amir not only
18had allowed Ishaq to raise a large army, which was
composed of Kabulis, Uzbeks, Turcomans and G-hilzays, but
iq
also sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure. J
Thus the necessity of exacting money from the people for
the maintenance of a large army in a comparatively small
province did not arise. Also, because of Ishaq1s mild
rule, there was a great influx of people into Turkistan,
20especially of Uzbeks from Bokhara, and of the inhabitants
of Khanabad, who escaped the oppressive rule of Sardar * Abd
Allah Tokhay. Indeed, Turkistan, especially the cities
21
of Mazar and Tashqurghan, had prospered under Ishaq.
Ishaq was the first Afghan ruler who treated the 
Turkistanis well and they, in turn, felt loyalty to him.
While maintaining a conciliatory appearance, the Amir 
still strove to remove Ishaq from Turkistan. He tried, 
on several occasions, to persuade Ishaq to come to Kabul. 
Each time Ishaq failed to obey the summons. The fact was
14 Elphinstone, 2, 188.
15 Mahomed, S., 1, 265.
16 PD, 7 Jan 1886, PSLI, 46, 461.
17 Khafi, 2, 160.
18 For number see p. 194.
19 BCA, 106.
20 BCA, 112.
21 BCA, 112.
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that the Amir1s attitude towards his governors had still
further estranged Ishaq from him. The Amir’s policy
towards his governors was to dismiss them in disgrace
before they became wealthy and influential, Governors of
influential families, including the Barakzay sardars, were
especially subject to this policy. The best examples
were the cases of fAbd al-Qudus and ’Abd al-Rasul, who
had been removed from Herat and Kandahar respectively, and
imprisoned. High posts, including provincial governqrates
were being given to non-Barakzay sardars, especially to
the head servants of the Amir’s court and households,
whereas the Barakzays, or those who were still in
Afghanistan, were detained in Kabul. Ishaq was the only
Barakzay sardar with ambition and a claim to the throne
who was still a governor of a province. Under such
circumstances, it was most unlikely that he would visit
the Amir in Kabul. Hence Ishaq’s excuses. In late 1884,
22he pleaded ill-health. In 1885, he said his absence 
from the province would lead to disruption, and he unsuc­
cessfully asked the Amir to send him his brothers, before
23he could visit Kabul.
Next, the Amir sent to Turkistan his mother-in-law,
who was a daughter of the late Amir Dost Mohammad, and
who enjoyed the confidence of both Ishaq and himself, to
24try to effect a reconciliation, but her mission was a 
failure, and relations between the two cousins deteriorated
22 MM, Nov 1884, PSLI, 42, 825.
23 MM, Dec 1885, PSLI, 46, 221,
24 PD, 12 May 1886, PSLI, 47, 205.
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further. In 1887, Ishaq, perhaps for the first time, 
refused an order of the Amir to confiscate certain waqf 
(religious endowments) property in Mazar. The refusal 
appeared serious in view of the G-h.il zay rising.
The repeated refusal of Ishaq to obey the summons
alarmed the Amir. Because he was subject to serious
26attacks of gout, the Amir feared that in the event of
his collapse, Ishaq would imprison his two sons and secure
the amirate for himself. He determined therefore to
remove this possible danger. But because of the G-hilzay
and Shinwaray risings, the Amir was not prepared for a
military expedition against him. Instead he summoned
all high military and civil officers of Turkistan to
Kabul, ostensibly to reward some and dismiss others, but
in reality to weaken the position of Ishaq. When the
Amir!s firman was made public, the Turkistanis appealed
to Ishaq, who delayed the order. The Amir's subsequent
summons of Ishaq's son, Sardar Mohammad Isma'il, was also 
28declined. Meanwhile, rumours were rife in Turkistan
that the Amir was dead. In order to ascertain the true
state of affairs, Ishaq wrote to the Amir that his
absence from public view might lead to a rising, and that
29he should appear at the darbar in four days.
25 MM, Jan 1887, PSLI, 49, 373*
26 Surgeon C.W. Owen, Member of the Afghan Boundary 
Commission who visited the Amir in Kabul, 12 Oct 1886, 
PSLI, 49, 51 *
27 MM, based on statement by a female servant of the Amir, 
July 1886, PSLI, 47, 1128.
28 Khafi, 2, 167*
29 ED, 29 Apr 1887, PSLI, 50, 524.
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It is not certain why Ishaq failed to take advantage
of the G-hilzay rising when the Amir's position was
critical. The Ghilzays, too, do not seem to have
approached Ishaq, despite the fact that he was on good
terms with them and was related to them by marriage.
In fact, Ishaq supplied the Amir with troops for use
against the Ghilzays, and the advice that he should adopt
a lenient policy, advice which was bitterly resented by 
30the Amir. But Ishaq, much to the annoyance of the Amir,
31freed all the Ghilzay prisoners, whom the Amir had
32sent to Turkistan. Ishaq also fixed allowances for them. 
Because free movement between Turkistan and Kabul was 
strictly prohibited, and only those who were given 
passports (rahdari) could travel, it seems likely that 
Ishaq failed to realise the full extent of the Ghilzay 
rising.
When the Ghilzay rising was over, the Amir stiffened 
his attitude towards Ishaq. At first he imprisoned a 
number of Ishaq's officials, who had been sent to Kabul 
in compliance with a previous order of the Amir."^ Kext, 
the Amir summoned Ishaq himself. Various reasons have 
been given for this new summons. IChafi maintains that 
the Amir wished to consult Ishaq on Turkistan affairs in 
view of the proximity of the province to its powerful,
30 KD, 23 Aug 1887, PSLI, 51, 385-
31 By 1886 the Amir had sent to Turkistan for settlement
about 10,000 "Afghan" families (BCA, 113) among whom 
the Ghilzays were the highest in number.
32 KD, 23 Aug 1887, PSLI, 51, 385.
33 KD, 20 Dec 1887, PSLI, 52, 382.
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34hostile neighbour, Russia, But according to the Amir,
the summons was for the purpose of consulting Ishaq on
35the impending arrival of a British mission to Kabul,
while according to the Commissioner of Peshawar, the
36Amir wished to appoint Ishaq Governor of Kabul,
Whatever the real reason, it was feared in Turkistan that
37if Ishaq went to Kabul he would never return. Ishaq, 
therefore, summoned his senior officers and officials for 
consultation.
The consultations were held in Shadian, the summer
seat of Ishaq near Mazar. According to Khafi, the view
was common among the elders and ordinary men in Turkistan
that the Amir was determined to destroy the province and
impoverish its inhabitants. They therefore unanimously
offered their service to Ishaq to fight the Amir. In
Shadian, they took an oath on the Quran, pledging themselves
to occupy the whole of Afghanistan for Ishaq. During the
next two weeks, military officers extracted an oath of
loyalty from the soldiers, and the elders from the
ordinary people. Only one officer delayed signing the
38Quran and was instantly killed. Afterwards, Ishaq 
moved to Mazar, where he was declared Amir in the public 
mosque on Friday, 10 August,1888. Ishaq1s seal was 
inscribed 11 Amir Mohammad Ishaq, son of the late Amir 
Mohammad Azim Iihan"^ indicating that his claim was
34 Khafi, 2, 168.
35 Amir to British Agent (Mazar), 6 Feb 1890, PSLI, 59* 6 8 6 .
36 PD, 17 Dec 1887, PSLI, 52, 101.
37 Khafi, 2, 168.
38 Khafi, 2, 168-170.
39 HD, 6 Oct 1888, PSLI, 5 5 , 718.
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based on his being a son of A'zam. The Amirfs version
of the inscription is ,fLa illah / sic_7 Z"~HlallahJT’ L iJ
Amir Mahomed Ishak Khan.11 (There is no God but God, Amir
\ 40Mohammad Ishaq Khan.) But this is in complete contrast 
to the religious character of Ishaq, All the elders, 
however, were not unanimous in declaring Ishaq as Amir in 
Mazar. Some suggested that this should be deferred to 
a later date and done in Kabul.^ According to Khafi, 
who was a witness to the event, this did not suggest any 
opposition but was a matter of policy.
Khafi does not say why Ishaq assumed the amirate
while the Amir was alive. Although, according to the
42Amir, Ishaq believed that the Amir was dead, this is
made uncertain by the silence of Khafi, and the declarations
of Ishaq against the Amir. Khafi only mentions that
Ishaq made it known publicly that the people of Kabul had
43asked him to come and occupy the capital of the kingdom.
In his written proclamations, Ishaq declared a jehad
against the Amir, declaring himself the avenger of the
44oppressed people, although for tactical reasons he also
circulated rumours of the death of the Amir which gained
45a considerable degree of credence.
Ishaq sent agents throughout the country, inciting
40 Mahomed, S., 1 , 267.
41 Khafi, 2, 1 7 1 ,
42 Mahomed, S., 1, 267-
43 Khafi, 2, 171.
44 MM, Aug 1888, PSLI, 55, 134.
45 MM, Sept 1888, PSLI, 5 5 , 5 9 9 .
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the people against the Amir. He also sent proclamations
to the refugees at Peshawar, and to Sardar Mohammad Ayub
in Lahore, and also to the Afridays of the Khyber, and
the people of Kunar, whose Bafay inhabitants were still
4-7holding out against the Amir. Similar invitations were
48
also extended to the Ghilzays, Hazaras, Bajauris and to 
Sardar Hur Mohammad Khan, who was in the Shinwar. But 
because of the restrictions imposed by the Government of 
India, no refugee was able to take part in a move against 
the Amir. Indeed, Sardar Ayub handed over the proclamation 
to the G-overnment of India.
Shortly after declaring himself Amir, Ishaq set out
for Kabul, but when he reached G-omar (a stage from Mazar),
affairs in Maimana turned against him. Although Mir
Husayn was the Wali of Maimana, actual power was exercised
by the Amir1s military officer, who commanded troops in 
49the city. Mir Husayn was at Mazar, presumably summoned 
by Ishaq, when the latter declared himself Amir. The Wali 
was imprisoned, probably for his refusal to accept Ishaq 
as Amir, whereas General Sharbat Khan, Commander of the 
Maimana troops, declared for Ishaq. But the troops, and 
the sons of the Wali, remained loyal to the Amir. They 
seized the General and sent him to Herat where he was 
killed. Soon, General Rustam Khan arrived with 
reinforcements from Herat and took over the administration
46 KD, 21 Aug 1888, PSLI, 54, 969.
47 MM, Aug 1888, PSLI, 55, 154.
48 MM, Sept 1888, PSLI, 55, 599.
49 GAT, pt 2, 221.
50 Khafi, 2, 172.
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of Maimana. The example of Maimana was soon followed by
the elders of Andkhui, and Dowlat Abad, who reiterated
51their allegiance to the Amir. Thus the north-west
flank of Ishaq1s position became insecure, and his attempts
to bring Maimana under control failed. Nevertheless,
Ishaq continued on his march, leaving his son and heir-
apparent, Sardar Isma’il, in charge of Turkistan, to look
after Maimana and to cope with the possible danger from
52
the Hazarajat and Herat. After passing Tashqurghan,
Ishaq was joined on the bank of the Kunduz river by the 
Amir!s army quartered at Khanabad, and subsequently the 
whole of Badakhshan fell to him. The Amir1s officials 
and soldiery swore the oath of loyalty to him. Only a 
limited number, who refused to do so, were imprisoned and 
killed. The ground for this easy victory had been 
prepared by his emissaries, and facilitated by the 
absence of Sardar ’Abd Allah Tokhay, the Governor of 
Badakhshan, who was on his way to Kabul.
The combined forces then moved on to Khanabad, where 
towards the end of August, Ishaq was joined by Sultan 
Murad, the opportunist Mir of Kunduz who, in the past, 
had never hesitated to join a strong contender to the 
throne, and subsequently to desert him. In Khanabad, 
Ishaq’s march was delayed, because of the slow movement 
of the army in Shighnan (a district in the far east of 
Badakhshan) whose commander, Saidal Khan, was at first
51 MM, Aug 1888, BSLI, 55, 133
52 Khafi, 2, 173.
194
hesitant to join Ishag, For three weeks Ishaq remained
in Khanabad, during which time the news of his march
53spread and the Amir1 s reply was allowed to develop,
The revolt of Ishaq presented the Amir with problems
similar to those caused by Sardar Ayub in 1881, Both
S&rdars claimed the throne, though the claim of Ishaq
had been of lesser weight. But under Ishaq, a large army
(the total number of the Turkistan and Badakhshan troops
54was 1 8 , 7 0 0 with 86 guns, minus the number of troops and
guns in Maimana, Andkhui and Dowlatyar) advanced on Kabul
at a time when the Amir was so ill that ",. .he could not
walk for more than*..,,two or three steps." Furthermore,
because of the prevailing discontent in the country, the
56general feeling was in favour of Ishaq, But the Amir 
acted swiftly.
In Kabul, the Amir imprisoned the three brothers of
Ishaq, and 360 relatives of men in the service of Ishaq
in Turkistan. He directed his efforts to mobilise
religious and public opinion against Ishaq. The mullas
and elders of Kabul and Jalalabad gave him a fetwa to the
57 ■effect that Ishaq was a rebel. The Amir then called on
58all the tribes to act against Ishaq. Further, he gave
59out that Ishaq*s rebellion was due to Russia, and thus
53 Khafi, 2, 173-176.
54 Military Resources of Afghanistan, Hov 1886, Ho. 78, 1.
55 KD, 21 Aug 1888, PSLI, 54, 969.
56 KD, 21 Aug 1888, PSLI, 54, 969.
57 PL, 9 Sept 1893, PSLI, 72, 64.
58 Amir's proclamation, KD, 28 Aug 1888, PSLI, 5 5 , 21.-
59 Amir's proclamation, KD, 28 Aug 1888, PSLI, 24-
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he called the suppression of the insurrection "a religious
60■war#” It is worth noting that the Amir obtained a
fetwa easily from the mullas against Ishaq, whereas he
failed to do so against the Ghilzays. By implicating
Russia in the revolt, the Amir apparently hoped to obtain
assistance from the British Government, and to turn the
tribes against Ishaq# In fact, there is no evidence to
suggest that Ishaq was supported by Russia# In the past
there had been occasional vague and general reports of
Russian association with Ishaq. In 1883 it was reported
that ” ...the Russians place great confidence in him,”^
In 1884, that Ishaq was ” ...in correspondence with the 
6 2Russians,” and in 1888 that the Russians visited Ishaq
63
more frequently than before. That the Amir in his
proclamations spoke of Ishaq as ”the bastard Armenian
servant of Russia” , and that Ishaq accused the Amir of
64being ”a British prot&gfe” was, in fact, no more than 
propaganda directed at inciting tribes against each other.
Militarily, the Amir also acted very swiftly. He 
despatched a strong force to Turkistan under Ghulam Haydar 
Orakzay, who had been promoted to the rank of Naib Salar 
(Deputy Commander-in-Chief) after his victory over the 
Ghilzays. Another force under Brigadier Sayyed Shah Khan, 
and a third under Sardar !Abd Allah Tokhay, were also 
sent. After having combined in Saighan (a district of
60 KD, 4 Sept 1888, PSLI, 55, 190.
61 PD, 1 July 1883, PSLI, 3 7 , 312.
62 KD, 12 Peb 1884, PSLI, 3 9 , 1018.
63 MM, Mar 1888, PSLI, 5 3 , 286.
64 MM, Sept 1888, PSLI, 55, 600.
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Turkistan to the north of Bamian), the first two forces
arrived on 4 September Before Kahmard (near Saighan),
which was held By an advance force of aBout 700 Khasadars
under General Bajm al-Lin Ghilzay, father-in-law of Ishaq.
Prom the pass of Dandanshikan, the artillery of the
combined forces rapidly destroyed the so-called "iron
fort" of Shash Burja, where the Khasadars of Ishaq were,
65capturing General Lajm al-Lin and the rest. Prom there, 
the Naib Salar advanced on the town of HaiBak (about 
246 miles from Kabul), where he was well received By the 
elders. On 23 September, he was joined By the troops 
under Sardar fABd Allah Tokhay. The combined forces, 
comprising 13 regiments of infantry, 4 regiments of 
cavalry, 26 guns with some irregulars marched onwards, 
reaching the valley of Ghaznigak (three miles south of 
Tashqurghan) on 25 September. In this valley, advanced 
units of the army of Ishaq were already in position.
Ishaq himself, with the main body of his troops, was 
falling back on Tashqurghan. He had been abandoned already 
by the Mir of Kunduz who had crossed the Oxus to safety.
The decisive battle took place at G-haznigak on 
27 September. The exact number of Ishaq's troops under 
Haib Salar Mohammad Husayn in Ghaznigak is difficult to 
ascertain, but the Amir's army was larger than that of 
Ishaq. On the eve of the confrontation, Ishaq received
65 Khafi, 2 , 1 7 6-1 7 7 .
66 Amir to British Agent, Mazar, 5 July 1889 
PSLI, 55, 1068.
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a sealed Quran from a section of the Amir's army
( 9>*-'(fy 9 cA; ), promising desertion during the "battle.
Accordingly, Ishaq, who had taken position on a hill distant
from the "battlefield, issued orders to his army not to
fire first. That part of the Amir's army which was led
by 'Abd Allah Tokhay opened fire. This part was totally
defeated, some submitting while others, including 'Abd
Allah Tokhay, fled towards Herat, the Hazarajat, and 
67Kabul. According to the Amir, eight regiments of
68infantry surrendered while the cavalry fled. While 
Ishaq's army was plundering 'Abd Allah Tokhay's baggage,
Naib Salar Orakzay made a surprise attack and defeated 
Ishaq's troops with complete success. But what finally 
completely sealed the fate of the battle in favour of 
the Amir* s army was the sudden and unexpected flight of 
Ishaq, who was misinformed about the success of the 
major portion of his army under Naib Salar Husayn Khan. 
Ishaq's flight disheartened the rest of his army, which 
followed him. After having taken their families, Ishaq 
and the remainder of his troops crossed the Oxus at 
Patakasar, from where they finally reached Sherabad in
69
Bokhara. Ishaq took up residence at Samarqand once again.
Several factors contributed to the unexpected defeat 
of Ishaq. Communication was non-existent between him, 
about one farsakh from the battlefield, and his commanding
67 Khafi, 2, 178-186, MM, Oct 1888, PSLI, 55, 927*
68 Amir to British Agent, Mazar, 5 July 1889, PSLI, 57, 1068.
69 Khafi, 2, 178-186.
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officer, Naib Salar Husayn Khan, and the latter failed 
to send him the news of his victory over ’Abd Allah Tokhay. 
The two portions of Ishaq’s army were also unaware of 
each other’s position, probably because of the thick dust 
produced by the battle. Like Ishaq, his advisers were 
also cowardly and incompetent. From the beginning of 
hostilities, they worked on his fears and encouraged him 
to retreat. Ishaq was not a soldier and lost his judgement 
at the critical moment. When his own messengers incorrectly 
informed him that his officers had been killed, Ishaq 
instantly took flight, without verifying the report.
His flight was further hastened by fear of attack on his 
rear from the Maimana side, though the Maimana army was 
also reported to be on the brink of submission to him. 
Otherwise his army fought bravely, and had he shown 
courage it is possible that all of the Amir’s army would 
have submitted to him.
The early collapse of the revolt checked the distur­
bances which otherwise might have become widespread. 
Disturbances were raised in the neighbourhood of Ghazni, 
and the inhabitants of Muqur and Ghazni were reported to 
be ready for Ishaq, if he had gained any success. The 
Kabul-Kandahar and Kabul-Peshawar roads were infested 
with robbers. The difficulty of the Amir’s position 
could be realised from the fact that, after receiving 
the news of the defeat of a portion of his troops, the 
Amir instructed the British Agent at Kabul to declare, 
in a military darbar (which did not take place) that, 
should the Amir wish it, the British Government was
199
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ready to send troops to Kabul, in seven days. The 
escape of Ishaq was fortunate for the Amir. Since the 
expulsion of Ayub in 1881, no other important member of 
the ruling Barakzay family had been left in the country 
who might one day have become his rival. But the affairs 
of Turkistan had to be set on a new footing. The Amir 
left for Turkistan on 25 October, leaving his elder son 
Habib Allah in charge of Kabul.
Apparently two considerations induced the Amir to go
to Turkistan, where he remained until July 1890. First,
Ishaq with, according to Khafi, 8,377 followers, including
71women and children, across the Oxus might be a source 
of constant danger, especially since the Amir believed 
Russia had backed Ishaq. This necessitated the fortifi­
cation of the frontiers along the Oxus. Second, the control 
of the chaos following the revolt could not be handled by 
a person other than the Amir himself, as this involved
problems such as the punishment of the disloyal Turkistanis, 
the resettlement of the depopulated areas, and breaking 
the administration of Turkistan into smaller units.
On his way to Turkistan, the Amir1s first target 
became the Sheikh Ali Hazaras, who inhabited both sides 
of the south-western end of the Hindu Kush, and who had 
supported Ishaq, under their leaders Mir Ja!far and
70 KD, 2 Oct 1888, PSLI, 55, 689.
71 Khafi, 2, 185.
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72Bilawar. The Amir ordered them to submit their arms,
73a large number of cattle, and pay 50,000 rupees in fines.
But when they failed to do so, they were ordered to be
removed en masse from their country and disnersed through-
74out Afghanistan. Subsequent reports confirmed that 
many of them were removed to Qalat, Herat, and Bala Murghab 
in the province of Herat. Only those who had been detained 
in Kabul were later permitted to return to their homes.
In Turkistan, the Amir tried to tackle the other
problems simultaneously. The fortification of the
frontiers along the Oxus occupied his principal attention.
But, finding his initial proposed arrangement of building
about 40 forts along the border with Russia financially
difficult and politically inadvisable, the Amir decided
instead, at the suggestion of his geologist, Captain
G-riesbach, to choose two sites - one in the neighbourhood
of Bala Murghah (Herat), the other at Bawlat Abad
(Turkistan), for the construction of two fortified camps.^
But ultimately the fort of Behdadi (near Mazar), commanding
the valley along which runs the main road from the Russian
territory to Mazar and was one of the strongest in the
76country, seems to have taken their place. As a supplement
to this, the Amir decided to remove disloyal tribes from 
Turkistan and settle the frontier districts with non-TJzbeks,
72 British Agent, with Amir in Barfak in Boab, 20 Bov 1888, 
PSLI, 55, 1229.
73 British Agent, Mazar, 24 Sept 1889, PSLI, 58, 538*
74 British Agent, Mazar, 3 Peb 1890, PSLI, 59, 840.
75 MM, Mar 1889, PSLI, 56, 1071.
76 Mahomed, S., 1 , 271.
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especially with Pashtuns. He removed many Uzbeks from 
77Maimana, and settled many families from the Safays of 
Tagao, the Shinwarays, the Mohmands, Nurzays, and Hazaras 
in Khamiab (on the left bank of the Oxus, to the north-west 
of Mazar), and Bala Murghab,^
In connection with punishing those who were impli­
cated in the revolt, the Amir’s wrath fell especially on 
the notables- After obtaining letters addressed to Ishaq 
by Turkistanis, and four copies of the Quran in which 
people had signed their allegiance, the Amir singled 
out elders and officers for the hardest punishment the
Turkistanis had ever experienced. But people with no
79influence were pardoned. The remainder of the troops
RO
of Ishaq, numbering over 6,000, were disbanded. The
Kabuli officials of Ishaq were called upon to refund
81
the pay they had received for the past seven years.
82
By late 1890, about 1,000 people had been executed, and 
5,400 arrested. These actions of the Amir prompted a 
letter from the Viceroy Lansdowne in which he reminded
83the Amir that such treatment was ”abhorrent to civilisation” . 
But the Amir considered this reminder to be interference 
in his internal affairs, and in turn reminded the Viceroya a
that ’’Neither do the English like rebellions” - a 
reference to the brutal suppression of the Indian rising
77 MM, July 1894, PSLI, 75, 991.
78 HD, 7 Jan 1892, PSLI, 65, 651.
79 British Agent, 4 Jan 1889, PSLI, 56, 288,
80 PD, 6 Sept 1890, PSLI, 61, 231.
81 KD, 24 Sept 1890, PSLI, 61, 511.
82 Amir in darbar, PD, 6 Sept 1890, 61, 231*
83 Lansdowne to Amir, 27 Feb 1889, PSLI, 56, 721.
84 Fletcher, A., Afghanistan, Highway of Conquest. 
New York, 1965, 147.
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in 1857 *
Confiscation of property and realisation of revenue
were the measures which might have compensated for part
of the losses the Amir had suffered* But while fines and
confiscation of property were imposed upon those who were
in any way associated with the revolt, excessive revenues
x^ere collected from all those who were liable for the
payment of ordinary taxes* All hitherto rent-free lands,
including charitable lands, were made subject to the
85revenue payments. Large balances of revenues were
demanded from almost all districts of Turkistan and
86Badakhshan, except Maimana. Since the revolt had
originated in Turkistan, its landowners were further ordered
87
to pay a year’s revenue in advance.
Even before his arrival in Turkistan, the Amir had
determined to divide the province into smaller districts
" so that no one may aspire to the Amirship in future.”
Appointment of governors with wide power over the provinces
of Turkistan and Badakhshan was therefore avoided, and
the various districts of the latter were entrusted to
89the ” ...faithful servants and slaves” of the Amir.
The revolt of Sardar Ishaq was a combination of two 
tendencies, dynastic and social. Ishaq's original idea
85 MM, June 1889, PSLI, 57, 852.
86 MM, June 1889, PSLI, 57, 852.
87 British Agent, Mazar, 9 Aug 1889$ PSLI, 5 7 , 1435*
88 Amir to Captain G-riesbach, British Agent with Amir
in Dehara-i-Bed, 6 Nov 1888, PSLI, 55, 1129.
89 Amir’s proclamation, Izah al-Bayan, PB, 2 Sent 1889? 
PSLI, 5 8 , 390.
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that he and his brothers would rule Turkistan (including 
Badakhshan) 9 Herat and Kandahar in a loose confederation, 
under the hegemony of the Amir in Kabul clashed with the 
Amir*s desire to rule the country autocratically. By 
1884, when he was completely disappointed in his early 
hopes, Ishaq made strenuous efforts to get closer to the 
people, and to rule by consent rather than by force.
The Amir’s harsh and oppressive rule elsewhere also 
contributed heavily to the success of Ishaq in attaching 
the Turkistanis to himself. By the time the Amir finally 
decided to remove him from Turkistan, Ishaq was so popular 
with the Turkistanis that they volunteered to fight for 
him against the Amir. The oppressive rule of the Amir 
also brought Ishaq wider support, as was evidenced by 
the easy acceptance of his claim to the amirate by the 
army and people of Badakhshan, Kataghan, as well as by 
a portion of the Amir’s army. Had Ishaq held out longer, 
he might have been supported by tribes throughout the 
country. But as Ishaq was a religious romantic and not 
a general, he lost his opportunity in the battle. His 
sudden flight left the Turkistanis and Badakhshanis at 
the mercy of the Amir, who reduced their power and influence, 
not only by systematic impoverishment but also by encouraging 
people from other areas to settle in Turkistan, Kataghan 
and Badakhshan. This forceful immigration remained a 
policy of Amir ’Abd al-Rahman and his successors, and has 
continued to the present day.
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Chapter 7 
The Pacification of the Hazaras
Of all the tribal opposition to the Amir’s efforts 
to extend the authority of the central government, the 
opposition of the Hazaras was among the greatest. Having 
enjoyed a semi-independent status in the past, the Hazaras 
resisted the control the Amir was attempting to impose 
on them. Their opposition finally culminated in a full- 
scale war which lasted intermittently for three years, 
from 1891 to 1893* The position of the Hazaras was 
inherently a weak one. They were Shi’ite Muslims, and on 
bad terms with their Sunni neighbours. They had also made 
themselves unpopular, by assisting the British in the past. 
This enabled the Amir to rally popular support against 
them. Untimately the Hazaras were overcome and subdued. 
They were also greatly impoverished, and Sunni tribes 
settled on some of their lands.
The Hazaras occupy mainly the central highlands of 
Afghanistan (westward from Kabul, Ghazni, Qalat, to the 
neighbourhood of Herat and Turkistan). This area contains 
high mountains and inaccessible valleys, with long severe 
winters. In this area there were also Tajiks and the so- 
called Sayyeds, as well as the Hazaras. In Bamian, the 
number of Tajiks and Sayyeds was particularly high.
Outside this area, there are Hazaras in the districts of 
Badghis in the province of Herat, and of Doshi, Ghori, 
Khinjan and Andarab in the province of Badakhshan. As 
these Hazaras had been under the control of the Government
206
1for many years, they will not be considered here„
Like the Pashtuns, the Hazaras also had tribal 
organisation and were divided, according to Mohammad 
Husayn Jaghatu Hazara, into the Hazaras of Pas-i-Koh, the 
Behsud, Balkhabi, Deh Kondi, Jaghatu, Sheikh Ali, Jaghori,
Deh Mardad, Mohammad Khwaja, Chardasta, and Deh Zangi Giro.
In 1886, the Hazaras (probably also including the non- 
Hazara inhabitants of Hazarajat), were reported to number 
about 1 2 0 , 0 0 0 families.^
In the early nineteenth century each tribe had its own
elder with the title of Sultan, who had absolute control
over his own tribesmen. But the tribes had vendettas among
themselves, and at no time had any solid or useful confederacy.^
The Hazaras were generally sedentary, but as their land was
poor and the winters very cold, a considerable number of them
migrated in the winter to the cities of Kabul, Kandahar,
Ghazni, Lahore and Quetta, where they earned their living
in menial jobs. The bulk of the Hazaras adhered to the Shi'ite
sect of Islam, with the great majority being ntwelvers” but some
being "seveners” - the latter locally known as the 11 Agha
Khani" - the followers of the Agha Khan of Bombay. Only
the Hazaras of Herat and those "towards the north and west of 
4the country" were of the Sunni sect.
1 Bellew, H.V., The Races of Afghanistan, 113-117*
Elphinstone, 2, 208-212, Schumann, H.F. , The Mongols 
of Afghanistan, Leiden, 1962, 96-99* 110-158.
Wilber, D ., Afghanistan. 45-47, OAK, 37-171, OAB, 109-112.
OAT, 96-99, 269-273- OAH, 140-159. Mahomed, S., 1, 276-284.
2 Report by Subadar Mohammad Husayn, son of Raj at ’Ali 
(elder of Jaghatu Hazara), member of the Afghan Boundary 
Commission, Subadar in 2nd Sikh Regiment, 1886, PSLI, 4 9 , 415.
3 Elphinstone, M . , 2, 211.
4 Bellew, Races of Afghanistan. 115.
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The ITazaras were comparatively recent settlers, hut 
at what period they settled in the Hazarajat is not 
certain. The Hazaras seem to have no traditions about 
their settlement. In the late nineteenth century, they 
did not even seem to have a common appelation. They were 
known to each other by the name of the tribes to which 
they belonged. The word Hazara, meaning "thousand" in 
Persian, was given to them by their neighbours. There 
is a generally held view that the Hazaras are the 
descendants of the ten military colonies of a thousand 
each planted by Grhengiz Khan (1206 - 1227)?^ although 
when Grhengiz Khan returned to Mongolia after his invasion 
of the region he left no troops behind him. According to 
Wilber, the Hazaras are the descendants of the army of 
Chaghatai (1227 - 1241), a son of G-hengiz Khan, and were 
sent on expeditions to India during the last part of the 
thirteenth century.^ Schurmann maintains that the Hazaras 
are a mixed population formed by a fusion of an aboriginal 
Iranian mountain people with invaders of Mongol affinities. 
Be it as it may, the Hazaras are the third largest ethnic 
group in Afghanistan, with distinct Mongol features and 
Persian culture, as is evidenced by their Shi1ite faith and 
Persian language.
The Amir's attitude in the eighties was not the same 
towards all the Hazaras. Neither did the Hazaras adopt
5 Bellew, 114.
6 Wilber, 46.
7 Schurmann, 1 1 1 .
208
one policy towards the Amir. The Hazaras of Jaghori
(5,400 families in 1886) and Jaghatu (8,470 families),
occupying an area to the north-west of Muqur, opposed the
Amir when he marched against Ayub in 1881, because they
were associated with the family of the late Amir Sher ’Ali.
Their opposition, however, proved ineffective, and the
Amir was able to kill two elders of the Jaghori who were
the sons of Sardar Sher ’Ali Hazara. In 1884, the Amir
was able to appoint a hakim over them, thus exacting
8revenue in cash and kind. But on the eve of the G-hilzay 
rising, the Hazaras rose, killing their hakim. Their 
rising was caused ostensibly by a demand by the hakim for 
a daughter of a Hazara elder. But in fact, the Hazaras 
were disturbed over the killing of the elders and the 
imposition of heavy revenue.
After the apparent failure of a conciliatory mission 
to the Jaghori Hazaras,^ the Amir addressed them again to 
the effect that ”1 am your friend. Follow the right road, 
for the English, who are not my friends, are coming against 
me.” Apparently, the Amir wished to dissuade the 
Jaghori Hazaras from supporting the Ghilzays, because 
there was no question of any British advance on Afghanistan, 
In fact, such a reference to the British worked against 
the Amir. The Jaghori Hazaras were on good terms with 
the British, for who ‘ '' " Anglo-
8 Mohammad Husayn, 1886, PSLI, 49, 415.
9 KD, 5 Hov 1886, PSLI, 48, 1177.
10 KD, 18 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1157*
11 G-riffin to Stewart, 8 May 1880, PSLI, 25, 1258.
12 Mohammad Husayn, 1886, PSLI, 4 9 , 4 1 5 .
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70,000 rupees and gold medals by the British, This 
explains why the Jaghori Hazaras replied to the Amir that 
they were willing to join the British if and when they 
came and that they would never submit to him because he
14
was an infidel and ruining the Muslims.
Twice the Amir sent other Hazara tribal levies against
15them, but the Jaghoris repulsed them. In the summer of 
1888, the revolt of the Jaghoris seemed to have spread 
far beyond their confines among other Hazaras. But as 
the rising was not general, it did not constitute a threat
to the Amir. When a danger to the Amirfs authority loomed
bn the horizon of Turkistan, the Jaghoris were left in 
their rebellious state.
The only Hazaras who were reduced in the eighties 
were the Sheikh Ali Hazaras, who numbered about 3>090 
families in 1886 and occupied the area to the north-west 
of Bamian in the province of Turkistan. Although they had 
first been pacified during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali, 
after his death they had renewed their old practice of 
plundering caravans on the Kabul-Turkistan road which ran 
through their country. But during the first years of 
'Abd al-Rahman*s reign, three successive expeditions were 
sent against them in 1881,^ in 1882^ and in 1883
13 KD, 28 Bee 1886, PSLI, 49, 271,
14 KD, 18 Mar 1887, PSLI, 49, 1137.
15 PL, 14 Sept 1887, PSLI, 5 1 , 544.
16 PL, 4 Mar 1881, PSLI, 27, 1615.
17 AB, Kabul Correspondent, 26 Jan 1882, PSLI, 31, 729.
18 British Agent with Amir in Jalalabad, 8 May 1883, 
PSLI, 37, 52,
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A yet more drastic step against them was taken in 1890,
when they were removed en masse from their land following
19their support of Ishaq in 1888.
With other Hazara tribes, the Amir's policy of
peaceful penetration was successful. This penetration
was accomplished by methods such as the granting of
allowances and the posts of hakim to some leading Hazaras
of Behsud and Deh Zangi. By 1886 all Hazara tribes paid
land revenue and taxes on cattle, and even marriage fees.
But the revenue was not levied in a uniform manner. The
revenue was paid in cash as well as in kind, and the
latter included ghee, animal skins, sack, rope and barak
(woollen material). Whereas some tribes such as the
Behsud (13,020 families), Deh Mardad (4,370 families), and
Sheikh Ali paid ^ and l/lO of the produce of their lands,
other tribes such as the Mohammad Khwaja (3,330 families),
Balkhabi (10,400 families), Deh Zangi and Deh Kondi
(1 1 , 0 1 0 families) paid a fixed amount either on the land
or per family. But the rate of revenue on all tribes was
increased in various degrees during this period of the
Amir's reign. The only exception was the Hazaras of
Pas-i-Koh (beyond the mountain), who mainly occupied
Uruzgan (a region to the north-west of Qalat). They were
the largest of the tribes (44,000 families), and so far
had successfully defied all attempts to obtain their 
20submission.
19 See p. 199•
20 Mohammad Husayn, 1886, PSLI, 4 9 , 415.
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In 1890 the removal of the Sheikh Ali Hazaras was 
followed by the appointment of Sardar 'Abd al-Qudus, 
who had been under surveillance in Kabul since 1882 -
as Governor of Bamian. As the Sardar had been given wide 
powers and a large body of troops, it indicated the Amir's 
determination to bring the whole of the Hazaras under 
effective control. But at first, peaceful methods were 
employed. A deputation of about 40 elders was sent to 
the Hazaras, presumably to the Hazaras of Uruzgan, to
21persuade them to submit to the authority of the Amir.
22The Hazaras were at first not convinced, but later,
when the Amir sent his personal attendant (peshkhidmat),
Sardar Mohammad 'Azim Khan (an influential elder of the
Deh Kondi Hazaras), and offered them terms in return for
their submission, the Uruzgan Hazaras accepted, the terms. •
According to the Hazaras, they were to accept the Amir's
authority but to keep their internal autonomy, and pay
28no revenue for several years to come, Subsequent events 
seem to show that the Hazaras agreed to accept a governor 
of the Amir. In the spring of 1891, !Abd al-Qudus, accom­
panied by a force of 10,000 men made, according to the 
Amir, an opposed but, according to the Hazaras, unopposed, 
entry. Soon, on instructions from the Amir, the army 
began to disarm the Hazaras and to collect revenue from 
them. The Palo Hazaras, a subsection of the Sultan 
Mohammad clan of Uruzgan, rose, killing some soldiers
21 British Agent with Amir in Mazar, 18 July 1890,
PSLI, 60, 1237.
22 PD, 28 Dec 1890, PSLI, 62, 373.
23 Statement by Mir Mohammad Husayn Beg. Elder of the 
Sultan Mohammad clan in Uruzgan, led the Sultan Mohammad 
Hazaras in war against Amir's forces. 11 Apr 1894,
PSLI, 74, 547.
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and capturing some military supplies. Soon the whole of
the powerful Sultan Mohammad clan (12,000 families) rose
under Mir Husayn Beg and defeated the Amir*s troops, who
24took refuge in the fortresses. A detachment of about
4,000 men of the troops had previously proceeded to G-izao 
(to the north of Uruzgan) under Qudus, and this naturally 
made the victory of the Hazaras a little easier.
The disaster was a complete surprise to the Amir. 
Obviously the first step to be taken was to relieve the 
besieged troops. A reinforcement, according to Mir Husayn 
Beg of about ”10,000" men under one Faiz Mohammad, was 
despatched, but this force too, after some engagements, 
was compelled to take refuge with the already besieged 
army. The combined forces were besieged for a month, 
after which they surrendered unconditionally. The Hazaras 
took possession of the forts, massacring a great number 
of troops, and hunting the rest who fled to Tirin (a
p c
district to the south of Uruzgan). Other reports, 
however, speak of the total annihilation of the troops 
stationed at Uruzgan. By now the rising had become 
general and joined by all the tribes, including the Deh
27Kondi, Deh Zangi, Daya, Folad, Behsud, Jaghori and G-izao. 
The rising made a large scale expedition against the
24 Mir Husayn Beg, 11 Apr 1894, PSLI, 74, 548.
25 Mir Husayn Beg, 11 Apr 1894, PSLI, 7 4 , 5 4 8 .
26 KD, 21-24 May 1892, PSLI, 6 6 , 1104.
27 Mir Husayn Beg, 11 Apr 1894, PSLI, 74, 548.
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Hazaras necessary,, The total number given of tribal
PR
levies of from 30,000 to 40,000, and of tribal levies
and regulars of about 100,000, J may be debatable, but
it was certainly true that the Amir introduced men into
the Hazarajat on a scale he had never been able to do
before. With the exception of the Andars and Tarakays
who were, at one stage, reported to have rebelled, tribal
levies from all sides were despatched. Even some sections
of the Hazara tribes such as the Deh Kondi, Behsud and
Jaghori, who had not yet risen, supplied the Amir with
about 2,000 levies. But these Hazaras were obviously not
trusted. They were made to fight in front of the troops;
30half of them were slain and the other half deserted.
Two factors made the despatch of this large force
possible. Because the Hazaras were Shi ’ ite Muslims and
therefore in perpetual enmity with their Sunni neighbours,
the Amir obtained a fetwa from the mullas easily. For
the first time, the Khan-i“Mulla of Kabul, in consultation
with other mullas, declared a religious war against the
Hazaras. The issue of such a fetwa. had been facilitated
by the seizure of a book from some Hazaras in which the
first three Caliphs of Islam had allegedly been abused by 
31the Hazaras. In 600 proclamations which the Amir
distributed throughout the country, the Hazaras and all
32the Shi’as were declared to be Mkafirs’'. The task of
28 Mahomed, S ,, 1, 283 *
29 Amir to Durranis of Kandahar, 2 July 1892, PSLI, 66, 1721.
30 10), 21-24 May 1892, PSLI, 66, 1104.
31 KD, 21-24 May 1892, PSLI, 66, 1102.
32 KD, 22-24 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1511.
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inciting the Sunnis was entrusted to the Sunni mullas who,
in their religious preachings, spared no efforts in
condemning the Hazaras to death. In the past, the Hazaras
and their neighbours used to carry off girls and cattle
from each other.^ The Amir now officially declared that
"...after Urzagan /™Sic_7 is captured, all Hazaras are to
be put to the sword, their wives, children and property
34being distributed as booty among the Afghans." The 
result was that tribal elders volunteered their service 
against the Hazaras. Only the tribal levy of the eastern 
province could not be sent, because their service was 
needed at Asmar under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Charkhi.
For the effective use of tribal levies, efforts were
concentrated on their organisation and discipline. The
levies of the Kabul province were led by their maliks
(as leaders of ten men), pinjabashis (leaders of 50),
sinjbashi £~sadhashis?__/ (leaders of 100), hazarbashis
(leaders of 1,000). These leaders were to operate under
the general leadership of the military commanders or
governors of the same province. The maliks were asked
to provide their men with some ammunition, supplies and
3 5donkeys for transport for which the Amir would pay.
This may have been a model for the organisation of the 
levies of all the provinces, but information about them 
is not av&ilable. To keep up the spirit of war, stipendiary
33 Lady Hamilton, A Vizierfs Laughter, A Tale of the 
Hazara War, London, 1900, 23-
34 Amir’s firman, Kand. L., 28 May 1892, PSLI, 66, 1259*
35 KD, 2-5 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1731.
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mullas were ordered to accompany the tribal levies, and
36preach ghaza to them. Any member of the tribal levies
who wished to desert was threatened with the confiscation
of his house.^ Likewise, soldiers and officers who
were accused of being disloyal were brutally punished.
A number of such officers died after being mutilated,
38and their bodies -were burnt in the Hindu Suzan - a place 
in Kabul where the Hindus burn the bodies of their dead 
in accordance with their custom.
But the despatch of so large a force, and the
consequent dislocation of the economy, had their effects
upon the people, as a result of which the initial enthusiasm
for war evaporated, especially when the Hazaras put up
tremendous resistance. In Kandahar, the price of grain
rose quickly, because of the large quantity of grain being
sent to the Hazarajat. Free purchase of grain was forbidden
there. G-rain was rationed, and its sale made subject to
obtaining a permit (parwana) from the authorities.^
In Kabul, public disorder was feared. Rich people hid
their money and valuables.^ In Turkistan popular distress
caused by the war was further aggravated by the outbreak
41of cholera in epidemic form. But the Amir did not relax 
his rule, and to pay for the whole expensive operation he
42tried to obtain money ” ...from any source and by any means.1’
36 KD, 23-26 July, 1892, PSLI, 67, 316.
37 KD, 23-26 July 1892, PSLI, 67, 316.
38 KD, 4-7 ...--- 1892, PSLI, 66, 1291.
39 MM, Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 476.
40 KD, 6-9 Aug 1892, 67, 461.
41 MM, Aug 1892, 67, 698.
42 KD, 19-21 Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 455.
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Nevertheless, there was no fear of a major rising against 
43the Amir. The temptation of booty was so great that even
the refractory Andars and Tarakays joined the march.
Indeed, the Ghilzays were reported to show more zeal than
44the Burranis in fighting the Hazaras.
Fighting in the Hazarajat confronted the Amir with
many problems of which the main one was the despatch of
supplies. In general, the Amir was not short of supplies
and ammunition. The problem, however, was their safe
despatch to the forces in the field. Often, provisions
and ammunition with transport animals (camels, donkeys
45and ponies) were plundered by the Hazaras. As a result,
towards the end of the summer supplies became so scarce
in the camp of Qudus that his soldiers were compelled to
46live on parched wheat. Another difficulty was the
outbreak of cholera among the troops at the time of their 
47march in May, and its persistence till September. In 
some camps, this demoralised the troops, as a result of 
which a combined attack had to be deferred to a later date.^
43 Three isolated disturbances which were the outcome 
of oppressive rule took place, however, during the 
Hazara rising. In early 1892, the Sunni Hazaras of 
Herat revolted. Russian intrigue may have played a
part in this rising, (MM, May 1892, PSLI, 66, 877).
The Maimana tribal levies attacked the Amir’s
garrison at Maimana, (MM, July 1892, PSLI, 67, 275).
Also the Firozkohis of the Herat Province made 
disturbances. But all these disturbances were 
suppressed easily.
44 Note by Major J. Brown (G-overnor-General' s Agent, 
Baluchistan), Hand. D., 18 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1517.
45 KD, 8-10 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1296.
46 Sardar Qudus to Bivan Sadnan (Sarishta Bar of Kandahar), 
Hand. B., 13 Aug 1892, PSLI, 677"7657
47 KD, 21-24 May 1892, PSLI, 66, 1106.
48 MM, Sept 1892, PSLI, 68,
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Unquestionably, the Amir1s army had superior arms
to the knives, daggers, flint-lock guns, muskets and
about 300 rifles of the Hazaras, but at that time the
Government of India imposed an embargo on the supply of
arms to the Amir. Apparently the Government of India, did
not mean to assist the Hazaras against the Amir, but the
embargo actually proved advantageous to the Hazaras.
Ihe Amir was told that "...until the correspondence now
proceeding between him and the Government of India
regarding.... the frontier / i.e. the Durand Frontier^/
has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion, neither
the Hotchkiss guns nor any munition of war / which the
Amir had purchased in England^/ can be allowed to pass
49the frontier." Workshops in Kabul which the Amir had 
set up for the manufacture of munitions in 1887 were
SOtherefore ordered to work for twenty-four hours a day.
In 1891y these workshops produced, among other things,
5110 breech-loading rifles and one artillery gun a day.
Betxtfeen the annihilation of the combined forces in 
the early spring of 1892 and August, the rising had become 
general. With the exception of those Hazaras who lived 
close to Qalat and on the fringes of the Hazarajat, all 
other Hazaras had joined the rising by August. Hazara 
labourers x^ ho used to work in the main cities, including 
those who x^orked in India, returned to Uruzgan. The last
49 MM, Aug 1892, PSLI, 6 7 , 700.
50 MM, Aug 1892, PSLI, 67, 689.
51 PL, 8 Oct 1891, PSLI, 64, 756.
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main triles to join the rising -were the Behsud and 
Deh Zangi, Because of the assistance the Deh Zangi 
Hazaras had earlier given to Qudus in fighting the Uruzgan 
Hazaras, their elders Mir Ihrahim Beg, Wa’im Beg, Mir 
Mohammad Husayn Beg and G-hulam Shah Beg were given valuable 
presents in Paghman by the Amir, and sent back to the
52Hazarajat to influence the Hazaras to refrain from fighting.
But in the Hazarajat, they were compelled to join the 
55rising. Bever in the past had the Hazaras been so
united among themselves as they now were against the Amir.
In an assembly where the Hazaras were reported to have
arrived like '’swarms of bees", Timus Shah, a sayyed
descendant of Imam Musa Raza, was elected as their Khalifa
54for the purpose of religious war against the Amir. But
those who led the Hazaras in the fighting were Sardar
Mohammad 'Azim Khan Hazara and a chief known as Qazi
'Askar. In the overdramatised version of the Hazara war
written by Lady Hamilton, the Hazaras detested the "unholy
alliance"^ between the Amir and the British. The Hazaras
declared "We will fight for one true G-od, and his prophet,
56and for Ali against these Kafirs and allies of Kafirs'.
There is ample evidence to prove that the Hazaras were 
not against the British, but it was certainly true that 
they gave their struggle a religious cloak.
While fighting was going on, peace appeals were
52 ICD, 16-19 July 1892, PSLI, 67, 192.
55 KD, 50 July-2 Aug 1892, PSLI, 67, 417.
54 KD, 10 May 1892, PSLI, 66, 606.
55 Lady Hamilton, 51.
56 Lady Hamilton, 51.
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occasionally made but, except for a short interval, they
came to nothing. When the Hazaras rejected an earlier
appeal made by the Amir for their submission in return
for good treatment and pardon, the Amir became very
conciliatory. He addressed them as his children and said
that he did not want bloodshed between Muslims. Alternatively
the Amir proposed a 50-day truce to which the Hazaras 
57agreed. Whether the truce was observed for the whole
period is doubtful, but even a short truce may have helped
the tribal levies and the Hazaras in cutting their harvests.
When the Hazaras had the upper hand, they did not listen
to any proposals which Sardar ’Abd Allah, governor of
58
Kandahar, made to them. The peace ovei'tures were, in
fact, merely a device for gaining time. The Amir never
offered them a serious bargain. It is not surprising that
when the Uruzgan Hazaras, justifying their rising in self-
defence, asked for the Amir’s ’’justice and Magnanimity,”
the Amir demanded that the Hazaras should either kill the
ring-leaders or expel them from their land before he
59could extend them pardon.  ^ Of course such a proposal
could not be acceptable to the Hazaras. They were only
willing to accept such terms which would involve the
withdrawal of the troops from their land,^ but this was
61not acceptable to the Amir, who determined to subdue 
the Hazaras. Meanwhile, the simple-minded Hazaras, in 
view of their co-operation with the British in the past,
57 KD, 8-10 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1296.
58 Kand. D ., 16 July 1892, PSLI, 67, 325*
59 Herat Governor in Durbar, HD, 6 Aug 1892, PSLI, 67, 528.
60 MM, Sept 1892, PSLI, 68,
61 PD, 10 Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 348.
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were led "to believe that we /
62them.,,,.” in their struggle with the Amir. They
therefore asked for " ...the help of the British (Government
to prevent the Hazara tribe from being crushed'1 and in
return offered their co-operation with the British "in 
63every way,"  ^ But their request was left unanswered.
Perhaps the most difficult problem of the Hazara 
war is to describe military operations. An entirely 
accurate version of them seems impossible to give. The 
difficulty arises from the lack of knowledge of the 
Hazarajat and of the Hazaras at the time of the operations 
and of the control over the movements of newswriters.
The information collected by the British Hews Agents in 
Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and by the Commissioner of Peshawar 
is therefore confused and contradictory. The clearest 
account seems to be that of Mir Husayn Beg, the elder of 
the Sultan Mohammad tribe of Uruzgan. Mir Husayn Beg 
led his tribe throughout the war against the Amir’s 
troops until he was treacherously captured by Sardar ’Abd 
Allah Khan, but escaped to India in disguise. As is 
understandable, he speaks mainly of the gallantry, 
successes of the Hazaras and the defeats and losses they 
inflicted on the Amir’s troops.
The plan of advance on the Hazarajat was made by 
the Amir himself. In accordance with this plan, the
the British 7 would help
62 Major J. Brown to Secretary to G-overnment of India, 
11 Apr 1894, PSLI, 74, 547.
63 MM, Sept 1892, PSLI, 68,
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Hazarajat was attacked from the sides of Turkistan, Kabul, 
Ghazni, Herat and Kandahar. On the approach of these 
forces at Daya, and Folad under Sipah Salar G-hulam Haydar 
Orakzay, Sardar Qudus, Colonel Ferhad Khan, and !Ata 
Mohammad Khan, the Hazaras of Folad, Daya, Deh Zangi, Deh 
Kondi, Jaghori, Kaimsan, and others, except those of the 
Uruzgan, surrendered. About 9,000 of the Uruzgan Hazaras 
marched to Daya to meet the forces there. While they were 
engaged in battle at Daya, a detachment of the Amir1s 
cavalry was despatched to Folad. This detachment cut off 
all communications between the fighting Hazaras and the 
Hazaras in Uruzgan. The fighting Hazaras then moved on 
to Folad inhere, in the severest battle that followed, the 
casualties on the side of the Amir's army was reported to 
be about 2,000. No figure on the Hazara Bide was reported, 
although Mir Husayn Beg admits that the Hazaras were so 
pressed that they had no alternative but to retreat to 
Uruzgan.
In Uruzgan, the Hazaras then moved their families 
to remote areas. The battle with the Amir’s forces 
continued for five days.^ Mir Husayn Beg does not 
mention the outcome of these battles, but reports from 
other sources which might refer to these battles speak 
of the great losses of the Hazaras. In the words of the 
Amir "...51 skirmishes took place before the country 
Uruzgan?^ was r e t a k e n . A c c o r d i n g  to the Amir, the
64 Mir Husayn Beg, 11 Apr 1894, PSLI, 74, 548.
65 Amir in darbar, KD, 21-25 Sept 1892, PSLI, 68, 105-
f
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Hazaras, after suffering considerable losses, were 
eventually reduced by force.^ Mir Husayn Beg maintains 
that the final victory was gained by treachery. The 
fact was that the Hazaras were outnumbered by the troops 
and the tribal levies and they suffered a series of 
setbacks from about July onwards as was evidenced by the 
large number of their prisoners continually being sent 
on to Kabul. Seeing that their position was desperate, 
the Hazaras accepted the offer of peace although, in 
fact, it was military power which forced them to do so. 
But with the approach of the winter, further military 
operations were suspended. Since there were no adequate 
quarters in the Hazarajat, most of the troops and tribal 
levies were withdrawn by November. Only General Sher 
Mohammad Khan, with a portion of the troops, remained in 
Uruzgan.
The apparently quiet winter was followed by a stormy 
spring, when some, if not all, the Hazaras resumed 
fighting. This time the Hazaras of the Koh-i-Baba area, 
where no garrison had been left, rose first. Although 
the Amir minimised the seriousness of this rising, yet 
it was quite clear that the Hazarajat was difficult to 
pacify unless its leading men were crushed and a large 
force permanently stationed there. Since the disturbed 
area this time was in the northern Hazarajat, the Amir 
ordered the speedy despatch of regular troops and tribal
66 Mir Husayn Beg, 11 Apr 1894, PSLI, 74, 548.
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levies from Kabul, Tagao, Logar, Maimana, Herat and 
Turkistan. As before, the Turkistan forces were led by 
Sipah Salar Orakzay, but the Kabul forces x^ere led by 
General Amir Mohammad Khan of Tagao, Soon, the initial 
success of the Hazaras in Deh Zangi in April was followed 
by a series of defeats in the Yakawlang to the west of 
Bamian by the Sipah Salar and in the Deh Zangi by General 
Amir Mohammad Khan. Perhaps the last decisive battle 
was won by the General over the Hazara forces led by 
Ghulam Husayn, son of Mir Mohammad Amin of the Behsud, on 
the bank of the Helmand river between Deh Zangi and 
Behsud, where the Hazaras were routed leaving about 250 
dead behind. Although towards the end of June 1893
67the General claimed that all the Hazaras had submitted,
the Hazaras were still far from being crushed. However,
because of their weakness, the Hazaras were unable to
offer battles in the open. Instead they resorted to
guerrilla tactics and surprise attacks at night until
68
they were finally subdued in September 1893•
Military conquest was followed by the usual practice
69of demolishing fortresses and removing arms. For 
administrative purposes, the Amir had already appointed
70hakims in the various districts of the Hazarajat in 1891-
67 General Amir Mohammad to Amir, KD, 28-30 June 1893,
PSLI, 70, 1811.
68 MM, Sept 1893, PSLI, 72, 257*
69 Reportedly 13,000 horses, 16,000 rifles / flint-locks?_/ 
(KD, 16-19 Sept 1893, PSLI, 72, 374), 25,000 rifles
Z flint-locks or musketbJ  (Sardar Qudus to British 
Agent, KD, 4-7 Mar 1893, PSLI, 69, 1443) were brought 
■fco Kabul.
70 KD, 12-14 Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 417.
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After the pacification of the Hazaras, he appointed
71Qazis and muftis as well. For the maintenance of law
and order, nine Hazara elders led by Sulaiman, son of
Host Mohammad, entered into an Magreement1’ with the Amir,
undertaking to hand over wicked Hazaras to the hakims as
well as arms and weapons which may be found in the
72
possession of the Hazaras. Whether increased revenue 
was assessed is doubtful. The earlier assessment was in 
line with the assessment in the rest of the country. But 
Uruzgan had been almost desolated and its colonisation by 
Pashtuns was stressed. The Amir asked the Hurranis and 
Ahmadzay G-hilzays to send 12,000^ and 4,000 families^ 
respectively to Uruzgan for permanent settlement there. 
Later, the Hazaras of Malistan, Heh Zangi, Ajristan and 
Uruzgan left their homes en masse to emigrate to Meshed 
and Quetta because of their extreme poverty. The Amir 
then announced that anyone wishing to settle in their 
places would be welcomed by being exempted from revenue 
for the first year, and allowed to pay at a lower rate7
in the future, ^
The prisoners of war on both sides were treated 
brutally. The treatment of the Hazara prisoners is 
recorded in detail. The total number of these prisoners 
who arrived at Kabul between July 1892 and June 1894 and 
recorded by the British Agent was 8,755* Judging from
71 KD, 5-5 Jan 1894, PSLI, 75, 541.
72 KD, 5 July 1895, PSLI, 81, Ho. 25 (5). 
75 MM, Hov 1892, PSLI, 68, 828.
74 Kand. U., 6 Jan 1895, PSLI, 69, 627*
75 KD, 2 June 1895, PSLI, 80, Ho. 21.
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the subsequent reports in Kabul, the actual number may 
have been higher. The Amir chose 50 beautiful girls and 
women to work in his household as suratis (concubines).
He also selected young sons of the mirs of the Hazaras 
and made them his ghulam bachas (page boys). Sardar Qudus 
was reported to have married 21 wives, presumably concubines, 
from the Hazaras* The rest of the Amir’s high officials 
chose Hazaras from among the prisoners, to serve them or
ryrj
to offer to friends as presents. Similarly, all leaders
of the tribal levies had their share of the Hazara
prisoners* In Kandahar, the Amir’s soldiers seized all
those Hazaras who had submitted, claiming that they were 
7ft
their booty. Other prisoners were sold by auction.
The price fixed for a young man or woman was 100 rupees,
and for a person of 12 years of age, 50 rupees, and for
79one under 12 years of age 3.0 rupees. The auctions
continued till June 1894, but at a reduced price because
the Hazara slaves were so plentiful that there were no
80buyers to be found for them.
Mirs and elderly Hazaras were killed in many ways. 
Between November 1893 and February 1894, over 150 prisoners 
were either made targets and shot dead by soldiers, or 
blown from guns. Others were blinded and afterwards put
81to death. Some were hanged and others died in the jails.
76 KD, 11 Apr 1893, PSLI, 70, 341.
77 Lady Hamilton, 239*
78 Kand. D., 6 Jan 1893, PSLI, 69, 627*
79 KD, 13-15 July 1892, PSLI, 67, 187*
80 Lady Hamilton, 236.
81 Bi-MM, Nov~Dec 1893, PSLI, 73, 161.
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Still, in the middle of 1894, there were about 5,000 left 
in jails. Because they were fed by the G-overnment, the 
prisoners were a financial burden. The Amir, therefore, 
instructed the Kabul Kotwal to "Take out of the jail 
15 men every night, putting halters on their necks in 
the same manner as one would treat dogs, and put them 
to death so that we may get rid of them. Sell their
82wives and children in the bazaar by public auction."
Apparently there were still many left and it was reported
that in April 1895 over 1,000 of them were released and
85others were to be released later.
The Amir1s reason for subjugating the Uruzgan Hazaras
84
and others was their refusal to accept his sovereignty,
In particular, they persisted in robbing caravans, passing 
through or near their territory. They also constituted 
a potential source of disloyalty to the state, because of
85their readiness to join foreigners against "Afghanistan".
They were therefore considered to be a standing menace to
the internal security and existence of Afghanistan. In
the Amir’s view with "...the extension of the British and
86
Russian territory on either side of Afghanistan," the 
pacification of the Hazaras was a necessity at that time. 
That because of the feud with the Sunnis, the Hazaras 
were a factor in disturbing the internal peace was no
82 Amir to Mohammad Husayn (Kabul Kotwal), KD, 6-8 June 1894? 
PSLI, 75, 132.
83 KD, 23 Apr 1895, PSLI, 79, No. 15-
84 Mahomed, S., 1, 279.
85 Mahomed, S., 1, 276.
86 Amir's firman, Kand. D., 10 Aug 1891, PSLI, 63, 1294.
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doubt true, but as the Hazarajat was surrounded on all 
sides by the Amir’s territory, it was impossible for any 
foreign power to annex it without invading Afghanistan.
The Amir spread this view of the Hazarajat being a danger 
to Afghanistan to justify his own invasion of it. The 
participants were prompted by the promised loot of the 
Hazaras, their property and their land. The Hazara war 
had all the elements of a foreign war. It was for these 
reasons that for the first time all the Sunni population 
rallied to the Amir. It increased his power and prestige, 
and infused a sense of unity among his subjects*
All Hazaras, except the Hazaras in Uruzgan, had 
accepted the Amir’s rule, yet the rising happened. There 
were, in fact, three risings, or three stages of a major 
rising, each caused by apparently different factors. It 
would be proper to look for these causes separately. 
Throughout the eighties, incidents among the Hazaras were 
isolated in nature. Disturbances among the Sheikh Ali 
and the Jaghoris were caused by entirely different factors. 
Among the rest of the Hazaras except the Uruzgan Hazaras, 
the Amir’s attempts at peaceful penetration were successful. 
He even made use of elders of Behsud and Deh Zangi tribes 
in winning over the other tribes. They paid his revenue 
and taxes. What, however, is not known is the method of 
tax collection, whether it was direct through government 
tax collectors, or indirect, as before, through Hazara 
elders. Departure from the conventional method of tax 
collection was likely to cause disturbances, especially 
among the Deh Zangi Hazaras whose mirs (elders of clans) 
alone owned the arable land. But there is no report of
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any disturbance among them in the eighties. Even the 
Hazaras in Uruzgan surrendered on terms.
It was after the peaceful invasion of Uruzgan that 
the rising became general and spread with remarkable 
speed throughout the whole of the Hazarajat in the summer 
of 1892. According to the Amir, it was the mujtahids of 
the Hazaras who were at the bottom of the rising. They 
gave out that the Amir intended to interfere with their 
ShiHite faith by having sent Sunni Qazis to the Hazarajat, 
who preached Islam and administered justice according to 
the Sunni Mohammadan law. The Amir officially rejected 
the view that the rising was caused by the misconduct of
his soldiers, but in a private darbar he admitted it to
88 " be so. The Amir1s view is further weakened by the
apparent fact that, before 1892, he had not appointed
Qazis in Uruzgan. In all probability, the Amir spread
this view to mobilise religious opinion against the
Hazaras.
The rising, in fact, was caused by the attempt by
the soldiery to disarm the Hazaras, collect revenue, and
take their women. In the long winter of Uruzgan, the
troops had no separate quarters for themselves. Of the
10,000 troops, some made 11 Qal’as (fortified villages)
89for themselves alone and turned away the inhabitants,
87 Amir to British Agent, KD, 29 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1676.
88 Amir to military officers in a private darbar,
KD, 8-10 June 1892, PSLI, 66, 1296.
89 Mir Husayn Beg, 11 Apr 1894? PSLI, 74, 547.
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while others scattered in different Qal’ as and lived with 
the Hazaras, Some soldiers married Hazara women* while
90others raped women and girls whom they found attractive.
When told that the Hazaras rose because Sherin Jan, a
91daughter of a Mir, was forcibly sent for by an officer,
the Amir cited the Persian saying, ,fIn sherini aez talkhi
bud I” - ’’This bitterness prising} because of the
92sweetness” , referring to Sherin which means ”sweet” .
Beside insulting their women, the soldiery pressed the 
Hazaras hard for supplies. What the Hazaras resented most 
was the survey of their lands for assessment of revenue, 
and the attempts to disarm them. These measures were in 
violation of the agreement concluded with the Hazaras, In 
1895 > an additional factor was the fetwa of the mujtahids of 
Meshed who declared ” ..,a religious war against Afghan
93Sunnis to be lawful and worthy of the martyr’s reward.”
The persecution of the Shi’ite population of Afghanistan 
which started with the rising and accelerated, with the 
fetwa of the Meshed mu,j tahids, had far-reaching consequences. 
Its echoes reached Persia, England and India, and caused a 
futile correspondence on the subject.
90 Two Hazaras to British Agent, KB, 21-24 May 1892,
PSLI, 66, 1103®
91 Brigadier ’Abd al-Subhan to Amir, KD, 28-30 Sept 1892, 
PSLI, 68, 200.
92 Lady Hamilton’s book is a dramatisation of the story of 
this girl, but she gives her name as Gul Begum, whom she 
makes a daughter of G-hulam Husayn, Chief Adviser or
”Vizier” to a Mir, presumably of Uruzgan. Sherin Jan 
was a daughter of this Mir, but according to Brigadier 
’Abd al-Subhan, her father was either Qazi Mir ’Askar 
or Mohammad Azim, the two leading figures of the rising.
93 MM, Apr 1893, PSLI, 70, 395®
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Among the Shi1ite population of Afghanistan there
94were some 50,000 Turcomans and. Persians* They were
collectively known as the Qizilbashes and consisted of
Juanshirs, Kurds, Rikas, Afshar, Bakhtiaris, Shah Sewans,
Talishes, Bayats, and others. The Qizilbashes lived in
the cities of Kabul (also in its suburbs), Kandahar,
Herat and Mazar. In the city of Kabul, the Qizilbashes
were the most powerful and influential body in the early
part of the nineteenth century* They occupied one half
of the city and the fortified quarter of Chandawal was
exclusively theirs. They x^ere encouraged initially to
live in Afghanistan by Nadir Shah Afshar, and were actually
settled there by Ahmad Shah under whom and his successors
they formed the principal portion of the Ghulam Khanas 
/ \ 95
(the household troops). They also had influence with 
the Barakzay rulers, because they held mainly clerical 
posts with the Government. But with 1Abd al“Rahman they 
lost favour, firstly because of their support of the 
British in the Anglo-Afghan wars, and secondly for their 
support of the late Amir Sher ?Ali.
Because of a common faith, language and feud with 
the Sunnis, the Qizilbashes were closely connected with 
the Hazaras. They were both in contact with the Shi’ite 
population of Persia, especially with those in Meshed
94 IGA, 25* Other estimates of numbers of Qizilbashes 
are: 100,000 (MRA, 111), 150,000 (Mac&reeor, 32).
Both estimates seem very high for the Qizilbashes.
95 Masson, C., Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan* 
Afghanistan, and the Panjab, 1826-1838, Vol. 2, London 
1842, 297*
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where they used to, and still, undertake pilgrimages to 
the shrine of Imam Musa Raza.
Although there is no evidence to suggest that the
Qizilbashes had supported the Hazaras in their rising,
the Amir implicated them with it. He called them ftenemies
96to the Afghan state” and spared no effort in inciting
the anti-ShiTite feelings among the Sunnis, In addition
to the confiscation of property and the imprisonment of
some leading Qizilbashes, the Amir persecuted them
religiously. The Qizilbashes of Kandahar*^ and Herat
were ordered to embrace Sunnism. Reports are unanimous
that this order was vigorously enforced. In Kabul, after
compelling the Qizilbashes to wear only red turbans, the
Amir also forced them to agree that they would no longer
qq
practise the Shi1ite faith, but only the Surma,
Consequently the Shi’ite population of Persia was 
greatly excited.
Towards the end of April 1893? the mu.jtahids of Meshed, 
led by Sheikh Mohammad Taqi, declared war against the 
Sunnis of Afghanistan. The fetwa was finally issued when 
the Shah of Persia had twice failed to stop the persecutions. 
In late 1892, the Shah had sent an urgent remonstrance 
to London in regard to the persecution of the Shi1as in 
Afghanistan.^^ Instructed by London, the Viceroy wrote
96 Amir in darbar, KD, 5-8 Mar 1892, PSLI, 65? 1150.
97 Kand. P., 13 Jan 1893? PSLI, 69, 628.
98 HD, 15 Sept 1892, PSLI, 68, 194.
99 KD, 24 Oct 1896, PSLI, F.L. Ho. 3167-F (1896), 89- 
100 Viceroy to Amir, 19 Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 335-
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to the Amir that "It would he a great advantage if Your
Highness were to authorise me to contradict these reports.
But the Amir adopted an uncompromising attitude, arguing
that "I gave instructions for the punishment of my
rebellious Shiah Sic_7* subjects, who are ryots £ Sic_7
of Afghanistan and sentenced them to death, imprisonment,
102and banishment according to their respective deserts." 
Further he wrote that "...should it be known that the 
Shah of Persia and his Mullas entertain a thought of 
interfering with the subjects of Afghanistan, the Sunnis 
of Afghanistan will.....render a good account of the 
matter without aid from the Sunnis of Turkey." The
Viceroy then dropped the subject altogether. From the 
displacement of the Hazaras and the persecution of the 
Qizilbashes, it is clear that, like hadir Shah in Persia, 
the Amir also wished to make his Muslim subjects adhere 
only to the Sunni faith of Islam, and thus bring religious 
unity among them.
101 Ibid.
102 Amir to Viceroy, 27 Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 1053*
103 Amir to Viceroy, 27 Oct 1892, PSLI, 68, 1053»
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Chapter 8 
The Conquest of Kafiristan
Kafiristan, a region in the north-east of Afghanistan* 
had remained independent for centuries. Its inhabitants, 
the Kafirs, had repulsed attempts by many rulers who 
tried to subdue them. In the eighties, Amir ’Abd al-Rahman, 
on several occasions, decided to pacify them but, because 
of various risings elsewhere, this project was postponed. 
Indeed, he pursued a policy of conciliating the Kafirs 
with impressive presents. The Kafirs, themselves hard 
pressed by their zealous Muslim neighbours, looked to the 
Amir for protection. This facilitated the Kafir conversion 
to Islam. But in the mid-nineties, when Russia occupied 
the Pamir and British India brought Chitral under control 
(two regions close to Kafiristan), the Amir considered 
a rapid military conquest of Kafiristan a necessity. In 
the spring of 1896, this was accomplished. Many roads 
were built. The Kafirs were converted to Islam. Many 
were removed to other provinces.
Kafiristan, a hilly region of about 5,000 square 
miles, consists of an irregular series of deep, narrow 
and tortuous valleys. It is bounded by the Hindu Kush 
in the north; Chitral in the east; the Kunar valley in 
the south; and the valleys of Panjsher, Nijrao and Tagao 
in the west. Despite the high altitude and the rugged 
nature of the land, communication with the whole of the 
region is possible through the valleys of Alishang,
Alingar, Pech, Bashgul and MinJan which lead to the 
interior of Kafiristan. But during the winter, Kafiristan 
is practically converted into a number of isolated
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communities with no means of inter-communication.
In 1891 the Kafirs, who dwelt in two- or three-storeyed
2wooden houses in large villages, may have numbered 52,500.
The Kafirs had no common name for themselves. For one thing, 
except for religion they had no common bonds. The commonest 
name, Kafir (infidel), given to them by their Muslim neigh­
bours, is too general to be of academic use. Chroniclers, 
Muslims and non-Muslims, have classified them by their dress 
rather than ethnic identity. Hence their division into two 
main groups of Sia Posh (black-robed.) and Safed Posh (white- 
robed) . But in view of linguistic and customary differences 
inside each group, this differentiation is misleading. The 
Kafirs, according to Robertson, were divided into tribal 
communities and each community into three distinct groups.
1 McNair, Exploration in Eastern Afghanistan, Kafiristan, 
1883, 36-46, PSLI, 44, 1208, Bellew, H.W., An Inquiry 
into the Ethnography of Afghanistan. London, 1891, 
143-148. Robertson, G.S., Kafiristan and its People, 
London, 1895, - , The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush. London, 
1896. Wilber, D.N., Afghanistan. GAK, 237-259.
2 Robertson, GAK, pt 4, 250. Other estimates:- 
Amir’s Agent sent to Kafiristan, PD, 9 Nov 1891,
PSLI, 64, 1171 - 44,000
McNair, 39 (1883) - 35,000
G-AK, pt 4, 250 (1910) - 60,000
3 Robertson, Sir George Scott (1852-1916). Anglo-Indian 
Administrator. Educated Westminster Hospital Medical 
School. Entered Indian Medical Service 1878. Served 
with Kabul field force at Kabul 1879-80. Surgeon at 
Gilgit Agency 1889. Travelled over a year in Kafiristan 
1890-91. British Agent at Gilgit 1893. Besieged at 
Chitral with a force, 1895* L British Agent, Chitral, 
1895-99 ?_/ Retired and returned to England 1899*
Liberal M.P. 1906. He was the first European to visit 
parts of Kafiristan (Bashgal valley, upper parts of the 
Pesh valley up to Minjan). Though he could not speak any 
of the Kafir languages, his writings are the major source 
of information on Kafiristan, on the eve of its conquest.
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Tribal Kafirs were the Katirs, Muman, Kam, Presun,
4Wai, and Ashkun. The Katirs with its subdivisions of
Ramgul, Kulam, Kti and Katirgulis were larger than all
other tribes put together. The Katirs, Muman and Kam
(all of the Siah Posh group) spoke one language, Kati,
with local variations, while others spoke Waiguli, Presun 
5and Ashkun. The latter languages, spoken by the Safed
Posh Kafirs, were mutually unintelligible. But all
languages belonged to the Dardic group of the Indo™
6European family.
Other groups consisted of the slaves and poor freemen. 
The poor freemen were a small number of detribalised Kafirs, 
who owned no land or cattle, and maintained themselves 
by being hired, mainly as shepherds. Slaves, who were the 
property of individuals not of the community, were either 
artisans or domestics. Among the slaves the position of 
the domestic slaves was better. But all slaves were liable 
to be bought and sold. On the other hand, members of the 
artisan slaves were allowed to be elected as members of 
the magistracy of the community because of their intimate 
knowledge of their own group. The artisan slaves could 
also own property. The three groups, in fact, corresponded 
to three classes which formed each community.
4 Every tribe had three or four names. I have used the 
names current among the Kafirs themselves, giving 
other names only in brackets.
5 Wilber, 51*
6 Grierson, Sir Or.A,, The Linguistic Survey of India and 
the Census of 1911. Calcutta, 1919, 68.
7 Robertson mentions another group of Kafirs as a 
separate " classff, The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush. 85* 
There is no reason why these Kafirs should not be 
included among the tribal Kafirs.
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Since only tribal Kafirs owned land and cattle (the 
two main sources of livelihood) and were in the great 
majority, they were dominant, economically and politically. 
Among them it was the wealthy heads of clans (those with 
numerous relatives) who were the political representatives 
of each community, The tribal Kafirs were the main 
moulders of their history. But on the eve of its conquest, 
Kafir society was on the verge of disintegration, and some 
of the conflicting tendencies within the society were 
perhaps more conspicuous then than at any time before.
To begin with, the tribes had feuds among; themselves. 
Even the subdivisions of the Katirs were at war with each 
other. In the absence of a common arbitrating authority, 
some of these wars had continued for generations. As 
land was scarce and production insufficient, cattle 
robbery was common. This was the commonest cause of the 
intra-tribal wars. The bitterness of the intra-tribal wars 
can be illustrated by the fact that a tribe was always ready 
to ask the help of Muslims against an enemy Kafir tribe, 
a factor which helped the penetration of Islam, and of 
the authority of the Amir in Kafiristan.
8Although religion was the only common bond among the 
Kafirs, it was on religious grounds that Kafir society was 
disintegrating. The Kafir religion had two main character­
istics. First, Kafir gods and goddesses, which were 
numerous, were believed to protect the Kafirs, their
8 For religion of the Kafirs, see The Kafirs of the 
Hindu Kush, 376,
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villages, crops and cattle from the enemies. Secondly,
worship required sacrifices of cows and goats to gods on
frequent occasions. To remain a Kafir was indeed costly.
Among the Kafirs of the Bashgul valley, older Kafirs were
9devout hut the younger generation was sceptical. Conversion
to Islam among them was therefore frequent. If a son
believed that his father had treated him unjustly, he would
10turn Muslim for some time. inside the Bashgul valley,
all the inhabitants of two hamlets of Agatsi and Agaru had
11turned Muslim. Similarly among the Wai (occupying a 
side valley to the left of the long valley of Pech with a
12population of 5 ?5 0 0 ), conversion was general and bloodless.
Perhans the greatest number of the new converts to Islam
13
were in the "numerous villages" of Kafirs on the fringes 
of Kafiristan. These converts, locally known as the 
"sheikhs" were,the main source of contact with neighbouring 
Muslims. But the Presun who, with a population of 5?000, 
occupied the upper part of the Pech valley in the interior 
of Kafiristan, were loyal to their faith. The Katirs of 
Ramgul and Kulam, with a population of 18,000 and 3,000 
respectively, may also have been religious, as they showed 
considerable opposition to their conversion in 1896. The 
Kulam lived in the interior and the Ramgul in the west of 
Kafiristan. On the whole, a considerable degree of 
religious tolerance was observed among the Kafirs, as was 
evidenced from their maintaining kinship relationships
9 Ibid, 379.
10 Kafiristan and its People. 26.
11 Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, 72.
12 Ibid, 73.
13 Ibid, 73.
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with the new converts* The Kafir antagonism with Muslims
14was "...one of race, not of religion".
The main channel of contact with Muslims was trade,
carried hy pedlars in time of peace. The Kafirs carried
the greater part of their external trade through the
Muslim villages on the frontiers, especially in Eunar and 
ISMinjan. They also traded with Chitralis. Muslims from
Peshawar and Badakhshan entered Kafiristan. The Min^anis
travelled into all districts of Kafiristan except Kamdesh."^
Similarly, the people of Kunar took their goods to the
17neighbouring Kafirs. Although the Amir had prohibited
the slave trade in Kafir "girls, it still continued^ even
19after their pacification in 1896. The Kafirs exchanged 
their ghee, hides, goats, wool, sheep, honey and walnuts 
for woollen robes, cotton cloth, salt, iron, gunpowder 
and match-locks.
The Kafirs maintained relationships with the Muslims 
on two levels, individual and tribal. In the Kunar 
district, every Kafir had a "brother" who protected him 
from other Kafirs. In return, the Kafir supplied his
20"brother" with food and lodging whenever called upon.
Many families of Bashgul Kafirs had Muslim blood relations
14 Holdich, Colonel Sir T.H., The Indian Borderland 
1880-1900, London, 1901, 276. Holdich was chief 
surveyor attached to the Mohmand Boundary Commission.
15 Kafiristan and its People, 53.
16 OAK, pt 4, 257.
17 Kafiristan and its People, 54.
18 8 Jan 1890, PStl,' 59,' 165.
19 G-AIC, pt 4, 257-
20 Kafiristan and its People, 9*
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21in the Luthko valley, or Chitral or Kunar*" But this is 
not to suggest that Kafir-Muslim relationships were 
basically friendly. In fact, they were composed of 
antagonism and war. The Kafirs were '’...incessantly 
robbing, blackmailing; or murdering on the frontier unless
22completely overawed by the power of some particular chief.
In raiding Muslim territories, they had some particular
object of plunder in mind."' Their feud with Muslims was
fully sanctioned by their religion, as it was interpreted
by their high priest (Utah) who often led these expeditions
in person. It is interesting to note that, among their
numerous gods, the god of war (G-ish) was second only to
the god of creation (Imra), and that, upon returning from
a successful raid, a Kafir was given the welcome of a
hero. The Muslims, too, made similar raids upon the
Kafirs. The ambition to become a ghazi and exact tribute
24
actuated many Muslim chiefs who raided Kafiristan. War
with the Kafirs was profitable because victories brought
25Kafir girls to be sold as slaves. Also, many of their
attacks on Kafiristan were in revenge for murdered
26relations and plundered caravans. The acquisition of
land, especially grazing land, was also a strong stimulant.
Sultan Mahmud of Grhazna (998-1030) may have been the 
first Muslim ruler to attack the Kafirs who are "...a
21 Ibid, 13.
22 The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush. 566.
23 Kafiristan and its People, 62.
24 The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, 566.
25 Ed, 8 Jan 1890,' tS'L'1, 59, 1 S5 .
26 The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, 566.
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27remnant of the original population of their area"
28and who refused " •••to embrace Islam" in the early part
of the eleventh century. Mahmud1s example was followed
by Timur (1370-1405)^ and by Muslim princes of Turkistan,
30among; them of Bokhara in the fifteenth century. In
the early part of the sixteenth century, Babur had a
small encounter with the ICafirs in the Kunar valley.
During the Maghul period in India, noted expeditions
against the Kafirs were carried out in the reign of Akbar
(1556-1605) when the Kafirs of Tagao, Nijrao and Laghman
31were forcibly converted to Islam. The Kafirs of the
Pech, Kunar and Laghman /“? 7 were converted durin.fr the
32
reign of the Emperor Jihangir (1605-1627). Ho mention
is made of similar attempts when the Maghul empire was
in decline. Likewise there is no mention of any attempts
by Hadir Shah, Ahmad Shah or Timur Shah during whose
reigns Kafiristan remained independent, like an island
in one corner of their empire. During the first half of
the nineteenth century, Kafiristan seems to have been
away from attention at all. However, in 1874 attempts
33for its conquest had been made by Amir Sher ’ Ali, but 
no details of them are available.
The Kafirs did not present a serious problem to Amir 
’Abd al-Rahman in the eighties, Beither was the Amir
27 Wilber, 50.
28 Kafiristan and its People, 2.
29 McHair, 38.
30 G-AK, 245*
31 Rahim, M . , Sifat Bama-i-Dervesh Mohammad Khan Ghaai. 
1288 A.H., Islamabod, (Laghman), introduction and 
annotation by Scarcia G-., Rome, 1965? 74.
32 G-AK, 246.
33 Viceroy Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr 1896, PSLI, P.L., 
Ho. 77 (96), 85.
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prepared to conquer Kafiristan, as he was preoccupied 
with other tribes. However, minor expeditions in 
western and south-eastern Kafiristan were occasionally 
made against the Kafirs by tribal levies and troops.
It would be convenient to trace the events on the two 
fronts separately.
The Russian occupation of Panjdeh In 1884 made the
situation of Kafiristan serious, perhaps for the first
time, in the eyes of the Amir, as he thought the Russians
84looked upon the Kafirs as " ...their auxiliary force1’ 
in the event of their occupying Afghanistan. Since the 
Amir* s troops had been removed from the Kunar to the 
Shinwar, military operations against the Kafirs of south­
east Kafiristan could not be undertaken. The Amir lent 
his official blessing to the jehad movement of Mulla 
Khalil, and the Khan of Asmar who, ever since the British 
withdrawal from Afghanistan, had led a jehad against the 
Kafirs. In 1886 the Mulla was able to occupy three 
villages of Kambir /“ G-ambir?/, Kattar and Dayuz belonging 
to the Katir who occupied a valley probably to the east
of Asmar. Shinwarays and Salarzays were settled in the
85conquered villages. The pressure on the Kafirs 
increased when the Amir feared that "...the British 
Government intend to annex Kafiristan." This folloxfed 
an unsuccessful request by the Government of India to 
permit a party led by Colonel W. Lockhart to enter
34 Amir to Col. Afzal, KD, 17 Mar 1885, PSLI, 44, 740.
35 ED, 23 July 1886, PSLI, 47, 1191.
36 MM, Apr 1886, PSLI, 47, 77.
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Kafiristan via Badakhshan to make themselves "...acquainted 
with the nature of the ground of KafiristanJT"." ^  The 
year before, an attempt by the Colonel to enter Kafiristan 
without the knowledge of the Amir had been thwarted by 
the Katirs of the Bashgul valley. But because of the 
subsequent risings of the G-hilzays, of Mohammad Ishaq, 
and of the Hazaras, the Amir was unable to pacify the 
Kafirs until the early nineties. However, from 1886 
onwards, with the additional increased activity of Mulla 
Khalil, the Amir tried to influence the Kafirs by 
impressive presents. This aspect will be discussed later.
By 1890, the movement of Mulla Khalil had become 
fairly widespread. He had about 400 other mullas in his 
camp. Mulla Najm al-Din also sent him his followers.
Tribal levies of about 1,500 Salarzays, Mohmands and the 
Shinwarays of Shigal might have joined together also, as 
the area of their operations was the same as those which
70
were under attack by Mulla Khalil, but it is not certain
whether the operations were led by him. What is certain
is that the Kafirs, probably the Kafirs to the east of
Asmar, were frightened of this new danger. They appealed
to the Amir for protection and 1 submitted11 to his authority.
The tribes were dispersed, and a fine of 2,000 rupees
was imposed on them for their attacks "...on the subjects 
40
of the Amir." After 1892, Mulla Khalil, on instructions
37 M, Durand to Amir, 22 June 1886, PSLI, 47, 1027.
38 MM, May 1891, PSLI, 63, 496.
39 Ibid.
40 PD, 13 June 1891, PSLI, 63, 625.
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from the Amir, disengaged himself from activities against 
the Kafirs and tried to incite the Salarzays and Mohmands 
against TJmra Khan of Jandol.
In south-east Kafiristan, another source threatening
the Kafirs was Umra Khan of Jandol, who revived the
centuries old practice of ,jehad against the Kam in the
late eighties. The Kam Kafirs occupied the lower part of
the Bashgul valley close to Dir and Bajaur. Umra Khan
intended to suhdue the Kafirs and exact revenue from them,
hut he failed to impress them by peaceful overtures.^
When Umra Khan contemplated sending a large tribal combi-
42nation against the Kam, the latter and Aman al=Mulk,
the Mehtar of Chitral, entered into an agreement with the
rival faction of Umra Khan led by Mohammad Sharif Khan,
of Dir, and Shah Baba, the noted religious leader of Dir.
43The Kam undertook to refrain from murdering travellers.
The large-scale invasion of Kam by Umra Khan does not 
seem to have taken place, but in 1891 he succeeded in 
occupying Narsat (Bari), a village of Kam on the left 
bank of the Kunar river.
After Umra Khan had expelled Mohammad Sharif Khan
from Dir, and weakened the position of Safdar Khan
considerably, he again invited the tribes to attack the
AA
Kam, but their action was anticipated by the Kafirs. *
The Kam had never before invaded the territory of Umra
41 PD, 27 June 1889, PSLI, 57, 966.
42 PD, 10 Sept 1889, PSLI, 58, 250.
43 Ibid.
44 PD, 23 Nov 1892, PSLI, 68, 703.
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Khan, Now they did so, because the balance of power had
changed considerably. After the pacification of the
Shinwarays in 1892, the Amir’s troops were removed from
the Shinwar, first to Chaga Serai, and then to Asmar,
from where the Sipah Salar incited the Kam to invade the
45territory of Umra Khan. In the early part of 1894,
when, as a result of the Durand Agreement, Kafiristan
was, by implication, recognised by the G-overnment of India
as a part of Afghanistan, the Sipah Salar warned Umra
Khan to leave the Kafirs alone.^ But, believing that
47m  Kafiristan his claim was ’’superior” to that of the
Amir and the Mehtar of Chetral, Umra Khan was still
preparing a grand invasion of Kafiristan. He only gave
up his planned invasion when the G-overnment of India
48prevented him from carrying it out.
Their loss of confidence in the Mehtar also caused
the Kam to lean towards the Amir. Traditionally not only
the Kam but all the inhabitants of the Bashgul valley
looked on the Mehtar as their suzerain. They offered him
presents on various occasions, but these presents were not
a fixed revenue. The Mehtar was not in a position to
administer the affairs of the Kafirs, though he usually
allied himself x^ith the Kam in their feud with other 
49Kafirs. But in 1890, relations between the Mehtar and
45 PD, 24 July 1893, PSLI, 71,
46 PD, 8 Jan 1894, PSLI, 73, 208.
47 Umra Khan to Mehtar, PD, 8 Jan 1894, PSLI, 73, 208.
48 Secretary to Government of India to Umra Khan,
30 Mar 1894, PD, 9 May 1894, PSLI, 7 4 , 711.
49 Kafiristan and its People, 6.
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the Kam became strained when the former, against the 
wishes of the 14ter, persisted in settling Gujars 
(flock”raising nomads who were originally from Dir, Swat 
and Hazara Kohistan),^ in the -village of Narsat,-^
It is clear from Robertson’s travels among the Kam that 
the Mehtar’s suzerainty was nominal. Further, with the 
occupation of Harsat by the Khan of Jandol, and the 
widespread fear of his invasion of the Kam, the Kafirs’ 
confidence in the Mehtar was completely shaken. They there­
fore asked the Sipah Salar to protect them from Umra Khan,
otherwise, they argued, all the Kafirs {_ Ka.m?_7 would
52submit to the Khan* The acceptance of this request 
still drew the Kafirs away from the Mehtar.
Ever since 1886, when the Amir feared Kafiristan to 
be under threat from the Government of India, he adopted 
a more markedly conciliatory attitude towards the Kafirs.
The new attitude probably was the result of his inability 
to launch military expeditions against the Kafirs. But 
peaceful infiltration in Kafiristan was systematically 
followed. From 1889 to 1895? large deputations of Kafir 
elders paid visits to the Amir in Kabul and the Sipah 
Salar in Jalalabad and Asmar* Large presents (cash, 
clothes) were given to the Kafirs. Usually the Kafir 
elders would promise the Amir that, upon their return, 
they would persuade their tribes to submit. Some even
50 Israr al-Din, A Social Geography of Chitral State,
Thesis for M.A., London University, 1965? 98.
51 Kafirs of the Hindu Kush. 298.
52 Kam elders to Sipah Salar, PD, 8 Jan 1894? PSLI, 74? 1282.
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outrightly would accept Islam, in which case the ritual 
of conversion would have "been performed in the presence 
of the Amir. Sometimes neither promise nor conversion 
would come, hut the effects of their honourable reception 
and presents, especially cash, which had a wide appeal 
to the Kafirs, were undeniable.
During the corresponding period, the Amir's attitude
towards the western Kafirs was rather militant. In 1886,
the Khan of lagao was reported to be operating against
the Kafirs from the Panjsher side with about 10,000 tribal 
53levies. As a result, two years later, elders of the
Siah Posh, presumably the Ramgul in the neighbourhood of
the Upper Panjsher, submitted to the Amir but agreed to
54pay only jizya. In 1891, two forces of the Amir, one
55under General Katal Khan from the Andarab side, the
5 6other under Sayyed Shah Khan from the Panjsher side,
advanced on the Kafirs. The latter succeeded in bringing
the submission of a portion of the Kafirs. But the
proposal for the peaceful submission of all Kafirs failed.
In reply, the Kafir elders said that their people were
unwilling to submit, and if pressed would go further up
57into the mountains. It is not known whether any further 
measures were taken against them. Presumably the Hazara 
war gave them a respite. But these Kafirs were sufficiently
53 ED, 20 July 1886, PSLI, 47, 1002.
54 MM, June 1888, PSLI, 54, 54.
55 HD, 23 May 1891, PSLI, 63, 507.
56 PD, 13 June 1891, PSLI, 63, 625.
57 Kafir elders to Commanding Officer, Parian valley 
(Panjsher), KD, 4 Feb 1891, PSLI, 62, 710.
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overawed, as was evidenced from the regular despatch of 
their elders to the Amir in Kabul. Occasional references 
have also been made to operations against the Kafirs from 
the Badakhshan and Minjan sides, but no details are 
available.
At Asmar, the Sipah Salar was occupied mainly with 
the affairs of Bajaur and beyond. There was no question 
of the invasion of Kafiristan when he moved to Asmar from 
the Shinwar, although he was active in Kafir affairs on 
the diplomatic front.
Prom 1893 to 1895, the Bashgul valley was the subject 
of a diplomatic wrangle between the G-overnment of India 
and Afghanistan. Umra Khan also claimed it, but in the 
end the Amir had his way. Bashgul was inhabited by about
20,000 Kafirs of the three main divisions of the Sia Posh, 
the upper part by the Katirgulis (Kamtoz, Butdeh), the 
middle part by the Muman (Madugal), the lower by the Kam
cro
(Kamoz, Kamdesh). Until 1895 India, being separated from 
the Kafirs by a broad belt of semi-independent Pashtun 
tribes, was unable to communicate with the Kafirs 
directly, except through the Mehtar. Although the Mehtar's 
suzerainty over the Bashgulis was nominal, the Bashgul 
valley was included in the Kabul Convention (by Durand), 
as being in the sphere of influence of the G-overnment of 
India. The Amir agreed, because he mistook the Arnawai 
(or Bashgul) of the Kabul Convention for a stream of the
58 GAK, 65 *
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same name which joined the river at the village of
59
Arnawai from the east instead of the west. But two
years later, during the delimitation of the frontiers,
he "...threatened to break off negotiations"^ unless he
61had "...the whole of Kafiristan to its last house."
Aware of the error in the map, the G-overnment of India 
62gave way.
During all these years, the Kafirs were so impressed
by their mild treatment by the Amir that in 1895 the
Sipah Salar was able to report to the Amir that the Kafirs,
6*5presumably the Kam, were willing to embrace Islam, but 
they begged that troops might not be sent to their country. 
Accordingly the Sipah Salar, with a small force, moved to 
Kamdesh (a town of about 600 houses and the headquarters 
of the Kam), where he was welcomed.^ Expression of 
submission did not mean that the Kam became Muslims and 
subjects of the Amir overnight. They were, in fact, 
divided, with the town inhabitants for submission and 
the rest against it. Besides, no further progress was 
made, as the Sipah Salar returned to Asmar from where 
he was instructed to try to win over the Mohmands, whose 
country had been left undemarcated.
59 Holdich, 266.
60 Lee Warner, W ., Kafiristan, 1896, 7.
61 Ibid.
62 Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr 1896, P.L. Ho. 77, (96),
PSLI 85* Alder, G-., holds that this concession was
intended to involve the Afghans with Umra Khan, (290).
65 Kafir elders to Amir through Sipah Salar, PD, Ho. 12, 
(12), 24 June 1895, PSLI, 80.
64 ED, No. 14, 25 July 1895, PSLI, 81.
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Meanwhile the Amir at Kabul offered terms to a
deputation of the Kam for the submission of, presumably,
all Kafirs. The deputation was told that if the terms
65
were not accepted Kafiristan would be invaded. No
details of the terms are available, but it could be
assumed that the Kafirs were asked to accept the Amir* s
rule and allow the introduction of mullas for the preaching
of Islam in their country. These were, in fact, the terms
66which the Sipah Salar was demanding from the Kam. Other
Kafirs were observing these developments with keen 
interest. It would be useful to look to these negotiations 
in some detail.
The Kam, who held their assemblies (jirgas) in Kamdesh,
were divided among- themselves. Muslim Kam (sheikhs) had
sided with the Sipah Salar. The first reaction of the Kam
was to accept the Amir's rule, but not Islam. They
proposed they should be treated like non-Muslim subjects,
67paying .jizya, with no troops stationed in their country.
The Sipah Salar, however, insisted on their conversion 
68also and captured some of their villages between Bari
(or Barsat) and the Kamdesh district, where he stationed
some troops. He refused their request for the withdrawal
6 9of the troops in return for the payment of revenue only.
He then moved his forces to Sao (about 6 miles below Bari),
65 Amir to Sipah Salar, KD, Bo. 30, 7 Aug 1895, PSLI, 81.
66 PH, Bo. 16, 20 Aug 1895, PSLI, 81.
67 Jalalabadi, Mirza Sher Ahmad, On the Conquest of 
Kafiristan (Persian ballad), Lahore, 1313, A.H., 4.
68 PH, Bo. 16, 20 Aug 1895, PSLI, 81.
69 PH, Bo. 17, 6 Sept 1895, PSLI, 82.
251
and through Sheikh headmen of Nari he again tried to
70persuade the Kam to accept the terms, but without
71success. The Sipah Salar again refused their request.
But by this time, the resistance of the Kam was almost
72broken. Only a small portion of them was against submission. 
Shortly after, they all surrendered and allowed mullas to 
preach Islam among them. They agreed to pay revenue and 
.jizya. The Amir, however, refused to accept their tribute,
r j ’Z
saying he wanted Kafiristan, not money. ^
Meanwhile, the Sipah Salar had moved with all his
forces (five regiments) and tribal levies closer to
Kamdesh, to Birkot (a village on the right bank of the
Kunar river) which he made his permanent headquarters.
Birkot, in fact, replaced Asmar and developed into a big
local market. The Sipah Salar persuaded the Kam elders
to sell their goods there, and guaranteed their safety.
He issued strict orders to the soldiers, who were living
in tents and newly built huts, not to fire on the Kafirs
74even if they fired on them. But the peaceful conversion
and complete submission of the Kafirs was insisted upon.
Presents, often cash, were liberally given to Kafir elders.
In Kamdesh, this led to quarrels between common men and 
75elders. However, the efforts of the Sipah Salar did 
not make immediate headway. The Kafirs suspected his
70 G-ilgit Diary, 24 Aug 1895, PSLI, 82.
71 GD, 31 Aug 1895, PSLI, 82.
72 GD, 4 Oct 1895, PSLI, 82.
73 GD, 12 Oct 1895, PSLI, 83.
74 Sayyed Amir Shah, headman of Arandu to British Agent,
GD, 14 Oct 1895, F.L. No. 4350 (1895), PSLI, 83.
75 A Sheikh to British Agent, G-D, 16 Nov 1895, PSLI, 83.
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motives, because of the construction of a road through 
Bashgul to Badakhshan, and his insistence on a jirga of 
about 80 Kam elders to wait upon the Amir in Kabul.
Their fear, of course, increased with the concentration 
of a large force so close to Kamdesh.
The Kam, therefore, told the Sipah Salar that,
although they agreed to become subjects of the Amir, they
were opposed to the occupation of their country by troops,
76and the construction of the road through their valley.
They warned the Sipah Salar that, if pressed, they would
go farther up into the hills and then to Chitral, after
having burnt their houses and crops, as they had done
twelve times previously. The Sipah Salar dissuaded them
from their proposed action by telling them that they would
be refused asylum in Chitral, as the British G-overnment
was the friend of the Amir. However, the resultant
stalemate made him much more cautious than before in
dealing with the Kafirs of the Bashgul valley. But the
Sipah Salar1s approach to the Bashgulis, presumably
77Muman, for submission was not successful at all. The 
Katirgulis of the Bashgul valley whose land was close to
Badakhshan were approached by the Amir1s General at
IPi V Q
Paizabad, but they refused submission, although they
sent him a deputation with a slave-girl as a present.
76 Kam elders to Sipah Salar, GD, 16 Nov 1895, PSLI, 83*
77 GKD, 17 Aug 1895, PSLI, 82.
78 GD, 12 Oct 1895, G. P* Minchin (Assistant British
Agent, Chitral) to Secretary to Government of India, 
No. 478, 16 Oct 1896, PSLI, 83.
79 Gomura, Katirguli elder to British Agent, GD,
28 Oct 1895, PSLI, 83.
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Threatened by the General, they asked the Mehtar for 
help hut they were disappointed. The G-overnment of
India had advised the Mehtar 11 ...to observe strict
80neutrality as between Kafirs and Afghans.11 He was
advised not even to give refuge to the Kafirs in Chitral.
The Katirgulis then told the British Agent that ” ...their
country belonged to Chitral and Gilgit and for that
81reason they asked for help against the Afghans.” But
82the Agent told them that it was not so. Only then the
Katirgulis submitted to the Amir’s rule when they were
assured that ” ...after their conversion they would not
83be made prisoners.”
The Presun (Virun, Parun) Kafirs who were remarkably
peaceful had, in 1894, made their submission to the Amir
84through his General at Faizabad. Proposal also had
been made to the Kafirs of north and west Kafiristan,
presumably Ramgul and Kulam, for their submission. The
Kafirs close to Andarab, Panjsher and Bijrao accepted the
85Amir’s suzerainty, but the Kafirs of the remoter areas
86were not willing to do so* The Wai, among whom Islam
had penetrated deeply, and who had always asked the help
of Muslims in their feuds with other Kafirs, had renewed
their loyalty to the Amir in 1894, and since then they
87had kept aloof from the other Kafirs altogether* There
80 MM, Oct 1895, (5), PSLI, 83.
81 GD, 14 Oct 1895, P.L. Bo. 4350(1896), PSLI, 83.
82 Ibid.
83 A Sheikh to British Agent, GD, 16 Bov 1895, PSLI,83 *
84 CD, 16 Bov 1895, PSLI, 83-
85 KD, Bo. 35, 11 Sept 1895, PSLI, 82.
86 Ibid.
87 GD, 16 Bov 1895, PSLI, 83.
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is no report available as to whether the Ashkun and Kti 
had been approached for their submission.
This diplomacy mixed with intimidation was successful 
in so far as it led to the extension of the Amir* s rule 
over the Kafirs. But, despite the headway of Islam among 
some Kafirs, they did not become Muslims. On the other 
hand they did not show opposition to the preaching of 
Islam, as was evidenced by their acceptance of mullas.
The evidence suggests, however, that these efforts were 
only a prelude to the physical invasion of Kafiristan 
in the coming winter.
Preparations for military operations against
Kafiristan were under way since autumn. Asmar in the
south and Minjan in the north had been chosen as two big
military camps. Although tribal levies from Laghman had
engaged the Kafirs of Shagiri, Pandu and Katihi clans in
inconclusive encounters above Hajil, in the Alishang 
88valley, the initial all-out invasion of Kafiristan was
deferred to winter, apparently at the suggestion of a
89Kafir slave-boy of the Amir. The idea was that, because 
in the winter the Kafirs come down to the lower parts of 
the valleys, their pacification would be comparatively 
easy and quick. Hence an all-out invasion of Kafiristan
90for the 11.. .absolute submission and conversion to Islam*1
88 ED, 20 Aug 1895, PSLI, 81.
89 KD, Ho. 41, 23 Oct 1895, PSLI, 83. According to 
Jalalabadi, this postponement had been initially 
proposed by the Sipah Salar, 5.
90 Sayyed Shah Daryu of Lutkoh to British Agent, GD,
2 Hov 1895, F.L. Ho. 4493(1895), PSLI, 83.
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of the Kafirs in the winter from four sides, from the
Panjsher by General ’Ata Khan, from Laghman by the son
of Sardar Hasan Khan, from Birkot by the Sipah Salar,
91and from Badakhshan by General Sayyed Khan. In the 
operations, tribal levies preceded the troops. Operations 
in the Bashgul valley would be discussed first, to be 
followed by those in the Pech, and then in the west of 
Kafiristan.
Rapid success attended the progress of the Sipah
Salar. He occupied the country between the Kamdesh and
Birkot quickly. Only in Muman was opposition offered,
as a result of which about 200 tribal levies and 180
92Kafirs were reported lost. The regulars did not take
part in the fighting;, but a large number of Kafirs still
93burnt their houses and fled to the foot of Katirgul,
and then to Chitral. On 25 December 1895? news reached
94Kabul that ’’Kafiristan" had been conquered. But this 
"Kafiristan” was, in fact, the Bashgul valley which had
91 PD, Ho. 25, 9 Dec 1895, F.L. No. 4601, PSLI, 85- 
According to Sultan Mahomed, the commanding officers 
weres Captain Mohammad ’Ali from the Panjsher side, 
and General Katal from the Badakhshan side, 290. 
Fletcher's account that Kafiristan was attacked in 
the "winter of 1896" and that the Amir's troops were 
also concentrated at "Chitral" is incorrect, 148.
92 Chitral Diary, 7 Dec 1895? P.L. No. 4602 (1896),
PSLI, 83.
93 Reports from Peshawar Diary indicate that the Sipah 
Salar made an unopposed, entry in Bashgul, P D , No. 24,
20 Dec 1895? PSLI, 84. Since a large number of the 
Kafirs fled to Chitral, this does not seem to be likely.
94 Sipah Salar to Amir, KD, 28 Dec 1895? PSLI, 84.
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been overrun quickly and from which the troops returned
to Birkot in early January, after having left small
95garrisons in Katirgul, Human and Kam,
The Beeh valley, known by several names (Kama,
Presun, Pech and Tsarogul) in different localities,
stretching from Chaga Serai to Minjan, was one of the
longest valleys in Kafiristan. Together with its tributary
valleys, Pech was inhabited by Presun, Wai, Ashkun and Kti.
Only the Kti, occupying a side valley to the right of the
Pech valley, were a subdivision of Katirs and therefore
a part of the Siah Posh. The others were separate tribes,
but collectively known as the Safed Posh. In February 1896,
the Sipah Salar with a force moved from Asmar. He had
instructed the elders of Katirgul, from whom he had married
96a wife, to advance on the Presun and Wai, But before
such an advance was made, a deputation of about 60 Wai
elders met him in Chaga Serai and offered to submit without 
97fighting. Similarly, the Presun offered their submission
98without opposition; but the submission of neither of them 
was acceptable to the Sipah Salar, who demanded that the 
Presun should accept mullas, send their elders to the Amir, 
and surrender their arms. These may have also been the 
terms offered to the Wai. After the expiry of a 15“day 
grace, during which the terms were not accepted, the Kafirs 
were attacked from Minjan and Chaga Serai. Their lands
95 CD, 11 Jan 1896, F.L. Mo. 250(1896), PSLI, 84.
96 CD, 22 Feb 1896, F.L. No. 737-F.(1896), PSLI, 85-
97 CD, 29 Feb 1896, F.L. No. 740-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
98 PD, Mo. 6, 20 Mar 1896, F.L. No. 881-F(1896), PSLI, 85.
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were occupied, 110 of their elders sent as hostages to
99Kabul, and the two forces of the Amir joined at Presun. 
Soon the Sipah Salar left for Asmar, after having disarmed 
M ...all the Kafirs in the Pech v a l l e y . T h e r e  is no 
report available of the Kti and Ashkun, but it seems 
likely that they were also subdued.
Ramgul and Kulam proved the most difficult of all
the Kafirs to be overcome. The advance on them was made
by tribal levies and regulars (number not knoxra) from the
south from Laghman, from the north-west from Khanabad,
G-horband, Panjsher and Andarab,^^- A large number of
tribal levies and troops perished in avalanches, but
shortly the 15 forts of the Ramgul were taken and their
102inhabitants fled to Kulam. Details of the operations 
against them which continued until the next winter are 
not known, but their magnitude can be assessed from the 
number of their prisoners - 11,000 from the Laghman
side and 6,000 from the Panjsher side*^^ (the former 
figure may also include prisoners from the upper parts of 
the Alishang valley) - sent to Kabul. The valley of 
Ramgul became almost empty of its inhabitants (only 100 
married Ramgulis were allowed to return from Jalalabad, 
and the remainder fled to the surrounding lands). The 
valley of Kulam fell only in the winter of 1896 after 
heavy fighting with considerable losses on both sides.
99 CD, 21 Mar 1896, F.L. No. 942-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
100 GD, 4 Apr 1896, F.L. No. 1012-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
101 PD, No. 2, 25 Jan 1896, PSLI, 84.
102 CD, 22 Feb 1896, F.L. No. 737 (1896), PSLI, 84.
103 KD, 24 Jan 1896, F.L. No. 395)F.(1896), PSLI, 84.
104 CD, 29 Dec 1896, F.L. No. 78-F.(l897), PSLI, 90.
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With the fall of Kulam, the conquest of Kafiristan was
complete. It was near the large village of Patchah in
the Ramgul valley that an inscription on an enormous
105rock known as the Sang-i-Naveshta, dating back 
presumably to the period of Timur, was foundp An officer 
of the Amir inscribed the following on the rocki-
”In the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman G-hazi, in 1896, 
the whole of Kafiristan, including Kullam, was 
conquered by him.. .. .
The conquest of Kafiristan presented the Amir with
many problems, first, he had to establish an administration.
But the enforcement of Islamic law on the Kafirs made this
task difficult* We see then that mass conversion was
closely linked with the administration in which the mullss
played a complex role in a still basically Kafir society.
In the first place, many Kafirs were converted to Islam
immediately after the conquest of their lands. Mosques
were built. But, by the Amir’s order, no Kafir was to be
107
converted forcibly. The Kam, Muman and Katirgulis may
have been the first to accept Islam. By June 1896, there
were already mullas of Kafir origin among them. They were
” ... sufficiently versed in Islam” and undertook ” ...to
108instruct Islam to their fellow tribesmen,” in place of 
Afghan mullas. Conversion among the Bashgulis was so 
successful that a number of Kafirs in Chitral, presumably
105 Newby, E., A Short Walk in the Hindu Kush, London,
1968, Penguin, 226. — - ”
106 Mahomed, S., 1, 292.
107 PD, Ho.11, 9 Jan 1896, F.L. Ho. 1637-F.(1896), PSLI, 87.
108 CD, 9 June 1896, F.L. Ho. 1720-F.(1896), PSLI, 87.
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some of those who had fled there, voluntarily accepted
Islam. Despite a revolt in the Bashgul valley in 1897?
Islam remained popular, especially among the younger
Kafirs. Because of this widespread acceptance of Islam,
109
the Amir renamed the Bashgul valley "Nuristan" - the
land of light (of Islam) - a name which appears to have
displaced the unmelodious Arabic term "Nur al-Islam"
(the light of Islam) which was given to Kafiristan by the
110Amir's son and successor in 1906.
Ill
Similarly, the Wai and Presun also accepted Islam,
although they were reported to dislike praying five times 
112a day. But among the Ramgul, who had nearly all been
taken to Kabul, conversion was not so easy. The elder
Kafirs still worshipped their idols. The Amir threatened
them with death if they failed to become Muslims, But the
113young among them had become sincere Muslims. During 
this mass conversion, the non-Muslim Safays, presumably 
of Badil, Dewagul and Pech, and the non-Muslim Shinwarays 
of Shigal,^^ were also converted to Islam.
The task of preaching Islam was entrusted to Sunni 
mullas, armed with rifles, swords and escorted by some 
ten to twenty khassadars. Each village had one or two 
mullas. By October 1896, Katirgulis, for instance, had
109 OAK, 67.
110 Ibid, 259. Nuristan denotes the territory. It is 
incorrect to speak of its inhabitants (Nuristanis)
as "Nuri tribes" or "Nuris" (Wilber, 50; Fletcher, 19)? 
because the latter terms suggest an ethnic significance.
111 CD, 28 Apr 1896, F.L. No. 1220-F.(1896), PSLI^ 8 6 .
112 CD, 16 Mar 1897, Foreign Secretary Letter No. 4M (1897), 
PSLI, 9 1 .
113 ED, 20 June 1896, F.L. No. 1879-F.(1896), PSLI, 87.
114 Amir's firman to Safays, Shinwarays of Shizal, etc.,
PD, No.16, 15 Aug 1896, F.L.No.2544~F(l896), PSLI, 8 8 .
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11513 mosques and 28 mullas while the Kam (hy August)
had 112 mullas, with Mulla Satar of TurldLstan as chief of
- I T / "
all mullas in Kafiristan. The mullas, who drew twenty
rupees a month as salary, instructed the Kafirs in the
"basic tenets of Islam. They were also in charge of
village schools where young hoys received instruction in
religious knowledge, and performed duties similar to those
of lumberdars (theregistered representative of a coparcenary
117community, who is responsible for G-overnment revenue)
* -i ■ 113m  India.
On the whole the Kafirs, especially those who
submitted without fighting, were treated leniently. The
Sipah Salar proclaimed a general pardon for all the
Bashgulis But five out of fifteen Kafirs Ramgul
who tried to burn themselves in Laghman, because they
were opposed to conversion, were publicly executed in 
120Kabul. The initial lenient attitude of the Amir
occasionally gave way to brutality when instances of 
opposition t©^conversion were observed.
Neither were the Kafir prisoners of war enslaved.
Their sale and enslavement was strictly prohibited. The
Amir warned his subjects that offenders would be fined
1217,000 rupees each. Though Muslims, the Hazara prisoners
115 CD, 27 Oct 1896, F.L. No. 3128-F.(1896), PSLI, 89.
116 PD, No, 16, 15 Aug 1896, F.L. No. 2544-F.(1896), PSLI, 8 8 .
117 Yule, Col.H., and Burnel, A.C., Hobson-Jobson (A glossary 
of colloquial Anglo-Indian words and"~phrases) . London,
1903, 524.
118 G-AK, 423.
119 Viceroy Elgin to 0. Hamilton, 22 Apr 1896, F.L. No.77(1896), 
PSLI, 85.
120 KD, 10 Oct 1896, F.L. No. 3077-F.(1896), PSLI, 89.
121 PD, 7 Apr 1896, F.L. No. 1011-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
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of war were made subject to sale and enslavement, "but the 
Kafir prisoners were not. The Hazaras rebelled and 
fought, while war was brought upon the Kafirs and the 
majority of them submitted without fighting. The proximity 
of Kafiristan to Chitral may also have had a bearing upon 
the lenient attitude of the Amir towards the Kafirs.
122
Sheikhs were rewarded and made Khans for their service, 
which was, in fact, contrary to their traditional neutral 
attitude in a war between Muslims and their own kinsmen.
In contrast with his policy towards other rebellious 
groups, the Amir’s treatment of the Kafirs was almost 
paternal. He made particular efforts to educate them in 
Islamic and Afghan ways, although this was paid for 
largely from loot from Kafiristan. Over 300 sons of Kam 
and Katir elders were sent to Kabul for education, while 
22 other boys under 10 were chosen to become the Amir's 
page-boys, and 20 girls under 12 to serve in the harem. 
Absorbtion, however, proved difficult. Cannibalism was 
observed among some Kafirs who had been settled in Paghman
The pattern of assessment on the produce was not 
uniform. Favouritism was shown to the Kam, among; whom 
there were many sheikhs and who were the first to accept 
Islam. A light assessment of chehel-wa-yak on their
124cattle and tithe on their land produce was introduced.
123
122 PD, Ho. 4, 27 FeL 1896, F.L. Mo. 695-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
123 KD, 20 June 1896, F.L. Ho. 1879-F.(1896), PSLI. 87.
124 PD, No. 11, 9 June 1896, F.L. Ho. 1637-F.(1896), PSLI, 89.
The Katirgulis were required to pay a reduced amount of
2,000 rupees a year.1 But the Wai were heavily taxed.
They were to give eight out of every 40 of their cattle,
in addition to eight rupees per man family?^/. Also
they were required to supply a large quantity of ghee and
wheat each month, without payment, to the troops stationed
126in their land. This assessment is so high that it
would seem unlikely that the Wai (who were favourably 
disposed to the Muslims) could have paid it indefinitely. 
There is no report available about the assessment on the 
other Kafir tribes.
Apart from the increasing role of the mullas, the
pattern of administration in Kafiristan was the same as
in the rest of Afghanistan. The Siah Posh, in general,
127were reported to have accepted qazis and hakims 
which meant the extension, and enforcement of the Islamic 
laws in their land. As the assessment on the Kafirs was 
light, and the Kafirs remained acquiescent (except the 
Wai, among whom discontent was general because of the 
high rate of taxation), the administration was projected 
towards introducing Islam on a mass scale. A pattern 
was established whereby a mulla introduced Islam, and 
acted as the Kafir representative; a qazi decided Kafir 
legal disputes in accordance with the Shari1 a and a hakim 
and khassadars. backed by a distant army, enforced their 
decisions. It is not clear what happened to the 11 elective 
magistracy" and its chief (Ur Jast), who were formerly
125 CD, 27 Oct 1896, F.L. No. 3128-F.(1896), PSLI, 89-
126 CD, 24 Nov 1 8 9 6 , F.L. No. 5523-F.(1896), PSLI, 89.
127 PD, No.6 , 20 Mar 1896, F.L. No. 881-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
responsible for the internal affairs of a tribe. It
seems probable that, in the face of the new pattern of 
administration, the "elective magistracy" dwindled into 
Insignificance while an acquiescent "Jast" (tribal elder) 
continued to function. The Utah and other priests, of 
course, were replaced by mullas.
The reported number of Kafirs (men, women and
children) who were sent to Kabul was well over 25,0C0.
They were treated not like prisoners of war, as they were
fully maintained by the G-overnment, and were not kept in
jails. They were distributed among other districts in
order to learn about "...Islam and the manners of the
120people among whom they live." Hence their distribution
in various provinces; Laghman (5,000), the neighbourhood
of Kabul (4,000), Turkistan (some), Kohistan (5,000), and
Paghman (1,700). They were given land for cultivation.
How many of them remained in these places is difficult to
ascertain, as they were later permitted to return home
150when they obtained the confidence of the Amir  ^ which
was dependent on their acceptance of Islam. It appears
that eventually all of them returned either to Kafiristan
or Paghman. This is partially corroborated by a reference
in The Life of Abdur Rahman that those Kafirs who had
151fought bravely had been removed to Paghman. About
10,000 Kafirs were ordered to be enlisted in the army,
128 Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, 435.
129 Amir's firman. P L , 7 Apr 1896, F.L. No. 1011-F.(1896), 
PSLI, 85o
130 Ibid.
131 Mahomed, S ., 1, 291 *
132and their regiments known as 11 jadid al~»Islam,f - from 
which the word jadidi (the new) has been derived and used 
even to the present day.
Of the 1,100 Bashgulis who had fled to Chitral, there
was a substantial number from Kamdesh. Upon their return
from Chitral, from where except a small xmmberJJ they
were all turned away, ^ they had nowhere to go and
134nothing to eat, because, before their flight, they had
destroyed their crops and burnt their houses. The Sipah
Salar sent them to Uarsat and other districts. This led
to a scarcity of grazing land for the G-ujars, some of
whom now lived in Uarsat. Whereupon the Sipah Salar
settled them in Kamdesh. Eventually the Kam were
136allowed to return to Kamdesh, but whether the G-ujars
had been turned away from there is not clear. Similarly
1,000 nomadic families from the Safays of Tagao, 1,000
from Laghman, 1,000 from Panjsher x^ere ordered to be
settled in Kafiristan (where is not known), where each
family was to reclaim land without paying revenue on it 
137for one year. Kafiristan was also populated by retired
138soldiers, " besides becoming a ”Siberia” for those, 
including Barakzays, who fell under the Amir’s suspicion.
Much importance was attached to the construction of
132 MM, / 1895?7, N o . 30 (G), PSLI, 84.
133 CD, 14 Dec 1895, PSLI, 84.
134 CD, 11 Jan 1896, F.L. Mo. 230-F.(1896), PSLI, 84.
135 CD, 11 Jan 1896, F.L. Mo. 230-F.(1896), PSLI, 84-
136 MM, Apr 1896, PSLI, 8 6 .
137 PD, No. 4, 27 Feb 1896, F.L. No. 695-F.(1896),
PSLI, 85.
138 Mahomed, S., 1, 291.
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roads in Kafiristan. Before the conquest, all routes
139leading to Kafiristan were extremely narrow. The
construction of roads went side by side with the conquest.
Three main roads were built, connecting Badakhshan with
the Kunar and Laghman valleys through Kafiristan, (Chaga
Berai to Minjan, Asmar to Badakhshan, and Laghman to
Minjan). Although the best among them (Chaga Serai to
Minjan) was like 11 a sort of track11 , ^ 0  they were usable
for loaded ponies, horses and mules. A sum of 20,00,000
rupees was sanctioned for their construction, public
serais and hamlets along them. Hindus were encouraged
141to open shops along the first two. Bor their use by
merchants, efforts were made to popularise them. Hitherto,
merchants of Badakhshan sent their goods through Chitral,
avoiding Kafiristan altogether. There was a good demand
in the markets of eastern Afghanistan for the goods of
Badakhshan such as ghee, wheat, zera, salt, namad and
gold dust (washed since 1888). The Amir declared exemption
from tolls for three years for merchants who would use the
142Asmar-Badakhshan road.' In the early part of 1897, 
when the Asmar to Badakhshan road was open to traffic, 
merchants used it. It would then appear that the sole 
purpose of the Amir in the construction of the roads was 
the encouragement of trade, but it was not so.
159 McNair, 58.
140. Lorimer, J* G-., Afghan Troops and the Roads in
Ningrahar and Kafiristan, 7 Aug 1899 (4), Letters 
Received from India (1899), 865, Political and Secret 
Department.
141 PD, No. 21, 9 Nov 1896, F.L. No. 3169-P.(1896),
PSLI, 89.
142 CD, 5 Nov 1896, F.L. No. 3170-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
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The construction of roads was linked mainly with
the developments in the Pamirs and Chitral, In 1895?
Russia and India came closer than ever before to each
other, with the former in the Pamirs and the latter in
Chitral, The same was also true of India and Afghanistan,
In 1895? ns far as Britain and Russia were concerned, a
measure of stability both north and south of the Hindu Kush 
145was achieved. But the position of Afghanistan as the 
Amir saw it was precarious, Borth of the Hindu Kush,
Russia had threatened the north-east of Afghanistan,
(the threat was subsequently averted by the fixing of 
Afghan boundaries with the Russian dominated Bokhara).
South of the Hindu Kush, the G-overnment of India established 
a firm hold on Chitral, by sending forces there from G-ilgit 
and Peshawar. Chitral was subsequently annexed to India.
Thus, apart from neutralising the Amir’s disguised attempts 
on Chitral, the opening of the new Peshawar-Dir-Chitral 
road, hitherto unpenetrated by the British, dominated the semi­
independent states of Swat, Dir and Bajaur.
The Amir was alarmed. He distrusted the advance of
Russia in the Pamir and of Britain in Chitral. In his
public proclamations he warned his people repeatedly that
’’All Christians cast eyes upon my country from all sides”
and that ’’Russians and English. ... ,are both enemies of my 
<« 144
country , and that ’’The time is not very far off that
145 Alder, G., 298.
144 Amir’s firman to people of Kunar, Asmar, etc., PD, 
Ho. 18, 29 Sept 1895? PSLI, 82.
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this country of us Afghans will be divided by the Russians
and English among themselves. ... ^ n 145 ma^ argUe{j
that the demarcation of all the frontiers of Afghanistan
with Russia and to a large extent with India might have
removed his apprehension, but the Amir trusted neither of
them* He believed that 11... everything changes so very
suddenly,"-^6 conquest of Kafiristan and the
construction of the roads were, therefore, mainly for
reasons of security and strategy. The conquest was
considered necessary in 1895 because, situated as it was,
147Kafiristan was "a danger to Afghanistan." Roads were
rapidly opened in the hope that the Russians might use
1 AR
them when they chose to invade India, thus avoiding the
central parts of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Amir
increased the number of his army first by introducing the
selective system of char nafari (one out of four) in the
149eastern province, and subsequently by hasht nafari 
(one out of eight). The latter remained the basis of
conscription until very recently.
145 Amir’s firman to the people of Hingrahar and Laghman, 
Kabul, etc., PD, Ho. 23,' 9 Dec 1995, PSLI, 83*
There is an exaggerated, and misleading, stress on 
the Amir* s apprehension of Russia’s threat to 
Kafiristan in The Life of Abdur Rahman (288-289)? 
and no mention of his apprehension of Britain. For
a general comment on the book see p. 269*
146 Ibid.
147 Amir quoted by 3. Pyne (Amir’s engineer) to a 
Reuter’s Agent, 20 Jan 1896, 66-F, PSLI, 84*
148 PD, Ho.l, S Jan 1896, F.L * Ho. 159~F*(1896), PSLI, 84*
149 PD, Ho.23, 9 Dec 1895, P*D* Ho. 4601-F.(1895),PSLI, 83*
150 MM, Sept 1896, F.L. Ho. 175-F.(1896), PSLI, 88.
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The external threat was not the only reason for the
conquest of Kafiristan, The extension of laws among the
151 162Kafirs, the opening of the trade routes in Kafiristan,
155the enlistment of warlike Kafirs in the army, and an 
end to the centuries old feud between the Kafirs and 
Muslims (which had encouraged slavery), were also strong 
reasons for its conquest. The Amir also wished to make 
the Kafirs, who had no previous loyalty, attached to his 
dynasty - a policy which has been consistently pursued 
by his successors even to the present day.
In contrast to operations against other rebellious
tribes and the AmirTs rivals, the operations against the
Kafirs were on a much smaller scale. Their military
significance lay only in the difficult terrain of
Kafiristan which had helped the Kafirs to repulse attempts
made against them by famous emperors and kings in the past.
But now, because of the internal and external pressures
(the last accentuated by the superiority of weapons)
Kafir society was disintegrating in any case. It just
needed a push. Nevertheless, the Amir put himself above
the famous Muslim conquerors by telling his troops that
the conquest of Kafiristan had been reserved for Amir
1Abd al“Rahman to be performed through you - an act
which, said the Amir, no Indian or Afghan king, even
154-Amir Timur, had achieved. In fact, the conquest of
151 Amir to Viceroy, 16 Jamadi al-Sani 1513 A.H. (4 Dec 1895), 
enclo. No. 3, PSLI, 84.
152 Amir quoted by Pyne, 20 Jan 1896, No. 66F, PSLI, 84.
153 H), No. 1, 8 Jan 1896, F.L. No. 159-F.(1896), PSLI, 84.
154 KD, 22 Feb 1896, F.L. No. 693-F.(1896), PSLI, 85.
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Kafiristan was significant for religious reasons and the 
Amir made political capital out of it. He tried to use 
these events as a means of increasing his prestige and 
acquiring loyalty for his dynasty.
At the suggestion of many Barakzay and Mohammadzay 
166sardars, the Amir accented the title of Zia al-milat-
i-wa al-Lin (light of the nation and religion). But
in a gathering of about 40,000 people in the newly-built
public mosque of 1Idgah in Kabul, where representatives
of each tribe pledged themselves to remain loyal to the
Amir and his dynasty, a long title of Zla al-milat-i-wa
al-Lin. Amir-i-ibn. Amir. Amir !Abd al-Rahman G-hazi
(light of the nation and religion, Amir the son of the
Amir, Amir * Abd al-Rahman G-hazi) appeared on the gold and 
157silver coins. Meetings of loyalty were also held in
the provinces and August 17? 1896 (7 Rabi' al-Awal 1314 
A.H. lunar) was declared jashn-i-mutafiqya< (the festival 
of unanimity) and a public h o l i d a y , W i t h  the conquest 
of Kafiristan, the whole of Afghanistan lay under the 
Amir!s control.
155 KD, 6 June 1896, F.L, No. 1 7 2 1-F.(1896), PSLI, 87.
156 MM, June 1896, F.L. No. 131-F.(1896), PSLI, 87.
157 PL ? No. 6, 6 July 1896, F.L, No. 1934-F.(1896), 
PSLI, 87.
158 MM, Sept 1896, F.L. No. 175-F.(1896), PSLI, 88.
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Conclusion and Consideration of the Sources
The present thesis is hased mainly on the Political 
and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India in 
the Commonwealth Relations Office Records* As far as 
Afghanistan is concerned, these records contain weekly 
official diaries, reports of British missions to 
Afghanistan and official correspondence exchanged 
between the Amir and the high officials of the G-overnment 
of India* As such, these records are the most comprehen­
sive and important source both for diplomatic relations 
and for internal developments during the critical, forma­
tive period of modern Afghan history with which this 
thesis is concerned* As internal developments are the 
main theme of this thesis, we are concerned here with the 
diaries rather than with the official correspondence* 
However, use has also been made of those parts of the 
official correspondence which throw light on internal 
developments.
Three groups of official diarists have recorded 
events in Afghanistan from 1880 to 1896* They were 
British officials, Indian Muslims and local agents.
The diaries of the British officials in Afghanistan 
cover only the period of occupation during the second 
Anglo-Afghan war* Brief though it was, the period was of 
great importance* The occupation gave rise, on the one 
hand, to popular anti-British activities while, on the 
other, it brought into the open the basic conflicts 
which existed between local factions. St. John and Lepel 
Grriffin have left us, on the whole, a very informative
272
record not only of political affairs lout also of social 
and economic changes. In certain cases their view of 
events was not borne out by subsequent developments.
St. John!s view of Ayub after Maimand is a clear case 
in point. So is Griffin's view about 'Abd al-Rahman's 
position after the latter had adopted delaying tactics 
in the negotiations. But on the whole it is fair to say 
that they were intelligent and, in recording events, 
they were cautious to avoid fraud and rumours. They were 
themselves influenced by only the minimum degree of 
prejudice. This, however, cannot be said of General 
Frederick Roberts whose grasp of events was poor. He 
overestimated the strength of some minor groups who 
assisted the British, and showed bias against those who 
fought him. A distinctive feature of this period is 
the interception of a large number of private letters 
which were exchanged between elders of various factions. 
The original letters were often sent on to their desti­
nations, but from the style and contents of the 
translations which are preserved, the letters seem to 
be genuine.
Outside Afghanistan, the Peshawar diary, compiled 
by various deputy commissioners, is another important 
source which covers the whole period of this work. Its 
information comes mainly from merchants, Afghan refugees, 
and spies, who were occasionally sent to eastern Afghan­
istan to collect information. Its reports on eastern 
Afghanistan are fairly reliable but those on the rest 
of the country are mixed with exaggerations and rumours. 
But the Chitral and Gilgit diaries, which were compiled
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mainly by Sir George Robertson, and which form the main 
source for the chapter on Kafiristan, are very reliable.
Robertson had an intimate knowledge of Kafiristan and 
Kafir elders, many of whom were Robertson1s acquaintances, 
went freely to Chitral and G-ilgit, where they volunteered 
information. Consequently a substantial degree of 
accuracy can be claimed for the chapter on Kafiristan.
The two accounts of the conquest of Kafiristan - one 
by Sher Ahmad Jalalabadi and the other by the Chitral 
diary - which tally very closely one to another, support 
this view. But with the diaries of the Muslim agents 
inside Afghanistan, the story is strikingly different.
1To begin with, the Agents had a very unpleasant
life in Kabul. They were lodged in squalid surroundings, were
looked down upon by all Afghans with "undisguised 
2contemnt", not only because they were British Agents but
1 Qazi 1 Abd al-Qadir, 1880-82.
Colonel Mohammad Afzal Sadozay, 1882-85 *
Colonel ’ Ata Allah (Rajput), 1885-91- 
Afzal Khan G-andapuri, 1891-94•
(A Khap. of Deraj at and a Lawyer
British Agent with Amir Sher fAli, Assistant, Kabul 
Kotwal 1879-80.)
Resaladar Mohammad-Akram Khan, 1894-95*
Maulawi ’Abd al-Ghafur of Luknow, 1896 - ...
Kabul Agency had a hospital attached to it. It also 
had about 20 men listed as "retinue". In the absence 
of the Agent, Kabul Diary was compiled by a secretary.
2 Durand to Cunningham, 3 Dec 1893? PSLI, 73? 16.
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also because they were Indian natives. In 1893? M. Durand 
threatened to boycott a grand festivity prepared in his 
honour, because the British Agent was not allowed to 
occupy a respectable seat. Not only was the British 
Agency under constant surveillance, but the movements of 
the Agents were also restricted. Some of them were not 
even allowed to ride on the public roads. For fear of 
the Amir, not only did the local inhabitants cease to 
keep open contact with the Agency but Peshawar merchants, 
who were subjects of the Government of India also ceased 
to meet any member of the Agency. The Agents were treated 
like ’’prisoners'*. But they had free and undisturbed access 
to the Amir* s darbar, where the Amir treated them 
courteously, The Amir claimed that the British had made 
friends with him, not with the people of Afghanistan, and 
that it was neither proper nor necessary for the Agents to 
mix with the Afghans. In fact, of course, the Amir's 
opposition to contacts between the Agents and the Afghan 
population was political. He had treated very harshly 
all those sections of the population who had in any way 
helped the British during the occupation. He had also 
expelled many Barakzay sardars to India. The contacts of 
the Agents with such people and their relations was likely, 
the Amir thought, to foment trouble and endanger relations 
with the Governmexit of India. Hence the restrictions 
not only on the movements of the Agents but also on the 
movements of foreigners and natives.
Two results were to follow from the Amir* s treatment 
of the Agents, First, the Kabul Diary became mainly a 
record of darbar proceedings, as the Agents understood
27 5
them. But the durbar was the centre from where the Amir, 
as an absolute head of the State, exercised his overall 
power. Also, in the darbar the Agents had a good chance 
of obtaining information from high officials and courtiers, 
among whom a few Agents had relations. The Agents also 
had regular reporters who collected information from the 
city and the country where they were occasionally sent.
But, as they were under surveillance, they were handicapped 
in their work. Many of their local contacts lost their 
lives. Secondly, the reports of four out of the six 
Agents in Kabul between 1880 and 1896 were, in varying 
degrees, biased. Although they had been instructed to 
confine their reports to facts and figures only (they were 
asked to send their own impressions separately), the Agents 
concentrated on the dark side of events. Of Colonel Ata 
Allah who, of all the Agents, served for the longest 
period, it was said that he always took "...the gloomiest 
views of the Amir's position and character".
But the reports of Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir and Maulawi 
fAbd al™Ghafur were better balanced and more impartial.
Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir who acted as a secret news-writer and 
wrote under the name of AB, Kabul Correspondent, belonged 
to a respectable family of Peshawar. He was an adviser to
4
Amir Sher TAli in Kabul during the seventies. During this 
period and especially on account of his supervising the 
taking of a general census, in 1876, the Qazi acquired a
3 MM, Aug 1888, PSLI, 5 5 , 1 3 5 .
4 BCA, 5 .
5 CAKand., 74.
276
thorough knowledge of Afghanistan. In spite of his 
service with Amir Sher ’Ali, the Qazi succeeded in 
entering the service of Amir ’Abd al-Rahman for two years. 
While hack at Peshawar, the Qazi was often consulted by 
the Deputy Commissioner on the Afghan affairs. Subsequently 
he worked again for Amir ’Abd al-Rahman as his news-writer 
in Peshawar. But because he was known to be the most 
anti-British of all Sher ’All’s advisers,^ the Government 
of India always suspected him. Ripon even spoke of him as 
,fan acknowledged scoundrel”? The fact was that ever since 
1864, when the Qazi, while a nai’b tahsildar (a junior 
revenue officer) in Peshawar, had been imprisoned for his 
alleged corruptions,^ relations between him and the 
Government of India remained strained. In spite of this, 
the Government of India asked for his service in Kabul, 
because it was thought inadvisable to send an Agent openly 
so soon after the evacuation and because the Government 
of India was concerned to know about the activities of 
Russian agents in Afghanistan and their treatment by the 
Amir. But the Qazi was the most intelligent of all the 
Muslim news-writers. His reports on Afghan affairs are 
the most meaningful. As he wished to remain in the service 
of the Amir who paid him well, the Qazi was cautious to 
avoid misrepresentation. Maulawi ’Abd al-Ghafur’s reports 
were impartial but they were very short and usually did 
not contain much significant information.
6 BCA, 4,
7 Singhal, 69°
8 BCA, 4 .
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Mir Mohammad Hashim, Mirza Mohammad Taqi, Mirza 
Ya1qub ’All and Sayyed Delawar Shah who were stationed
q
at Kandahar and Herat formed another group of news-writers.
For the obvious reason that ’Abd al-Rahman was the first 
ruler to break the power of the Qizilbashes, these news- 
writers, who, with one exception, were all Qizilbashes, 
reported unfavourably of the Amir and of the feelings of 
his subjects towards him. Sandeman’s view of Mir Hashim 
that he did not report ”truly” of what happened in 
Kandahar applies, in varying degree, to the others also.
But they were all treated with contempt and scorn. Not 
only were they restricted in their movements, but difficulties 
were created even for their obtaining the necessities of 
life. Bor fear of the Amir’s spies and for their service 
to the British, they were boycotted even by their own 
relations. However, the Amir’s officials, from whom they 
obtained information in the darbars. did not treat them so 
badly, mainly because the Amir had obliged them to report
9 A - ’Ali, Mirza Y a ’qub
Herat, 1886-92.
B - Hashim, Mirza Mohammad, a resident of Kabul.
1879-80, a member of Intelligence Department, Kabul. 
1881-92, Kandahar.
C - Shah, Sayyed Delawar ’Ali,
1895 - News-writer, Kandahar.
D - Taqi, Mirza Mohammad, resident of Kandahar.
1879, Member of Political Commission enquiring into 
the causes of the massacre.
1880-81, news-writer for Ayub, Herat,
1881-.., Secretary to the British, Kandahar,
1882-92, news-writer, Herat,
1892-95, news-writer, Kandahar.
10 Sandeman, R. G-. , Foreign Secretary (India), 19 May 1885, 
PSLI, 44, 893.
to him on his own officials. Despite the restrictions 
placed on them, their diaries are especially valuable for 
their recording the firmans of the Amir in parts and the 
system of taxation in detail.
But these prejudiced and subjective reports still
contain much valuable information. It is possible to check
them against one another as each contains records of the
same events. Also, the Amir’s own firmans and the pamphlets
which reflect his system of administration help us to look
into events from his point of view. Perhaps one day, if
the reports of the Amir’s own spies are made available,
it will be possible to make a far more complete and
accurate reconstruction of the history of Afghanistan than
is possible at the moment. But even now it is quite
possible to construct a coherent picture of the period
under discussion by a thorough comparison of the multitude
of different reports. Still, one difficulty cannot be
avoided. This difficulty, which is probably characteristic
of this work, is the absence of documents dealing with high
level policy. Here ’Abd al-Rahman, both as a person and a
ruler, comes into the picture. He had an ’’unlimited flow 
11of language” and tended to give different impressions 
of himself on different occasions. Although he used to 
consult his advisers at times, he did not make public his 
own views on major issues although they alone were decisive. 
One result of this method of ruling is that we are now 
obliged to construct generalisations and logical patterns
11 Durand to Cunningham, 3 Dec 1893? PSLI, 73, 15.
of the events exclusively from the implementation of the 
policies rather than from the enunciation of the policies 
themselves. How far I have heen able to succeed in this 
is for the reader to make his own judgement. Here, I 
would like to make one point clear about the method which 
I have followed in composing this thesis. Because no 
other work on the subject of this thesis exists? I have 
tried first to reconstruct the past by establishing the 
facts, and then to draw conclusions by analysing them.
Of the printed works about the period under discussion,
The Life of Abdur Rahman by Sultan Mahomed is by far the
best. But it is not an autobiography in its entirety, as
has generally been assumed, as only the first eleven
chapters (covering the present thesis) have been written
by ’Abd al-Rahman. Sultan Mahomed, who was originally a
native of the Panjab, claims in one place that he wrote
12the rest as dictated by the Amir. In another place, 
he speaks of translating the book from Persian into
13
English. But it is doubtful whether the Amir personally 
dictated the rest of the book to him as he claims. In 
1895? Dr. Gray, the Amir’s former physician, sent ’Abd 
al-Rahman his book Mv Residence at the Court of the Amir - 
a collection of personal impressions of rather insignificant 
matters. The Amir became displeased with the book but it 
gave him the idea of writing a book himself. This was 
the time when Sultan Mahomed, the Amir’s former mir munshi 
(general secretary) was without a job, mainly because he
12 1 , viii.
13 1? ix.
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was under suspicion for toeing in correspondence with some 
Britons in India* In January 1896, the Amir commissioned 
him to compile a hook on his life and made available to 
him all the necessary documents* But Sultan Mahomed was 
instructed to show the manuscript to the Amir only through 
Sardar Habib Allah and Sardar Mohammad Yusuf, the Amir’s 
son and uncle respectively* How the work proceeded from 
this time onwards is not known to me, as I have not been 
able to go through the records up to the death of the 
Amir in 1901. One thing is certain however; the second 
part of the book, especially that which deals with the 
foreign policy, is not genuine* I have been at pains for 
some time how to reconcile the Amir’s conflicting views 
as expressed in his firmans with his alleged Autobiography, 
until I discovered that ” ...all the latter part / of the 
Autobiography^ is made up in England.”"^ However, 
providing the reader guards against the several factual 
mistakes, the latter part in so far as it deals with 
internal, as opposed to international, affairs, can be 
regarded as generally reliable.
The second most valuable book in English on Afghanistan 
under ’Abd al-Rahman is probably Frank Martin’s Under the 
Absolute Amir. Frank Martin was the younger brother of 
Sir A* Martin, through whom the Amir employed English 
specialists for his workshops and bought war materials 
from England. Frank Martin came to Kabul in 1899■
14 Lord Kitchener to Curzon, 20 Apr 1903? Mss Bur*, F.lll, 
Curzon Collection, Vol. 207, Letter Ho.117? 109.
I am indebted to Miss Lai Baha - S0AS ~ for this 
reference *
281
Subsequently he succeeded Salter Pyne as the Amir’s chief 
engineer, Martin spoke Persian well and Pashto poorly.
The Amir treated him well and received him frequently in the 
darbar. The main merit of his book is that it contains a 
good description of the institutions, especially of the 
darbar. rather than concentrating on the author's personal 
impressions *
Except for certain aspects of diplomatic relations, 
this thesis is based on materials previously unused, and 
deals with topics which have not been dealt with before.
An exception is Sultan Mahomed’s book, but this book gives 
only an outline of some major events from the Amir’s point 
of view. As such, it is hoped that this thesis will be a 
contribution to knowledge.
Chapter 1 shows how, as a result of the the second 
Anglo-Afghan war, the political atmosphere finally became 
suitable for ’Abd al-Rahman to appear as a candidate for 
the throne of Afghanistan, Chapter 2 covers both diplomatic 
and internal developments, as a result of which 'Abd al- 
Rahman was accepted as the Amir of Kabul. This is perhaps 
the most important chapter of all, in which anti-British 
popular resistance, the activities of various political 
factions and the position of ’Abd al-Rahman in relation to 
all, including the British, has been dealt with at some 
length. Chapter 3 analyses the causes of the confrontation 
between ’Abd al-Rahman and Ayub. It is in this confron­
tation that the Durranis and G-hilzays play an important 
role, "With the outcome favourable to the Amir, the 
Durranis became estranged from him. Also, the reunification
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of Afghanistan was, to a large extent, assured.
While the first two chapters describe the establishment 
of his rule by the Amir, the rest <are accounts of his 
efforts mainly for the extension and consolidation of his 
rule. Chapter 4 is a clear illustration of the latter, 
which covers the Amir’s attempts in eastern Afghanistan 
until 1897* The consolidation of the central power is 
best illustrated in the struggle with the Shinwarays. It 
shows, in part, how and at what price, the previously only 
nominally subject Shinwarays were, for the first time, 
brought under the firm control of Kabul. It also analyses 
how the Amir’s advances further east were finally checked 
and a large section of the Pashtuns was, by treaty, separated 
from Kabul.
Chapter 5 describes how the G-hilzays finally reacted 
to the oppressive rule of the Amir. It shows the full 
significance of a major tribal rising and its wider 
implications for the Amir’s future dealings with the 
tribes. In Chapter 6 , the Amir’s apparently surprising 
confrontation with Ishaq is fully discussed. It shows how, 
by defeating Ishaq, who was supported by a regular army 
and the Turkistanis, a major threat to a probable civil 
war was averted surprisingly quickly. Chapters 7 and 8 
show how, for the first time, the semi-independent and 
independent territories of the Hazarajat and Kafiristan 
were incorporated into Afghanistan.
Bibliography
Manuscript in Persian 
R±sala-i-Mu"za, /~Kabul_7, 17 Safar 1311, A.H
Printed Books in Persian
Bek, M.P. &
Mohammad, M. S.
Jalalabadi, S.A.
Khaf i , Mirza Y .A .
Mohammad, F .
Quli, M.A.
Rishtia, Sayyed Q
Rahim, M . R •
Tarikh-i-Badakhshan, 1525? A,H. (1907)? 
Badakhshan, photostat copy, Leningrad, 1957
Fath Nama-i-Kafiristan, Lahore, 1896.
Shahan-i-Muta*khir-i-Afghanistan, 2 Vols., 
Kabul, 1554-56 Sh.
Saraj al-fawarikh, Kabul, 1551? A.H,
Tarikh-i-WaqaM wa Sawanih-i-Afghanistan? 
Tehran, 1857.
Afghanistan dar Qarni-i-Ruzdahum, Kabul, 
1556, A.H.
Sifat hama-i-Darwesh Mohammad Khan G-hazi, 
1288, Islamabad, published in Rome 1965 
with introduction and annotation by 
G-. Scarcia.
Official Documents - Unpublished 
fin English7~~
Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India, 
India Office Library, Commonwealth Relations Office, London. 
Vols. 25 - 91 (from 1880 to 1897).
Por comments on these documents and 
evaluation of the sources of information, 
see Conclusion.
284
Documents, etc. Published
See abbreviations
(Political and Secret Department Library, India Office Library)
B. 6
B. 9
B.13
E. Neel
A.W. Moore 
0. T . Burne
H. Le Poer 
Wyne
B *10 1869 J. Wheeler
B .11
T.C. Plowden
Correspondence relating to 
Afghanistan, 2 vols*, 1878 - 1881.
Afghan Memoranda, 2 vols,
Afghanistan - various Memoranda, 
Memorandum Afghanistan.
Memorandum - Afghanistan Frontier 
Demarcation, Hari Rud to Oxus, 
pts* i - v*
Memorandum - Indo-Afghan 
Demarcation.
Agreement with Amir, Parliamentary 
Questions, Chitral, Kafiristan, etc
Narrative of recent events in 
Afghanistan from the recovery of 
Kandahar to the conclusion of the 
rebellion of Yacoob Khan,
(1868 - 1871)•
Summary of events in Afghanistan 
from Dost Mohammad’s death to the 
battle of Sheikhabad, 1863 - 1871. 
With precis by Mr. Wyllie.
Memorandum on Afghan Affairs from 
1700*
Recent events in Afghanistan,
1866 - 1868.
Continuation of Mr. Wyllie’s precis
Precis of correspondence showing 
the policy and relations of the 
British Government towards 
Afghanistan, 1872 - 1879-
285
Bo43 1880 E.G. Hastings
B.44 1880 E.G. Hastings
B ,45 1880 E.G. Hastings
13.46 1880 E.G. Hastings
B .47 1888
B ,104 1893 A.H. Mason
B.107A
B ,182 1910
B o 220 1914
B,192 1919
Genealogical tree of the Peshawari 
sardars of the Barakzai family.
Genealogical table showing the 
Kabuli and Pie rati sardars and 
others.
Genealogical tree of the Kandahari 
sardars of the Barakzai family.
Genealogical tree of the reigning 
branch of the Barakzai family.
Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, 
Sardars and Others of Afghanistan. 
Report on the Mahsud Waziri tribe 
wi th map.
Treaties with Afghanistan (Amir Dost 
Mohammad Khan).
A dictionary of the Pathan tribes 
on the north-west frontier of India.
Who’s Who in Afghanistan.
Routes south of the Kabul river.
(Political and Secret Department Memoranda)
A, 5 1869 T. Wheeler Afghan Turkistan
A.W, MooreA, 21 
A «28
1878
1879 Report of the 
Court of 
Enquiry
Afghanistan? historical sketch.
Attack on the British Embassy 
at Kabul.
A ,30 1879 H, Grey Affairs of Afghanistan
285
A.31 1879 R.H.P. Bennick
A ,32 1880 Sir 0*T. Burne
A, 33 1880
A ,36 1880
Members of the 
Political 
Committee
A.34 1880 Lord Lytton
A.35 1880 Members of the
Political
Committee
Sir W.
Merwether
A.37 1880 Sir 0,1. Burne
A.38 1880 Sir 0,1, Burne
A.39 1880 Sir H. Borman
A .40 1880 Sir H.
Rawlinson
A .41 1880 Lord Napier
of Magdala
A.42 1880 Sir 0,T, Burne
A .43 1881 A,W. Moore
A,44 1881 H .¥, Wylie
A.46 1882 H. Waterfield
Afghanistan; Selection of an Amir,
Recognition of Sardar Sher Ali 
as an independent ruler of Kandahar
Affairs in northern Afghanistan.
Political situation in northern 
Afghanistan.
Notes on the "Herat Question".
Position of affairs in Afghanistan,
Negotiations with Abdur Rahman.
Russian correspondence found 
at Kabul.
Note on the retention of Kandahar,
Note on the retention of Kandahar.
Note on the retention of Kandahar.
Kabul family roll.
Narrative of events in Afghanistan, 
August 1878 to December 1880.
Pishin
Relations of the Amir of 
Afghanistan with the Badshah 
of Kunar.
287
A.47 1882 A.W. Moore
A • 48 
A »49 
A.50
A * 51
A.52
A.54
1882 G-o Napier
1883
1884
1884
1884
1886
A,53 1886
A o 68 1885
A.69 1885
Departmental
Dote
Sir O.T. Burne
Sir H.
Rawlinson
A.W. Moore
E. Neel
A.W. Moore 
Sir O.T. Burne
Relations of the Amir of 
Afghanistan with the Badshah of 
Kunar and the Khan of Dalpura.
Undefined frontiers between 
Persia, Afghanistan and Russia.
Afghanistan; disposition of the 
Amir's troops.
Policy towards Afghanistan in 
consequence of Russia's actions 
with regard to the Merv Turcomans
Shighnan and Roshan
Correspondence relative to the 
boundary of Afghanistan; Questions 
of Shighnan. 2 pts.
Correspondence in regard to the 
demarcation of the north-west 
frontier of Afghanistan from the 
Hari Rud to the Oxus. 2 pts.
Correspondence of the Amir of 
Afghanistan (Abdur Raliman) with 
the Viceroy of India and others.
2 pts.
North-west boundary of Afghanistan 
between the Hari Rud and the Oxus 
Rivers•
Central Asia and Afghanistan; 
Chronological table of events from
1855.
A. 70 1886 Strength of Afghan troops in 
Turkistan and Badakhshan,
1886
1886
1887
1887
1887
1888
1891
1892
1892
1892
1892
1895
1895
1896
268
Sir R. 
Sandeman
Sir R, 
Sandeman
T.H. Holdich
I.H. Holdich
Departmental
Note
Departmental
Note
Sir C. Bayley 
W.N.S.
Sir A.C. Lyall
Sir S.C. 
Bayley
Sir S.C. 
Bayley
F . E . Y oung- 
husband
Future policy in Afghanistan.
Boundary of the Quetta District.
Geographical results of the 
Afghan Boundary Commission.
Report on survey operations in 
western and north-western 
Afghanistan.
Military resources of the Amir 
of Afghanistan.
Indian Frontier policy.
Afghanistan: question of succession.
Extent and objects of the proposed 
delimitation in the Pamir region.
The responsibilities of Her 
Majesty’s Government for Afghan 
foreign relations.
Delimitation in the Upper Oxus 
territories.
Afghanistan; agreement with Russia 
of 1872-5? Upper Oxus question.
Notes on Chitral with reference 
to the murder of Nizam ul-Mulk 
and Umra Khan’s invasion.
Visit of Shahzadah Nasrullah Khan 
of Afghanistan to England.
Sir W. Dee 
Warner
Kafiristan
1896
1896
1896
1887
1886
1885
1880
1889
1887
1897
1884
289
Sir W. Lee-
War ner
A.C, Lyall
Sir W. Lee- 
Warner
Sir O.T. Burne
Resolution of 
the Political 
Committee
P. Roberts 
E. Barington
E. Baring
Sir R.
Sandeman
A. J.
Sir Ac Lyall
Sir W. Lee- 
Warner
R. Miohell
Memorandum on British relations 
with Afghanistan.
The Afghan succession and Russia’s 
advance.
Policy in regard to Afghanistan. 
The Afghan succession.
Afghanistan: Amir Sher Ali and 
negotiations with Abdur Rahman 
(MS. copy).
Afghanistan: disordered conditions, 
Russian aggression.
The defence of north-west frontier 
of India.
Negotiations with the Russian 
Government for the demarcation of 
the boundary of Afghanistan since 
the annexation of Merv.
The retention of Kandahar and Pishin.
Present position on the north­
western frontier.
The Afghan question.
Afghanistan: Russia’s advance.
North-west frontier affairs.
North-west frontier affairs.
Russian advance in central Asia.
290
A.137 1898
A.140
A .142 1889
A.143 1889
A *144 1899
A.147 1900
A.155 1901
A.157 1902
Parliamentary 
Year Vol.
1879 £VI
Sir W. Lee- 
Warner and 
Lord Curzon
Sir D* Fitz 
Patrick
A.H.M.
Sir A.C. Lyall
Question of the Afghan succession
Our relations with the tribes on 
north-west frontier.
Distribution of Afghan troops.
Minutes of correspondence with 
the Amir of Afghanistan.
J.G. Lorimer Strength of the Afghan troops.
Russian assurances in regard to 
Afghanistan, 1869 “ 1885•
Collection of agreements and 
treaties with Afghanistan.
R. Ritchie Afghanistan, the engagements with 
the late Amir.
papers
C ommand 
No. Title
2190 Correspondence respecting the relations
between the British Government and 
Afghanistan since the accession of the 
Ameer Shere Ali Khan*
2191 Further papers relating to the affairs
of Afghanistan.
2250 Further papers relating to the affairs
of Afghanistan.
2401
2402
Further correspondence. 
Further correspondence.
291
Year Vol. Go“ d
J \i 0  o
1880 Llll 2457
2690
2736
1881 LXX 2776
2811
2852
2865
1896 LX 8042
1896 LX1 262
Title
Correspondence relating to the affairs 
of Afghanistan*
Papers relating to the advance of Ayoob 
Khan and Kandahar*
Further papers*
Further correspondence relating to the 
affairs of Afghanistan, including the 
recognition of Sirdar Abdul Rahman 
Khan as Amir of Kabul.
Papers relating to the occupation 
of Kandahar*
Further papers relating to the 
occupation of Kandahar*
Further correspondence relating to the 
affairs of Afghanistan, including the 
transfer of the Administration of 
Kandahar to Amir Abdul Rahman Khan*
Agreement signed by Mr. R. Udny and 
Sipah Salar Ghulam Haidar Khan, Joint 
Commissioners for laying down the 
Afghan boundary from the Hindu Kush 
range to Fawa. Kotal, confirmed 
19th December 1895•
Correspondence relating to Afghan 
proceedings in Kafiristan.
General Bibliographies
Akram, M„
Blumhard, i 
MacKenzie,
Ivanovna , f] 
North, R,
Adamec, L.‘ 
Aitchison,
Alder, G.J
Argyll, D.
8 th Duke
Bakhsh, P.
Bibliographe analytique de 
Afghanistan, Paris, 1947.
F.P. and Catalogue of Pashto manuscripts in the
D.N. libraries of the British Isles,
London, 1965 -
]. A bibliography of Russian articles on
Afghanistan (Russian text), Akademiya 
Narodov Azii, 1965*
The literature of the North-West Frontier 
of India, A Select Bibliography, 1945.
Bibliography of Russian works on 
Afghanistan, (Russian-English text), 
Central Asian Research Centre,
London, 1956.
Printed Books
. Afghanistan, 1900 - 1923? Berkeley, 1967
Sir C.U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements
and Sanads relating to India and 
Neighbouring Countries, 4th edn., 
Calcutta, 1§09*
British India* s Northern Frontier 
1865 - 95, London, 1963.
3-. Campbell, The Eastern Question, 2 Vols., 
of London, 1879.
Translations of a report on Badakhshan, 
Balkh, and Bokhara (Selections from the 
records of the Government of the Pan^ab 
confidential. Series No. All, 1871).
293
Balfour, B.
Barrow, Sir E.G.
Bellew, H.W.
11
! t
11
1
1
Biddulph, Jo
Caroe, Sir O.Ii. 
Curzon, G-.L., Marquis
Davies, C.C.
Ditcher, D.
Downse, E.
Durand, A • G-. A •
Durand, H . M « 
Elphinstone, M.
The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian 
Administration, 1876 - 1880, London, 1899*
Confidential G-azeteer of Dardistan and 
Kafiristan, Calcutta, 1885.
Afghanistan and the Afghans, London, 1879.
An Inquiry into the Ethnography of 
Afghanistan, London, 1891.
The Races of Afghanistan, London, 1880.
Afghanistan and its late Amir, London, 1902
Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857? 
London, 1862.
Eorth-West Frontier and Afghanistan,
Lahore, 1879.
The Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh, London, 
1880.
The Pathans, London, 1958.
A Recent Journey in Afghanistan,
London, 1895.
The Problem of the Eorth-West Frontier ~ 
1890 - 1908, Cambridge, 1952.
The Eorth—West Frontier of West 
Pakistan, Oxford, 1967.
Kafiristan, London, 1875.
The Making of a Frontier, London, 1900.
The Amir Abdur Rahman, London, 1907.
An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul,
2 Vols., London, 1652.
294
Fletcher, A. 
Forbes, A,
Ghose, 33 *12.
Gopal, B.
Gray, J.A. 
Grierson, Sir G.A.
Habberton, W*
Hamilton, A.
Hamilton, Lady
Hanna, K.B.
Hensman, H. 
Holdich, Sir T.H.
Jarring, G*
Jenkyns, VI*
Leitner, G*W*
n
MacGregor, C .M .
Afghanistan, Connecticut (U.S.A.), 1965*
The Afghan Wars, London, 1892*
England and Afghanistan, Calcutta, I960.
The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1880 - 4, 
Oxford, 1953*
At the Court of the Amir, London, 1895*
Linguistic Survey of India, and the 
Census of 1911, Calcutta, 1919*
Anglo-Russian Relations concerning 
Afghanistan, Illinois (U.S.A.), 1937*
Afghanistan, London, 1906*
A Vizier1s Laughter, a tale of the 
Hazara war, London, 1900*
The Second Afghan War, 1878 - 79? 3 Vols* 
London, 1899 - 1910.
The Afghan War of 1879 - B0, London, 1881
Indian Borderland 1880 - 1900, 2nd edn*, 
London, 1909-
On the Distribution of Turk Tribes in 
Afghanistan, Lund, Leipzig-, 1939*
A Report on the Jalalabad District, 
Calcutta, 1880*
The Languages and Races of Dardistan, 
Lahore, 1877*
Dardistan in 1895? Woking, 1895*
Central Asia, part 2, Afghanistan, 
Calcutta, 1871*
295
Macmunn, Sir G- 
MacNair, W.W*
Mahomed, S .
Afghanistan, London, 1929•
Confidential Report on the explorations 
in part of Eastern Afghanistan and in 
Kafiristan during 1883? Dehra Dun, 1885.
The Constitutions and Laws of 
Afghanistan, London, 1900,
The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2 Vols,,
London, 1900,
Under the Absolute Amir, London, 1907•
Umra Khan and the Chitral Campaign of 
1895? Lahore, 1897.
Brief Account of Recent Transaction 
in Afghanistan, London, 1929*
The Foundations of India's Foreign 
Policy, 1860 - 82, Vol. 1, Calcutta, 1955
Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880 - 1900, 
Calcutta, 1965*
Notes on Afghanistan and Baluchistan, 
London, 1888.
" Ethnographical Notes on Afghanistan,
1880 - 83, London, 1883*
Report of the Sub-Committee under Lord Lawrence,
Causes of the Afghan War, London, 1879*
Martin, F„
Newman, Ho
Northbrook, Earl of
Prasad, B*
Rastogi, R.S.
Raverty, H.G-.
Ridgway, R.I.T
Robertson, C.G-.
Robertson, Sir G-.S
ft
(1
Pathans, Calcutta, 1910.
Kurram, Kabul and Kandahar, London, 1881,
Kafiristan and its People, London, 1895*
The Kafirs of the Hindu Kush, London, 1896
Confidential Report on a Journey to 
Kafiristan, London, 1894*
Chitral, London, 1898
296
Robinson* J.A.
Robinson* P.
S c hurmann, H . P .
Shadbolt* S.H.
Shakur, M.A.H. 
Singhal, D.P.
Sykes, Sir P.
Thornton, E.
Thornton E. and
Warburton, R.
Wheeler, S. 
Wilber, D.
Yate, A.C.
Yate, C.E.
Rotes on the Romad Tribes of Eastern 
Afghanistan, London, 1935«
Caubul, The Ameer Shair Ali, His 
Country and His People, London, 1878.
The Mongols of Afghanistan, The Hague,
1962.
The Afghan Campaigns, 1878 - 80, 2 Vols., 
London, 1882.
The Red Kafirs, Peshawar, 1946.
India and Afghanistan, 1876 - 1907» 
University of Queensland Press, 1963.
A History of Afghanistan, 2 Vols.,
London, 1940.
Life of Sir M. Durand, London, 1926.
G-azetteer of Countries adjacent to 
India, 2 Vols., London, 1844.
Anne Leaves from an Afghan Scrapbook,
London, 1910.
Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879 - 1898, 
London, 1900.
The Amir Abdur Rahman, London, 1895.
Afghanistan, Uewhaven, 1956.
England and Russia Pace to Pace in 
Asia, London, 1887.
northern Afghanistan, London, 1888.
Articles
Bacon, E.E,
Cervin, V.
Curzon, Lord
Laly, Mrs. K.
Davies, C.C. 
Frye, R.L* 
Griffin, Sir L,
it
t
Curd on, B . E . K . 
Hamilton, A. 
Hamilton, Lady
Huart, C .
Afghanistan, E.I., London, Vol. 1,
I960, 217 - 233»
An Inquiry into the History of the 
Hazara Mongol of Afghanistan, South- 
West Journal of Anthropology, 7 (1951)?
230 - 247.
Problems in the Integration of the 
Afghan Ration, Middle Eastern Journal,
Vol. VI, 1952.
Lectures on Afghanistan, Transactions 
of the Royal Geological Society, 1895*
Eight Years among the Afghans, Wide 
World Magazine, '1905.
1 Abd a 1 “Rahman, E.I., I960, Vol. 1, 87.
Ghalzay, E.I., Vol. ‘2, 1965? London, 1001.
Amir Abdur Rahman, Fortnightly Review, 
1893.
Peace or War, Fortnightly Review, 1885.
The Late Amir and his Successor, 
Fortnightly Review, 1901.
Early Explorers in Kafiristan,
The Himalayan Journal, Vol VIII, 1936.
Indo-Afghan Relations under Lord Curzon, 
Fortnightly Review, Vol. LXXX.
Lectures on Amir Abdur Rahman at the 
Imperial Institute, Indian Magazine,
June, 1898.
Qizil-bash, E.I. Vol. 2, London, 1927.
293
Hanna, H.B.
Harrison, Ho
t
Raverty, H.G-. 
Rawlinson, Sir H.C.
ti
f !
ti
Ridgeway, W. 
Robinson, E.K, 
Thornton, A. P.
Yapp, M.E,
it
Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 
Fortnightly Review, 1901*
Martial Law in Kabul, pt. 1, Fortnightly 
Review, 1879*
Martial Law in Kabul, pt 2, Fortnightly 
Review, 1880.
An Account of Upper and Lower Suwat and 
the Kohistan, Journal of the Asiatic 
Society of Bengal, XXXI (1862), 227*
On Badakhshan and Wakhan, Proceedings 
of the Royal Geographical Society,
XVII (1872 - 73), 108.
The Afghan Crisis, The Nineteenth 
Century, 1877*
The Results of the Afghan War, The 
Nineteenth Century, 1879*
The Situation in Afghanistan, The 
Nineteenth Century, 1880.
The New Afghan Frontier, The Nineteenth 
Century, 1887*
The Afghan Alliance, Fortnightly Review, 
1895*
Afghanistan in Anglo-Russian Diplomacy, 
1869 - 73, Cambridge Historical Journal, 
XI, (1953 - 55), 204*
Durrani, E.I., Vol. 2, London, 1965? 628,
Disturbances in eastern Afghanistan,
1859 » 42, BSOAS, Vol. XXV, pt 3? 1962.
Disturbances in western Afghanistan,
1839 - 41, BSOAS, Vol. XXVI, pt 2, 1963-
The revolutions of 1841 - 2 in Afghanistan 
BSOAS, XXVII, pt 2, 1964*
Theses
Bacon, E.E.
C oughlin, R . L .
Durrani, M.A.
Hale, W*M.
Harris, L.
J ennings, M . J .
Jones, E.
Israr ud-Din 
Kundu, N .
Lunger, A . J ,
Uberoi, J.P. Singh 
Yapp, M.E.
The Hazara Mongol of Afghanistan: A Study 
in Social Organisation, Ph.D., Berkeley, 
1951c
British Policy in Persia, 1885 - 1907, 
London, 1953 - 54.
N.W.F.P., M.A., London, 1940 - 41.
Afghanistan, Britain and Russia, 1905 - 21 
Ph.D., Australian National University,
1966.
British Policy on the North-West Frontier 
of India, 1889 - 1901, Ph.D., London,
I960.
Anglo-Russian Relations concerning 
Afghanistan, 1882 - 1886, M.A., London, 
1953*
Anglo-Russian Relations from 1878 to 
1885 with Special Reference to Central 
Asia, M.A., Wales, 1934.
A Social Geography of Chitral State,
M.Sc., London, 1965.
The Afghan Policy of Lord Lawrence 
1876 - 1880, M.A., London, 1958.
The Economic Background of the Russian 
Conquest of Central Asia, Ph.D.,
London, 1953*
"Social Organisation of the Tajiks of 
Andarab valley, Afghanistan'1 , Ph.D., 
Australian National University,
Canberra, 1965.
British Policy in Central Asia,
1830 - 43, Ph.D., London, 1959*
300
Pamphlets published in Kabul by or 
by the order of Amir 1Abd al-Rahman
Anonymous A Book of Precepts? 1887-
" Risala-i-Islamiyya? 1887-
” Almanac? 1887-
" Rasihat Hamcha (in Pashto)? 1886.
” Targhib al*-Jehad? 25 Rajab? 1304 A.H. ?
PSLI? 1887? 50? 892.
,f Taqwim al-Din? 1887-
u Saif al-Zafar (in Pashto? on the
conquest of Kafiristan)? 1896.
n Kitabcha-i-Hukumati ? IGA? 39 „
Asas-al-Quzzat, IG-A, 39-
1 Mu' f as a-i-Afghani (Pashto)? Kabul, 1311
A.H,? (1894)? PSLI? 101? Ho. 351-
Kabi? Mirza M, (Babir al Sawal x^ra J awab-i-I) owl at i ? 1885- 
Mulk? Ha'ib al-Sultanat- 
i-D owl at-i-Khudad ad-i - 
Afghanistan)
Rahman, Amir 1 Abd al- Mir*at al-'Aql, 1891? PSLI? 62? 834-
11 Sarishta-i-Islamiyya-i-Rum? 1304 A.H.
" Kalamat-i- Jehad al-Man sub Allah Amir al
Balad? 1888? PSLI? 55? 995-
1 The Marriage Customs and the Social Life
of the Afghans (unpublished)?
The Life of Abdur Rahman? 2? 250.
3oi
Rahman, Amir ! Ahd al
ti
Rahman, Khan-i-Mulla 
Qazi 1 Abd al-
Yusuf, Mulla
The Words of the Amir, 1887* 
Merat al-Quluh, 1894 . 
Risalay-i-iMajiyya, 1886 .
Grhaza, 1887*
